Level Eulerian Posets

The notion of level posets is introduced. This class of infinite posets has the property that between every two adjacent ranks the same bipartite graph occurs. When the adjacency matrix is indecomposable, we determine the length of the longest interval one needs to check to verify Eulerianness. Furthermore, we show that every level Eulerian poset associated to an indecomposable matrix has even order. A condition for verifying shellability is introduced and is automated using the algebra of walks. Applying the Skolem--Mahler--Lech theorem, the ${\bf ab}$-series of a level poset is shown to be a rational generating function in the non-commutative variables ${\bf a}$ and ${\bf b}$. In the case the poset is also Eulerian, the analogous result holds for the ${\bf cd}$-series. Using coalgebraic techniques a method is developed to recognize the ${\bf cd}$-series matrix of a level Eulerian poset

A Cauchy-Dirac delta function

The Dirac delta function has solid roots in 19th century work in Fourier analysis and singular integrals by Cauchy and others, anticipating Dirac's discovery by over a century, and illuminating the nature of Cauchy's infinitesimals and his infinitesimal definition of delta.Comment: 24 pages, 2 figures; Foundations of Science, 201

Leibniz's Infinitesimals: Their Fictionality, Their Modern Implementations, And Their Foes From Berkeley To Russell And Beyond

Many historians of the calculus deny significant continuity between infinitesimal calculus of the 17th century and 20th century developments such as Robinson's theory. Robinson's hyperreals, while providing a consistent theory of infinitesimals, require the resources of modern logic; thus many commentators are comfortable denying a historical continuity. A notable exception is Robinson himself, whose identification with the Leibnizian tradition inspired Lakatos, Laugwitz, and others to consider the history of the infinitesimal in a more favorable light. Inspite of his Leibnizian sympathies, Robinson regards Berkeley's criticisms of the infinitesimal calculus as aptly demonstrating the inconsistency of reasoning with historical infinitesimal magnitudes. We argue that Robinson, among others, overestimates the force of Berkeley's criticisms, by underestimating the mathematical and philosophical resources available to Leibniz. Leibniz's infinitesimals are fictions, not logical fictions, as Ishiguro proposed, but rather pure fictions, like imaginaries, which are not eliminable by some syncategorematic paraphrase. We argue that Leibniz's defense of infinitesimals is more firmly grounded than Berkeley's criticism thereof. We show, moreover, that Leibniz's system for differential calculus was free of logical fallacies. Our argument strengthens the conception of modern infinitesimals as a development of Leibniz's strategy of relating inassignable to assignable quantities by means of his transcendental law of homogeneity.Comment: 69 pages, 3 figure

Ten Misconceptions from the History of Analysis and Their Debunking

The widespread idea that infinitesimals were "eliminated" by the "great triumvirate" of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass is refuted by an uninterrupted chain of work on infinitesimal-enriched number systems. The elimination claim is an oversimplification created by triumvirate followers, who tend to view the history of analysis as a pre-ordained march toward the radiant future of Weierstrassian epsilontics. In the present text, we document distortions of the history of analysis stemming from the triumvirate ideology of ontological minimalism, which identified the continuum with a single number system. Such anachronistic distortions characterize the received interpretation of Stevin, Leibniz, d'Alembert, Cauchy, and others.Comment: 46 pages, 4 figures; Foundations of Science (2012). arXiv admin note: text overlap with arXiv:1108.2885 and arXiv:1110.545

Tools, Objects, and Chimeras: Connes on the Role of Hyperreals in Mathematics

We examine some of Connes' criticisms of Robinson's infinitesimals starting in 1995. Connes sought to exploit the Solovay model S as ammunition against non-standard analysis, but the model tends to boomerang, undercutting Connes' own earlier work in functional analysis. Connes described the hyperreals as both a "virtual theory" and a "chimera", yet acknowledged that his argument relies on the transfer principle. We analyze Connes' "dart-throwing" thought experiment, but reach an opposite conclusion. In S, all definable sets of reals are Lebesgue measurable, suggesting that Connes views a theory as being "virtual" if it is not definable in a suitable model of ZFC. If so, Connes' claim that a theory of the hyperreals is "virtual" is refuted by the existence of a definable model of the hyperreal field due to Kanovei and Shelah. Free ultrafilters aren't definable, yet Connes exploited such ultrafilters both in his own earlier work on the classification of factors in the 1970s and 80s, and in his Noncommutative Geometry, raising the question whether the latter may not be vulnerable to Connes' criticism of virtuality. We analyze the philosophical underpinnings of Connes' argument based on Goedel's incompleteness theorem, and detect an apparent circularity in Connes' logic. We document the reliance on non-constructive foundational material, and specifically on the Dixmier trace (featured on the front cover of Connes' magnum opus) and the Hahn-Banach theorem, in Connes' own framework. We also note an inaccuracy in Machover's critique of infinitesimal-based pedagogy.Comment: 52 pages, 1 figur