Pacific Garrison or Contingency Force? Implications ofthe New National Security Strategy for the Marine Corps

President Bush’s announcement of his vision for a new national security strategy for the post-Cold War world, on 2 August 1990 at the Aspen Institute, was initially overshadowed by an event on the other side of the world-Saddam Hussein\u27s invasion of Kuwait. However, with the ensuing Gulf war victory and the diminution in the Soviet threat, the administration\u27s plans to reduce the overall size of the Department of Defense by almost one-third started to receive deserved attention in Congress and in the press

Sea Basing—Concept, Issues, and Recommendations

In a flat or shrinking defense budget, resources for the joint capability of sea basing will become contentious. However, a prudent strategy for the United States in uncertain times is to balance long-range capabilities based in the continental United States with highly maneuverable and well defended sea bases

Foreign Policy for America in the Twenty-first Century:Alternative Perspectives

A brief, clean-cutting compendium with six well known scholarly contribu- tors, Henriksen’s volume illuminates the current cardinal directions in the debate over American foreign policy—unilateral versus multilateral interven- tionism along one axis, and aggressive promotion of democracy (or global markets) versus conservative harboring of national strength on the other. Be- hind this compass hides the more theo- retical discussion of whether the United States needs or could possibly maintain a grand strategy in the absence of an immediate national security threat

Disadvantages Ashore—Constraints on Achieving Integrated All-Domain Naval Power

Strategists and analysts should be aware that the recently issued triservices strategy suffers from at least six political-bureaucratic-doctrinal disadvantages that very easily could turn into material disadvantages if the U.S. Navy were to face a competent enemy on the actual oceans

Antiaccess Warfare as Strategy

Thinking about the concept of antiaccess warfare may be likened to thinking about the Renaissance. Leonardo da Vinci, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Dante Alighieri did not know that they were part of a renaissance; they simply experimented, strategized, and wrote in a fashion that seemed logical to them and appropriate to their times. It was the nineteenth-century European historian Jules Michelet who “discovered” that “the Renaissance” had occurred