Convergence Model of Governance: A Case Study of the Local Government System of Pakistan

The future of devolution plan in Pakistan may be analysed in view of our Convergence model. This model views stability of the local Govt. system drawn on Devolution Plan 2001. It claims that as there would be more volatile and non-committed (floating) number of agents in the political market and governance system, there is more probability of divergence; i.e. the system will remain unstable. Contrary to that more is the systematic trend in political market and governance system more is the probability that the convergence in the system occurs and that in turn leads to stability of the over all system. In this ‘Convergence’ Model different types of agents have been highlighted on the basis of their political ffiliation and being in competition as ruling elite and/or their allies and non-ruling elite and/or their allies. The agents have interactive relationship horizontally and vertically with other agents i.e. either they are ally or otherwise. The composition of this structure of the agents and clients is based on the principle of bottom top pproach i.e. Union council’s members, Nazim and their political competitors, Tehsil council and Nazim, District Nazim and his allied district assembly members and their political competitors, Member provincial Assembly and their political rivals, Member National Assembly/Senator, and their political rival and the ruling political elites, Provincial Government and their political rivals, and Political elites ruling Federal Government and their political rivals.

Incompatibility of Laws and Natural Resources: A Case Study of Land Revenue Laws and Their Implications in Federal Areas of Pakistan

Better rule of law would generate economic growth, which would in turn build constituencies for democratic reforms [Root and May (2006)]. Consider prisoners dilemma, to Law and Economics Scholars, the inevitability of prisoner’s dilemmas arising to block potentially efficient exchanges explains the need for and consequently the adoption of contract law. When the law enforces contracts, it permits the participants in a potential prisoners’ dilemma the option of escaping the dominant strategy equilibrium of non-cooperation, which prevents the achievement of efficient exchanges, by permitting the parties to effectively pre-commit to future cooperative behavior. Mutual pre-commitments can produce the efficient cooperate-cooperate equilibrium. The existence of contract law then tends to foster efficient cooperative behaviour. Institutions are considered to provide the mechanisms by which individuals can resolve social dilemmas [Steins (1999)]. They are sets of rules that people have created in order to control/regulate the behavior of people using a natural resource. Several layers of institutions are important for institutional development and economic performance. These layers, from the slowest moving to the fastest moving are: human motivations and social institutions, political institutions, legal institutions and private institutions [Azfar (2006)]. Institutions perform their role to frame rules, procedure and enabling environment for implementation of rules. Rights of individuals are recognised and recognised through institutions as well

Weather effects on stock returns and volatility in South Asian markets

We study the effect of mood-proxy variables on index returns and volatility in six South Asian markets. Our mood-proxy variables include six weather (temperature, humidity, cloud cover, air pressure, visibility, and wind speed), three weather indicator variables (fog, thunder storm and rain or drizzle) and two biorhythmic variables (SAD and lunar phases). We adopt a robust approach and attempt to select the best parsimonious econometric model for each market. Our findings suggest that mood-proxy variables have some convincing influences in South Asian capital markets. In some instances, these variables are influencing returns while in other instances they are influencing volatility

Search for magnetoelectric monopole response in Cr2_2O3_3 powder

Powder samples have been suggested as a pathway to fabricate isotropic magnetoelectric (ME) materials which effectively only have a pseudoscalar or monopole ME response. We demonstrate that random distribution of ME grains alone does not warrant isotropic ME response because the activation of a non-vanishing ME response requires a ME field cooling protocol which tends to induce preferred axes. We investigate the evolution of ME susceptibility in powder chromia samples for various ME field cooling protocols both theoretically and experimentally. In particular, we work out the theoretical expressions for ME susceptibility for powder Chromia in the framework of statistical mechanics where Boltzmann factors weigh the orientation of the N\'eel vector relative to the local orientation of the c-axis of a grain. Previous approximations oversimplified the thermodynamic nature of the annealing process giving rise to misleading conclusions on the role of the magnitude of the applied product of electric and magnetic fields on the ME response. In accordance with our refined theory, a strong dependence of the functional form of $\alpha$ vs. $T$ of Chromia powders on the ME field cooling protocol is observed. It shows that Chromia powder is not generically an isotropic ME effective medium but provides a pathway to realize the elusive isotropic ME response.Comment: Submitted to Physical Review

