Where are the returns to lifelong learning?

Participation in formal education during adulthood (ages 25 to 54) is a key part of lifelong learning. Employing unique longitudinal data for Australia, we highlight the prevalence of such study, the varied reasons for undertaking it (consumption, career development, job and home disruption), and investigate whether it is socially valuable. Our more detailed estimates of the labour market return to adult education (wage rates, employment, hours of work and occupational status) confirm previous studies that generally found such returns to be small and isolated. We contribute to this literature by also estimating the effect of adult education on job satisfaction and satisfaction with employment opportunities. Increases in satisfaction help rationalise the education enrolment decisions of these adults

Diffusion of Multiple Information: On Information Resilience and the Power of Segregation

We introduce two pieces of information, denoted memes, into a diffusion process in which memes are transmitted when individuals meet and forgotten at an exogenous rate. At most one meme can be transmitted at a meeting, which introduces opportunity costs in the process. Individuals differ according to which meme thy find more interesting, and that is the one they transmit if they face a choice. We find that both memes survive under the same parameter values, and that relative interest is the main determinant in the number of people informed of a meme in the long run. We apply our framework to analyze the impact of segregation and find that segregation leads to polarization. Segregation also reduces the overall number of people informed in the long run. Our final set of results shows that agents are more likely to prefer segregation if their information preferences are more extreme, if they have few social contacts, or if they prefer a meme that is preferred by only a small fraction of the population

Diffusion of Multiple Information: On Information Resilience and the Power of Segregation

We introduce two pieces of information, denoted memes, into a diffusion process in which memes are transmitted when individuals meet and forgotten at an exogenous rate. At most one meme can be transmitted at a meeting, which introduces opportunity costs in the process. Individuals differ according to which meme thy find more interesting, and that is the one they transmit if they face a choice. We find that both memes survive under the same parameter values, and that relative interest is the main determinant in the number of people informed of a meme in the long run. We apply our framework to analyze the impact of segregation and find that segregation leads to polarization. Segregation also reduces the overall number of people informed in the long run. Our final set of results shows that agents are more likely to prefer segregation if their information preferences are more extreme, if they have few social contacts, or if they prefer a meme that is preferred by only a small fraction of the population

Are Patent Citations Driven by Quality?

The present paper builds a simple model of patent citations not based on the rich-get-richer aspect of preferential attachment. In our model the dynamics of citations are driven by known heterogeneities in the applicability of existing patents and aging. The model matches closely the hazard rates of citations for the vast majority of patents in a random sample of patents granted by the USPTO between 1975 and 1999. Furthermore, we show that the long run distribution of patent citations is well fitted when the distribution of applicability across patents follows a Gamma-distribution. We also discuss the possibility that popularity of patents might influence citation decisions if innovators are not perfectly informed about patents' applicability. We find that popularity matters but the size of the effect is very small. Finally, the possibility to distinguish between citations to patents within the same class and to different classes allows us to show that the magnitude of the influence of popularity is increasing in technological distance

Are Patent Citations Driven by Quality?

The present paper builds a simple model of patent citations not based on the rich-get-richer aspect of preferential attachment. In our model the dynamics of citations are driven by known heterogeneities in the applicability of existing patents and aging. The model matches closely the hazard rates of citations for the vast majority of patents in a random sample of patents granted by the USPTO between 1975 and 1999. Furthermore, we show that the long run distribution of patent citations is well fitted when the distribution of applicability across patents follows a Gamma-distribution. We also discuss the possibility that popularity of patents might influence citation decisions if innovators are not perfectly informed about patents' applicability. We find that popularity matters but the size of the effect is very small. Finally, the possibility to distinguish between citations to patents within the same class and to different classes allows us to show that the magnitude of the influence of popularity is increasing in technological distance

Risk Aversion in a Model of Endogenous Growth

Despite the evidence on incomplete financial markets and substantial risk being borne by innovators, current models of growth through creative destruction predominantly model innovators’ as risk neutral. Risk aversion is expected to reduce the incentive to innovate and we might fear that without insurance innovation completely disappears in the long run. The present paper introduces risk averse agents into an occupational choice model of endogenous growth in which insurance against failure to innovate is not available. We derive a clear negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and long run growth. Surprisingly, we show that in an equilibrium there exists a cut-off value of risk aversion below which the growth rate of the mass of innovators tends to a strictly positive constant. In this case, innovation persists on the long run and consumption per capita grows at a strictly positive rate. On the other hand, for levels of risk aversion above the cut-off value, the economy eventually stagnates

Risk Aversion in a Model of Endogenous Growth

Despite the evidence on incomplete financial markets and substantial risk being borne by innovators, current models of growth through creative destruction predominantly model innovators’ as risk neutral. Risk aversion is expected to reduce the incentive to innovate and we might fear that without insurance innovation completely disappears in the long run. The present paper introduces risk averse agents into an occupational choice model of endogenous growth in which insurance against failure to innovate is not available. We derive a clear negative relationship between the level of risk aversion and long run growth. Surprisingly, we show that in an equilibrium there exists a cut-off value of risk aversion below which the growth rate of the mass of innovators tends to a strictly positive constant. In this case, innovation persists on the long run and consumption per capita grows at a strictly positive rate. On the other hand, for levels of risk aversion above the cut-off value, the economy eventually stagnates