The full list of CeDEx Discussion Papers is available at

The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. Please visi

3D quantitative imaging of unprocessed live tissue reveals epithelial defense against bacterial adhesion and subsequent traversal requires MyD88.

While a plethora of in vivo models exist for studying infectious disease and its resolution, few enable factors involved in the maintenance of health to be studied in situ. This is due in part to a paucity of tools for studying subtleties of bacterial-host interactions at a cellular level within live organs or tissues, requiring investigators to rely on overt outcomes (e.g. pathology) in their research. Here, a suite of imaging technologies were combined to enable 3D and temporal subcellular localization and quantification of bacterial distribution within the murine cornea without the need for tissue processing or dissection. These methods were then used to demonstrate the importance of MyD88, a central adaptor protein for Toll-Like Receptor (TLR) mediated signaling, in protecting a multilayered epithelium against both adhesion and traversal by the opportunistic bacterial pathogen Pseudomonas aeruginosa ex vivo and in vivo

A Carrot and Stick Approach to Agenda-Setting ∗

The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. Please visi

The full list of CeDEx Discussion Papers is available at

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Bridging User Organizations: Knowledge Brokering and the Work of Information Technology Professionals

This interpretive case study examines knowledge brokering as an aspect of the work of information technology professionals. The purpose of this exploratory study is to understand knowledge brokering from the perspective of IT professionals as they reflect upon their work practice. As knowledge brokers, IT professionals see themselves as facilitating the flow of knowledge about both IT and business practices across the boundaries that separate work units within organizations. A qualitative analysis of interviews conducted with 23 IT professionals and business users in a large manufacturing and distribution company is summarized in a conceptual framework showing the conditions, practices, and consequences of knowledge brokering by IT professionals. The framework suggests that brokering practices are conditioned by structural conditions, including decentralization and a federated IT management organization, and by technical conditions, specifically shared IT systems that serve as boundary objects. Brokering practices include gaining permission to cross organizational boundaries, surfacing and challenging assumptions made by IT users, translation and interpretation, and relinquishing ownership of knowledge. Consequences of brokering are the transfer of both business and IT knowledge across units in the organization

A Service of zbw Team Incentives and Leadership CeDEx Discussion Paper Series Team Incentives and Leadership

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in Abstract We study, experimentally, how two alternative incentive mechanisms affect team performance, and how a team chooses between alternative mechanisms. We study a group incentive mechanism, where team output is shared equally among team members, and a hierarchical mechanism team output is allocated by a team leader. Our experiment examines these mechanisms in both homogeneous teams, where workers have identical productivities and in heterogeneous teams, where workers vary in their productivity. Our results are robust to whether teams are homogeneous or heterogeneous. We find that output is higher when a leader has the power to allocate output, but this mechanism also generates large differences between earnings of leaders and other team members. When team members can choose how much of team output is to be shared equally and how much is to be allocated by a leader, they tend to restrict the leader's power to distributing less than half of the pie

Dynamic Bargaining and External Stability with Veto Players CeDEx Discussion Paper Series Dynamic Bargaining and External Stability with Veto Players

The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. Abstract This note examines the structure of stationary bargaining equilibria in the finite framework of Anesi (2010). The main result establishes a tight connection between the set of equilibrium absorbing points and the von Neumann-Morgestern solutions: assuming that players are patient, that the voting rule is oligarchical, and that there is at least one veto player with positive recognition probability, a set of alternatives corresponds to the absorbing points of an equilibrium if and only if it is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. We also apply our analysis of ergodic properties of equilibria to the persistent agenda setter environment o

Evolutionary Approach ∗

The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. Please visi

Participatory Accountability and Collective Action: Experimental Evidence from Albania

The focus for the Centre is research into individual and strategic decision-making using a combination of theoretical and experimental methods. On the theory side, members of the Centre investigate individual choice under uncertainty, cooperative and non-cooperative game theory, as well as theories of psychology, bounded rationality and evolutionary game theory. Members of the Centre have applied experimental methods in the fields of public economics, individual choice under risk and uncertainty, strategic interaction, and the performance of auctions, markets and other economic institutions. Much of the Centre's research involves collaborative projects with researchers from other departments in the UK and overseas. Please visi