Convergence Model of Governance: A Case Study of the Local Government System of Pakistan

The future of devolution plan in Pakistan may be analysed in view of our Convergence model. This model views stability of the local Govt. system drawn on Devolution Plan 2001. It claims that as there would be more volatile and non-committed (floating) number of agents in the political market and governance system, there is more probability of divergence; i.e. the system will remain unstable. Contrary to that more is the systematic trend in political market and governance system more is the probability that the convergence in the system occurs and that in turn leads to stability of the over all system. In this ‘Convergence’ Model different types of agents have been highlighted on the basis of their political ffiliation and being in competition as ruling elite and/or their allies and non-ruling elite and/or their allies. The agents have interactive relationship horizontally and vertically with other agents i.e. either they are ally or otherwise. The composition of this structure of the agents and clients is based on the principle of bottom top pproach i.e. Union council’s members, Nazim and their political competitors, Tehsil council and Nazim, District Nazim and his allied district assembly members and their political competitors, Member provincial Assembly and their political rivals, Member National Assembly/Senator, and their political rival and the ruling political elites, Provincial Government and their political rivals, and Political elites ruling Federal Government and their political rivals

Convergence Model of Governance: A Case Study of the Local Government System of Pakistan

The future of devolution plan in Pakistan may be analysed in view of our Convergence model. This model views stability of the local Govt. system drawn on Devolution Plan 2001. It claims that as there would be more volatile and non-committed (floating) number of agents in the political market and governance system, there is more probability of divergence; i.e. the system will remain unstable. Contrary to that more is the systematic trend in political market and governance system more is the probability that the convergence in the system occurs and that in turn leads to stability of the over all system. In this ‘Convergence’ Model different types of agents have been highlighted on the basis of their political ffiliation and being in competition as ruling elite and/or their allies and non-ruling elite and/or their allies. The agents have interactive relationship horizontally and vertically with other agents i.e. either they are ally or otherwise. The composition of this structure of the agents and clients is based on the principle of bottom top pproach i.e. Union council’s members, Nazim and their political competitors, Tehsil council and Nazim, District Nazim and his allied district assembly members and their political competitors, Member provincial Assembly and their political rivals, Member National Assembly/Senator, and their political rival and the ruling political elites, Provincial Government and their political rivals, and Political elites ruling Federal Government and their political rivals

Search for magnetoelectric monopole response in Cr\u3csub\u3e2\u3c/sub\u3eO\u3csub\u3e3\u3c/sub\u3e powder

Powder samples have been suggested as a pathway to fabricate isotropic magnetoelectric (ME) materials which effectively only have a pseudoscalar or monopole ME response. We demonstrate that random distribution of ME grains alone does not warrant isotropic ME response because the activation of a nonvanishing ME response requires a ME field cooling protocol which tends to induce preferred axes.We investigate the evolution of ME susceptibility in powder chromia samples for various ME field cooling protocols both theoretically and experimentally. In particular, we work out the theoretical expressions for ME susceptibility for powder chromia in the framework of statistical mechanics where Boltzmann factors weigh the orientation of the Néel vector relative to the local orientation of the c axis of a grain. Previous approximations oversimplified the thermodynamic nature of the annealing process giving rise to misleading conclusions on the role of the magnitude of the applied product of electric and magnetic fields on the ME response. In accordance with our refined theory, a strong dependence of the functional form of α vs T of chromia powders on the ME field cooling protocol is observed. It shows that chromia powder is not generically an isotropic ME effective medium but provides a pathway to realize the elusive isotropic ME response