The Role of Knowledge Accessibility in Episodic Future Thought

The capacity to think about specific events that one might encounter in the future--episodic future thought--involves the flexible: re)organization of knowledge. However, little is known about the cognitive mechanisms that guide this process. The reported studies demonstrate evidence for the role of knowledge accessibility as one such mechanism. First, comparisons were drawn between episodic future thought and other cognitive tasks that similarly require participants to produce open-ended responses and for which the role of knowledge accessibility is well established. Second, three experiments: N = 270) provided direct tests of whether accessible knowledge becomes incorporated into episodic future thought. In Experiments 1 and 2, priming knowledge relevant to an upcoming episode generation task shaped the content of thoughts about the future. Experiment 3 revealed that, as with other open-ended production tasks, primed knowledge must be processed in a meaningful manner in order for it to exert an influence on the content of episodic future thought. These results further understanding of episodic future thought and suggest important avenues for future research

Get Real: Effects of Repeated Simulation and Emotion on the Perceived Plausibility of Future Experiences

People frequently imagine specific interpersonal experiences that might occur in their futures. The present study used a novel experimental paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation of future interpersonal experiences on subjective assessments of plausibility for positive, negative, and neutral events. The results demonstrate that repeated simulation increases estimates of plausibility for emotional, but not neutral, future interpersonal experiences. Additional correlational analyses reveal that increases in plausibility for emotional events are associated with concurrent increases in ease of simulation, event detail, and arousal. Implications for daily life and affective disorders such as depression and anxiety are noted.Psycholog

Memory for Emotional Simulations: Remembering a Rosy Future

Mental simulations of future experiences are often concerned with emotionally arousing events. Although it is widely believed that mental simulations enhance future behavior, virtually nothing is known about the mnemonic fate of these simulations over time or whether emotional simulations are especially well-remembered. We used a novel paradigm, combining recently developed methods for generating future event simulations and well-established memory testing procedures, to examine the retention of positive, negative, and neutral simulations over multiple delays. We found that with increasing delay, details associated with negative simulations become more difficult to remember than details associated with positive and neutral simulations. We suggest that these delay-by-emotion interactions reflect the mnemonic influence of fading affect bias, where negative reactions fade more quickly than positive ones, resulting in a tendency to remember a rosy simulated future. We also discuss implications for affective disorders such as depression and anxiety.Psycholog

Coming to Grips With the Past: Effect of Repeated Simulation on the Perceived Plausibility of Episodic Counterfactual Thoughts

When people revisit previous experiences, they often engage in episodic counterfactual thinking: mental simulations of alternative ways in which personal past events could have occurred. The present study employed a novel experimental paradigm to examine the influence of repeated simulation on the perceived plausibility of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual thoughts. Participants were asked to remember negative, positive, and neutral autobiographical memories. One week later, they self-generated upward, downward, and neutral counterfactual alternatives to those memories. The following day, they resimulated each of those counterfactuals either once or four times. The results indicate that repeated simulation of upward, downward, and neutral episodic counterfactual events decreases their perceived plausibility while increasing ratings of the ease, detail, and valence of the simulations. This finding suggests a difference between episodic counterfactual thoughts and other kinds of self-referential simulations. Possible implications of this finding for pathological and nonpathological anxiety are discussed.Psycholog

The past, the present, and the future of future-oriented mental time travel: Editors' introduction

This introductory chapter reviews research on future-oriented mental time travel to date (the past), provides an overview of the contents of the book (the present), and enumerates some possible research directions suggested by the latter (the future)

Episodic future thinking in generalized anxiety disorder

Research on future-oriented cognition in generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) has primarily focused on worry, while less is known about the role of episodic future thinking (EFT), an imagery-based cognitive process. To characterize EFT in this disorder, we used the experimental recombination procedure, in which 21 GAD and 19 healthy participants simulated positive, neutral and negative novel future events either once or repeatedly, and rated their phenomenological experience of EFT. Results showed that healthy controls spontaneously generated more detailed EFT over repeated simulations. Both groups found EFT easier to generate after repeated simulations, except when GAD participants simulated positive events. They also perceived higher plausibility of negative-not positive or neutral-future events than did controls. These results demonstrate a negativity bias in GAD individuals' episodic future cognition, and suggest their relative deficit in generating vivid EFT. We discuss implications for the theory and treatment of GAD.R01 MH060941 - NIMH NIH HHS; R01 MH078308 - NIMH NIH HHS; R01AG08441 - NIA NIH HHS; R01 AT007257 - NCCIH NIH HHS; R01MH60941 - NIMH NIH HHS; R01 AG008441 - NIA NIH HHS; R34 MH099311 - NIMH NIH HHS; R21MH102646 - NIMH NIH HHS; R01AT007257 - NCCIH NIH HHS; R21 MH102646 - NIMH NIH HHS; R34MH078308 - NIMH NIH HH

Episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking: Intersections between memory and decisions

This article considers two recent lines of research concerned with the construction of imagined or simulated events that can provide insight into the relationship between memory and decision making. One line of research concerns episodic future thinking, which involves simulating episodes that might occur in one’s personal future, and the other concerns episodic counterfactual thinking, which involves simulating episodes that could have happened in one’s personal past. We first review neuroimaging studies that have examined the neural underpinnings of episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking. We argue that these studies have revealed that the two forms of episodic simulation engage a common core network including medial parietal, prefrontal, and temporal regions that also supports episodic memory. We also note that neuroimaging studies have documented neural differences between episodic future thinking and episodic counterfactual thinking, including differences in hippocampal responses. We next consider behavioral studies that have delineated both similarities and differences between the two kinds of episodic simulation. The evidence indicates that episodic future and counterfactual thinking are characterized by similarly reduced levels of specific detail compared with episodic memory, but that the effects of repeatedly imagining a possible experience have sharply contrasting effects on the perceived plausibility of those events during episodic future thinking versus episodic counterfactual thinking. Finally, we conclude by discussing the functional consequences of future and counterfactual simulations for decisions.Psycholog

Testing potentiates new learning across a retention interval and a lag: A strategy change perspective

Practicing retrieval on previously studied materials can potentiate subsequent learning of new materials. In four experiments, we investigated the influence of retention interval and lag on this test-potentiated new learning (TPNL) effect. Participants studied four word lists and either practiced retrieval, restudied, or completed math problems following Lists 1–3. Memory performance on List 4 provided an estimate of new learning. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were tested on List 4 after either a 1 min or 25 min retention interval. In Experiments 3 and 4, participants took at 25 min break before studying List 4. A TPNL effect was observed in all experiments. To gain insight into the mechanism that may underlie TPNL, we analyzed the extent to which participants organized their recall from list to list. Relative to restudy and math, testing led to superior semantic organization across lists. Our results support a strategy change account of TPNL