Comparison of the Optimal Production Path of Buy Back and Production Sharing Contracts: A Case Study of Foruzan Oil Field

In this study, the optimum oil production pattern from the Frouzan oil field is extracted and compared using the generalized reduced gradient (GRG) optimal control method in the framework of Buy Back contract in the form of a scenario and the framework of the Production Sharing Contract in terms of different amounts of profit oil ratio in the three scenarios. Comparing the optimal route of oil production from the field in the framework of these two contracts, it is concluded that the annual production level and cumulative production will increase by increasing the ratio of profit oil and subsequently increasing the share of the contractor (or foreign oil company) as the operator of the production sharing contract. The optimum increases from the Forouzan field and by increasing the mentioned ratio from a threshold value, it is even higher than the level of annual production and optimal accumulation of the Buy-Back contract

Corrigendum to "Repeated stimulation of the dorsolateral-prefrontal cortex improves executive dysfunctions and craving in drug addiction: A randomized, double-blind, parallel-group study" [Brain Stimul 13 (3) (2020) 582-593].

n/

Risk Sharing in First, Second and Third Generation of Buyback Development Contracts

Risk sharing between international oil companies and hosting countries is one of the most important issues in oil contracts. This paper studies the risk sharing between National Iranian Oil Company (Government) and IOCs in three generations of buy back contracts. IOCs’ Risk in buyback contracts are cost risk, delay risk, failure to achievement to production profile and declining oil price. Government’s risks are no conservative production, declining oil production, cost risk and overestimated cost risk. This paper shows cost and failure to achievement to production profile risks for IOCs and no conservative production, declining oil production risks for government have more significant effects on projects profitability. In the first generation of buyback contract, there is not suitable mechanism to manage these risks. In the third generation of buy back contracts, main risks are significantly decreased and the expected risks of parties are declined. within the decreasing the risks of IOCs in third generation of buyback contracts, IOCs reward has been increased. It seems incompatible with risk and reward sharing in contracts

Optimal Oil Production Path in the Production Sharing Contract and Compare it with the Contractor's Production Specified in the Buy Back contract

The choice of contract type in oil fields has always been one of the main and problematic challenges in Iran and elying in making decisions in this regard leads to a dely or non-investment. On the other hand, one of the ways to recognize the components of bargaining power is to recognize and evaluate various types of international contracts. Therefore, in thiss study, while introducing the fiscal model of the contractual agreement concluded in Iran, as well as a combination of contracts for participation in traditional production in Azerbaijan with Joint venture, has been applied to financial simulation in Duroud oil field. After explaining the optimization problem using the generalized reduction gradient method, the optimal production path from the perspective of the parties to the contract is estimated andcompared with the production path specified in the buy back contract. The results show that the use of share-based indicators of project revenues and the net present value of a project for evaluate of oil contracts can be misleading. The oil production path agreed in the Buy back contract is higher than the optimal production path from the perspective of both sides of the combined contract. Tthis is due to the desire of the International Oil Company to rapidly capture capex and remuneration fee in the shortest possible time. Increase in recoverable reserves due to gas injection (presented in MDP), which was approved in buy back contract is less than its optimal amount from the viewpoint of Joint venture in a hybrid contract. This indicates that the proposed hybrid contract is closer to the Maximum Effective Rate and Maximum Final Recovery from Oilfields than the conventional buy back agreement in Iran

Designing Model of Associated Petroleum Gas Pricing with Emphasis on sale of Gas to NGL Units: Case Study of Feed Pricing of NGL-3200

The survey of Associated Petroleum Gas (APG) flaring illustrate that about 40 million cubic meter of APG have flared in oil operating regions at 1395 year. High volume of Associated Petroleum Gas (APG) flaring and problem of Notional Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) for execution of APG gathering plans has led to do policies such as auction of APG and transfer of NGL units to private sector by this company. Requisite for implementation of this policies that means present private sector in APG gathering plans is creation of given set up and framework in relations between NIOC and private sector. One of the cases that has important role in APG plans, is determined APG Pricing Model. So in this paper, meanwhile explained gas pricing models, a model was suggested for APG pricing. The main results of this study is pricing model for APG assuming sale to NGL unit such as NGL-3200 in which this model is based on fundamental principles such as type of use APG, gas quality, environmental issues, thermal value of gas and liquid content. Moreover, employing this model for feed pricing of NGL-3200 unit shows that minimum and maximum of APG price for this unit 5 and 8.2 cent per cubic meters Respectively. Also, sensitivity analysis presents that change of utilization rate, price of product from APG processing and capital cost can be effective on APG pric

A Comparative Analysis of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) Articles of Association during 1954-1978: Proposing a Number of Principles of the New Articles of Association

National Iranian Oil Company as the second largest oil company in the world and the biggest business complex of Iran has an undeniable importance in Iran, and its activities and management have significant impact on economic and political spheres of the country. The issue of reforming the NIOC articles of association has been a matter of discussion for years in the legislative and administration departments. The stated reasons could be the separation of state duties from the company duties, defining company’s scope of work, omission of additional advantages and adjustment with the new upstream legislations. This study is an attempt to answer the question of “what are the features and principles of a desirable NIOC articles of association?” This question is dealt with by analyzing the past NIOC articles of association as well as examining the selected similar articles of association from National Oil Companies world-wide. Based on this analysis, the acts such as concentration of NIOC on company duties and administrative affairs, not being involved in government affairs and subsequently submission of all the responsibilities and authorizations related to conservation, controlling and supervision on upstream activities to The Ministry of Petroleum are suggested to the National Iranian Oil Company. Considering the professional and business essence of NIOC responsibilities, the activities of the company must be performed in a competitive context with no specific exclusive advantage. More specifically, NIOC can succeed in a competitive environment only under the circumstances of facing the risks inherent in its activities

Investigating the Effects of Pricing Mechanism of Rich Gas on the Take of the Parties in the Development Contract of Phase 11 of South Pars

The contract for the development of phase 11 of South Pars has been signed by a consortium of Total in France with a share of (51%), CNPC in China (30%), and Petropars Iran (19.9%) in July 2017. By using a comprehensive and accurate model designed in this research, all the aspects of the mentioned project, including technical issues, production profile, gas price, project costs, and project revenues were evaluated financially and economically with the consideration of the fiscal and economic components of the development contract in the dynamic manner. Finally, regarding the results, executive suggestions were stated in order to improve the fiscal regime of the contract. According to the findings, the fiscal regime of the contract is so-called regressive and the revenue increase or decrease has no effect on the contractor’s profitability. The most significant drawback of the contract is the pricing mechanism of the produced gas, causing a false price followed by an overestimate of the project’s profit and underestimate of the contractor's take and creating an implicit obligation for repaying the contractor’s dues from their revenues of other hydrocarbon fields of the country in the case of petroleum and gas condensate price drop. The results show that during rich gas pricing, in the case of realistic pricing of the produced gas, the foreign contractor's discounted take would increase from 6% to 27%, and on the opposite side, the government's take would decrease from 92% to 67%