Optimal Capital Taxation and Consumer Uncertainty

This paper analyzes the impact of consumer uncertainty on optimal fiscal policy in a model with capital. The consumers lack confidence about the probability model that characterizes the stochastic environment and so apply a max-min operator to their optimization problem. An altruistic fiscal authority does not face this Knightian uncertainty. It is shown analytically that the government, in responding to consumer uncertainty, no longer sets the expected capital tax rate exactly equal to zero, as is the case in the full-confidence benchmark model. However, our numerical results indicate that the government does not diverge far from this value. Even though the capital income tax rate is close to zero in expectation, consumer uncertainty leads the altruistic government to implement a more volatile capital tax rate across states. In doing so, the government relies more heavily on the capital tax and, consequently, less heavily on the labor income tax to finance the shock to public spending.Robust control, uncertainty, taxes, capital, Ramsey problem

Optimal Fiscal Policy with Robust Control

This paper compares the fiscal policies implemented by two types of government when confronted by consumer uncertainty. Consumers, lacking confidence in their knowledge of the stochastic environment, endogenously tilt their subjective probability model away from an approximating probability model. The government does not face this uncertainty. Through its choice of a labor tax and the supply of one-period public debt, the government manipulates the competitive equilibrium allocation and the consumers\u27 probability distortion. I consider two types of altruistic government. A benevolent government maximizes the consumers\u27 expected utility under the approximating probability model, whereas a political government maximizes the consumers\u27 expected utility under the consumers\u27 subjective probability model. I find that, relative to a full-confidence setup, the benevolent government relies more heavily on labor taxes to finance fluctuations in spending, while the political government depends more on public debt to absorb the fiscal shock. These policies are designed to re-align the consumers\u27 savings decisions with their full-confidence values and to reduce the fluctuations in the consumers\u27 welfare across states, respectively

Optimal Capital Taxation and Consumer Uncertainty

This paper analyzes the impact of consumer uncertainty on optimal fiscal policy in a model with capital. The consumers lack confidence about the probability model that characterizes the stochastic environment and so apply a max-min operator to their optimization problem. An altruistic fiscal authority does not face this Knightian uncertainty. It is shown analytically that the government, in responding to consumer uncertainty, no longer sets the expected capital tax rate exactly equal to zero, as is the case in the full-confidence benchmark model. However, our numerical results indicate that the government does not diverge far from this value. Even though the capital income tax rate is close to zero in expectation, consumer uncertainty leads the altruistic government to implement a more volatile capital tax rate across states. In doing so, the government relies more heavily on the capital tax and, consequently, less heavily on the labor income tax to finance the shock to public spending

Optimal Capital Taxation and Consumer Uncertainty

This paper analyzes the impact of consumer uncertainty on optimal fiscal policy in a model with capital. The consumers lack confidence about the probability model that characterizes the stochastic environment and so apply a max-min operator to their optimization problem. An altruistic fiscal authority does not face this Knightian uncertainty. We show analytically that, in responding to consumer uncertainty, the government no longer sets the expected capital tax rate exactly equal to zero, as is the case in the full-confidence benchmark model. Rather, our numerical results indicate that the government chooses to subsidize capital income, albeit at a modest rate. We also show that the government responds to consumer uncertainty by smoothing the labor tax across states and by making the labor tax persistent

Political Contributions and Insurance

We propose a mechanism that eliminates the incentive for risk-averse agents to influence government policy via political contributions. The mechanism requires the government to create a political insurance exchange where agents can insure against the outcome of a government decision and firms selling insurance announce and commit to a price of insurance and their political contributions. If the exchange contains actuarially fair priced insurance, then the agent fully insures and neither the firm nor agent lobbies the government. The exchange is better than contribution limits because it is welfare-enhancing, more fair, and does not restrict speech

Fiscal Policy Cyclicality and Growth within the U.S. States

We exploit differences in the stringency of balanced budget rules across US states to estimate the effect of fiscal policy cyclicality on state GDP growth. While most states have passed laws restricting deficits, the nature and strictness of these laws vary greatly. States with more stringent balanced budget restrictions run more procyclical fiscal policy. We use the diversity in these laws as an instrument for the cyclicality of state government spending. We find modest evidence that more counter-cyclical public expenditure increases a state's average growth rate per capita. Further, our point estimates suggest that a state could increase its annual growth rate by 0.4% by relaxing the "ex-post" balanced budget restriction. This estimated effect is statistically significant at the 10% level in our basic specification, but loses its significance when we control for the initial debt to GDP ratio.growth, fiscal policy, cyclicality

A Model of Tradeable Capital Tax Permits

Standard models of horizontal strategic capital tax competition predict that, in a Nash equilibrium, tax rates are inefficiently low due to externalities - capital infl ow to one state corresponds to capital out ow for another state. Researchers often suggest that the federal government impose Pigouvian taxes to correct for these effects and achieve efficiency. We propose an alternative incentive-based regulation: tradeable capital tax permits. Under this system, the federal government would require a state to hold a permit if it wanted to reduce its capital income tax rate from some pre-determined benchmark. These permits would be tradeable across states. We show that, if the federal government sets the correct number of total permits, then social efficiency is achieved. We discuss the advantages of this system relative to the canonical suggestion of Pigouvian taxes

The Role of Expectations: An Application to Internal Migration

This paper examines the impact of unemployment on migration. In a theoretical model, we show that unemployment, per se, does not affect migration. Rather, migration only occurs when unemployment shocks force residents to update their expectations of the area\u27s unemployment rate. Once these expectations change, migration reallocates labor to bring the economy back to equilibrium. To test this theory, we devise an empirical strategy using state level data in the U.S. from 2000 to 2010, we find strong empirical evidence that unemployment shocks outside of expectations have a far greater impact on migration than unemployment shocks that are within expectations

Student Uncertainty and Major Choice

This paper examines how model uncertainty affects students\u27 choice of major. To account for this uncertainty, the students apply a max-min operator to their optimization problem. We show analytically that greater uncertainty in a particular major causes the student to be less likely to choose that major and that greater uncertainty across all majors causes fewer students to major in science, technology, engineering, and math. To test the model\u27s assumptions and predictions, we have conducted a novel survey of college freshmen. The results from this survey are consistent with assumptions and implications of the theoretical model

Fiscal Policy Cyclicality and Growth within the U.S. States

We exploit differences in the stringency of balanced budget rules across US states to estimate the effect of fiscal policy cyclicality on state GDP growth. While most states have passed laws restricting deficits, the nature and strictness of these laws vary greatly. States with more stringent balanced budget restrictions run more procyclical fiscal policy. We use the diversity in these laws as an instrument for the cyclicality of state government spending. We find modest evidence that more counter-cyclical public expenditure increases a state\u27s average growth rate per capita. Further, our point estimates suggest that a state could increase its annual growth rate by 0.4% by relaxing the ex-post balanced budget restriction. This estimated effect is statistically significant at the 10% level in our basic specification, but loses its significance when we control for the initial debt to GDP ratio