Renegotiating the Odious Debt Doctrine

Following the United States\u27 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq,\u27 the US government argued that the successor government in Iraq was not responsible for Iraq\u27s Saddam-era debt under the purported doctrine of odious-regime debt. This purported doctrine apparently excused--by operation of law--all successor regimes from repaying debts that were incurred by oppressive predecessor regimes. Here, Cheng presents three-part response regarding the purported rule that oppressive debts of a predecessor government do not bind its successor

Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration

This Article\u27s thesis is that, although arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration are not formally bound by precedent in the same manner as common-law judges, there is an informal, but powerful, system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to account for prior published awards and to stabilize international investment law. This informal system, however, imperfectly supports the relevant policy goals. It is additionally being tested by an increasing diversity of arbitrators, who are themselves facing pressures from investors and host States to meet conflicting demands. This Article proposes that the structure of investment treaty arbitration can absorb such stresses if: (a) the system of precedent is clarified and publicized to enable the global community to appraise awards and the arbitrators who render them; (b) investors and States exercise care in their selection of arbitrators; and (c) the community of international arbitrators exercises sufficient informal self-regulation and self-selection. This thesis is developed in three Parts. Part I discusses the concept and policies of precedent as it has developed in courts. Part II examines the extent to which these policies apply to investment treaty arbitration, and whether investment treaty arbitration has a system of precedent that promotes the relevant policy goals. Part III makes recommendations to further refine the system of precedent in response to emerging global trends, such as the economic growth of the People\u27s Republic of China and an increasing diversity of arbitrators from both developed and developing States

Precedent and Control in Investment Treaty Arbitration

This Article\u27s thesis is that, although arbitrators in investment treaty arbitration are not formally bound by precedent in the same manner as common-law judges, there is an informal, but powerful, system of precedent that constrains arbitrators to account for prior published awards and to stabilize international investment law. This informal system, however, imperfectly supports the relevant policy goals. It is additionally being tested by an increasing diversity of arbitrators, who are themselves facing pressures from investors and host States to meet conflicting demands. This Article proposes that the structure of investment treaty arbitration can absorb such stresses if: (a) the system of precedent is clarified and publicized to enable the global community to appraise awards and the arbitrators who render them; (b) investors and States exercise care in their selection of arbitrators; and (c) the community of international arbitrators exercises sufficient informal self-regulation and self-selection. This thesis is developed in three Parts. Part I discusses the concept and policies of precedent as it has developed in courts. Part II examines the extent to which these policies apply to investment treaty arbitration, and whether investment treaty arbitration has a system of precedent that promotes the relevant policy goals. Part III makes recommendations to further refine the system of precedent in response to emerging global trends, such as the economic growth of the People\u27s Republic of China and an increasing diversity of arbitrators from both developed and developing States

Power, Norms, and International Intellectual Property Law

This Article begins with the premise that international law is the net result of global processes of interactions among state and non-state participants in the international system. The Article builds on the author’s previous work by proposing a theory of international law that fills the interstices between private and public international law. Participants generally deploy power and invoke legal and social norms in pursuit of interests and in response to the strategies of other participants. Eventually, outcomes that reflect both power and norms result, and these outcomes in turn modify norms and reallocate power. New outcomes then follow in future conflicts in an iterative, evolutionary, interactive process. This Article tests this thesis against the global intellectual property (IP) system. International IP scholarship should account for power and could be enriched by the typology presented in this Article because international IP law lacks a comprehensive set of enforceable legal norms

Power, Norms, and International Intellectual Property Law

This Article begins with the premise that international law is the net result of global processes of interactions among state and non-state participants in the international system. The Article builds on the author’s previous work by proposing a theory of international law that fills the interstices between private and public international law. Participants generally deploy power and invoke legal and social norms in pursuit of interests and in response to the strategies of other participants. Eventually, outcomes that reflect both power and norms result, and these outcomes in turn modify norms and reallocate power. New outcomes then follow in future conflicts in an iterative, evolutionary, interactive process. This Article tests this thesis against the global intellectual property (IP) system. International IP scholarship should account for power and could be enriched by the typology presented in this Article because international IP law lacks a comprehensive set of enforceable legal norms

The Central Case Approach to Human Rights: Its Universal Application and the Singapore Example

Human rights situations are often analyzed and described in binary terms, that is, whether rights have been violated or upheld. This Article argues that it is more meaningful to measure human rights situations in terms of deviations from a central case of key characteristics, and to understand the subtle interplay of social, political, and economic vectors that cause such deviations. Using Singapore as a case study, this Article demonstrates that in any State the real human rights situation revealed by central case analysis can be dramatically different than the traditional binary assessment of that situation. The Article concludes by showing how the central case methodology can be used by all decision-makers in every State to promote human rights, with particular reference to recent disputes over Muslim minority rights in France and Singapore, and the executive detention of enemy combatants in the United States