An enhanced static-list scheduling algorithm for temporal partitioning onto RPUs

This paper presents a novel algorithm for temporal partitioning of graphs representing a behavioral description. The algorithm is based on an extension of the traditional static-list scheduling that tailors it to resolve both scheduling and temporal partitioning. The nodes to be mapped into a partition are selected based on a statically computed cost model. The cost for each node integrates communication effects, the critical path length, and the possibility of the critical path to hide the delay of parallel nodes. In order to alleviate the runtime there is no dynamic update of the costs. A comparison of the algorithm to other schedulers and with close-to-optimum results obtained with a simulated annealing approach is shown. The presented algorithm has been implemented and the results show that it is robust, effective, and efficient, and when compared to other methods finds very good results in small amounts of CPU time

No Place to Hide: Contactless Probing of Secret Data on FPGAs

Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) have been the target of different physical attacks in recent years. Many different countermeasures have already been integrated into these devices to mitigate the existing vulnerabilities. However, there has not been enough attention paid to semi-invasive attacks from the IC backside due to the following reasons. First, the conventional semi-invasive attacks from the IC backside --- such as laser fault injection and photonic emission analysis --- cannot be scaled down without further effort to the very latest nanoscale technologies of modern FPGAs and programmable SoCs. Second, the more advanced solutions for secure storage, such as controlled Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), make the conventional memory-readout techniques almost impossible. In this paper, however, novel approaches have been explored: Attacks based on Laser Voltage Probing (LVP) and its derivatives, as commonly used in Integrated Circuit (IC) debug for nanoscale low voltage technologies, are successfully launched against a $60$ nanometer technology FPGA. We discuss how these attacks can be used to break modern bitstream encryption implementations. Our attacks were carried out on a Proof-of-Concept PUF-based key generation implementation. To the best of our knowledge this is the first time that LVP is used to perform an attack on secure ICs

Flux caches: What are they and are they useful

Abstract. In this paper, we introduce the concept of flux caches envisioned to improve processor performance by dynamically changing the cache organization and implementation. Contrary to the traditional approaches, processors designed with flux caches instead of assuming a hardwired cache organization change their cache ”design ” on program demand. Consequently program (data and instruction) dynamic behavior determines the cache hardware design. Experimental results to confirm the flux caches potential are also presented.

Design Strategies and Modified Descriptions to Optimize Cipher FPGA Implementations: Fast and Compact Results for DES and Triple-DES

Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new mathematical DES description that allows us to achieve optimized implementations in term of ratio T hroughput/Area. First, we get an unrolled DES implementation that works at data rates of 21.3 Gbps (333 MHz), using Virtex-II technology. In this design, the plaintext, the key and the mode (encryption/decrytion) can be changed on a cycle-by-cycle basis with no dead cycles. In addition, we also propose sequential DES and triple-DES designs that are currently the most efficient ones in term of resources used as well as in term of throughput. Based on our DES and triple-DES results, we also set up conclusions for optimized FPGA design choices and possible improvement of cipher implementations with a modified structure description