Billionaires and Growth

A fundamental question in social sciences relates to the effect of wealth inequality on economic growth. Yet, in tackling the question, researchers have had to use income as a proxy for wealth. We derive a global measure of wealth inequality from Forbes magazine’s listing of billionaires and compare its effect on growth to the effects of income inequality and poverty. Our results suggest that wealth inequality has a negative relationship with economic growth, but when we control for the fact that some billionaires acquired wealth through political connections, the relationship between politically connected wealth inequality and economic growth is negative, while politically unconnected wealth inequality, income inequality, and initial poverty have no significant relationship

Barriers to Entry and Competitive Behavior: Evidence from Reforms of Cable Franchising Regulations

Between 2005 and 2008, nineteen of the fifty states of the U.S. reformed the franchising process for cable television, significantly easing entry into local markets. Using a difference‐in‐differences approach that exploits the staggered introduction of reforms, we find that prices for ‘Basic’ service declined systematically by about 5.5 to 6.8 per cent following the reforms, but we find no statistically significant effect on average price for the more popular ‘Expanded Basic’ service. We also find that the reforms led to increased actual entry in reformed states, by about 11.6% relative to non‐reformed states. Our analysis shows that the decline in price for ‘Basic’ service holds for markets that did not experience actual entry, consistent with limit pricing by incumbents. To control for potential state‐level shocks correlated with the reforms, we undertake a sample‐split test that finds larger declines in prices for both ‘Basic’ and ‘Expanded Basic’ services in local markets which faced a greater threat of entry (because they were close to a prominent second entrant). Our results are consistent with limit pricing models that predict incumbents respond to increased threat of entry, and suggest that the reforms facilitated entry and modestly benefited consumers in reformed states.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/139114/1/joie12152_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/139114/2/joie12152.pd

Three Essays in Public Finance and Regulation.

1. Essay 1: In politically competitive jurisdictions, there can be strong electoral incentives to underfund public pensions in order to keep current taxes low. I examine this hypothesis using panel data for 2,000 municipal pension plans from Pennsylvania. The results suggest that as a municipality becomes more politically competitive, it tends to have pension plans that are less funded, more generous, and use higher interest rates to discount future actuarial liabilities. IV estimates generated using demographic characteristics of the population as instruments corroborate these findings. 2. Essay 2: This paper looks at whether political ideology matters for enforcement of the nation’s tax laws. An analysis of the IRS budget and personnel suggests that the party affiliation of the President makes a modest difference to the overall level of IRS resources. However, there are significant increases in the number of IRS employees devoted to criminal investigation and revenue collection under Democratic administrations. Audits of tax returns filed by corporations, individuals, estates, and trusts are also significantly more likely under Democratic administrations. The body of evidence suggests that while Congress has a greater influence in determining the overall level of resources available to the IRS, the President has a more pronounced influence on the allocation of those resources. 3. Essay 3: Between 2005 and 2008, 19 of the 50 states of the U.S. reformed the franchising process for cable television, significantly easing entry into local markets. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits the staggered introduction of reforms, we find that prices for “Basic” service declined systematically by about 5.5 to 6.8 percent following the reforms, but we find no statistically significant effect on average price for the more popular “Expanded Basic” service. Our analysis shows that the decline in price for “Basic” service holds for markets that did not experience actual entry, consistent with limit pricing by incumbents. To control for potential state-level shocks correlated with the reforms, we undertake a sample-split test examining changes in local markets which faced a greater threat of entry; we find larger declines in prices, for both “Basic” and “Expanded Basic” services in these markets.PhDBusiness AdministrationUniversity of Michigan, Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studieshttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/110387/1/sbagchi_1.pd

Does Wealth Inequality Matter for Growth? The Effect of Billionaire Wealth, Income Distribution, and Poverty

A fundamental question in social sciences relates to the effect of wealth inequality on economic growth. Yet, in tackling the question, researchers have had to use income as a proxy for wealth. We derive a global measure of wealth inequality from Forbes magazine’s listing of billionaires and compare its effect on growth to the effects of income inequality and poverty. We find that wealth inequality reduces economic growth, but when we control for the fact that some billionaires acquired wealth through political connections, the effect of politically connected wealth inequality is negative, while politically unconnected wealth inequality, income inequality, and initial poverty have no significant effect

The Behavioral Roots of Information Systems Security:Exploring Key Factors Related to Unethical IT Use

Unethical information technology (IT) use, related to activities such as hacking, software piracy, phishing, and spoofing, has become a major security concern for individuals, organizations, and society in terms of the threat to information systems (IS) security. While there is a growing body of work on this phenomenon, we notice several gaps, limitations, and inconsistencies in the literature. In order to further understand this complex phenomenon and reconcile past findings, we conduct an exploratory study to uncover the nomological network of key constructs salient to this phenomenon, and the nature of their interrelationships. Using a scenario-based study of young adult participants, and both linear and nonlinear analyses, we uncover key nuances of this phenomenon of unethical IT use. We find that unethical IT use is a complex phenomenon, often characterized by nonlinear and idiosyncratic relationships between the constructs that capture it. Overall, ethical beliefs held by the individuals, along with economic, social, and technological considerations are found to be relevant to this phenomenon. In terms of practical implications, these results suggest that multiple interventions at various levels may be required to combat this growing threat to IS security

Barriers to Entry and Competitive Behavior: Evidence from Reforms of Cable Franchising Regulations

Between 2005 and 2008, 19 of the 50 states of the U.S. reformed the franchising process for cable television, significantly easing entry into local markets. Using a difference-in-differences approach that exploits the staggered introduction of reforms, we find that prices for “Basic” service declined systematically by about 5.5 to 6.8 percent following the reforms, but we find no statistically significant effect on average price for the more popular “Expanded Basic” service. We also find that the reforms led to increased actual entry in reformed states, by about 11.6% relative to non reformed states. Our analysis shows that the decline in price for “Basic” service holds for markets that did not experience actual entry, consistent with limit pricing by incumbents. To control for potential state-level shocks correlated with the reforms, we undertake a sample-split test examining changes in local markets which faced a greater threat of entry (because they were close to a prominent second entrant); we find larger declines in prices, for both “Basic” and “Expanded Basic” services in these markets. Our results are consistent with limit pricing models that predict incumbents respond to increased threat of entry, and suggest that the reforms facilitated entry and modestly benefitted consumers in reformed states.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/99577/1/1195_Bagchi.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/99577/4/1195_Bagchi.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/99577/5/1195_Sivadasan_Aug2015.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/99577/7/1195_Sivadasan_March2016.pdfhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/99577/9/1195_Sivadasan_Jan2017.pdfDescription of 1195_Sivadasan_Aug2015.pdf : August 2015 revisionDescription of 1195_Bagchi.pdf : Updated version opens on cover nowDescription of 1195_Sivadasan_March2016.pdf : March 2016 revisionDescription of 1195_Sivadasan_Jan2017.pdf : January 2017 revisio

Does Wealth Inequality Matter for Growth? The Effect of Billionaire Wealth, Income Distribution, and Poverty

A fundamental question in social sciences relates to the effect of wealth inequality on economic growth. Yet, in tackling the question, researchers have had to use income as a proxy for wealth. We derive a global measure of wealth inequality from Forbes magazine’s listing of billionaires and compare its effect on growth to the effects of income inequality and poverty. We find that wealth inequality reduces economic growth, but when we control for the fact that some billionaires acquired wealth through political connections, the effect of politically connected wealth inequality is negative, while politically unconnected wealth inequality, income inequality, and initial poverty have no significant effect