Adaptive Logics as a Necessary Tool for Relative Rationality: Including a Section on Logical Pluralism

In this paper, I show that adaptive logics are required by my epistemological stand. While doing so, I defy the reader to cope with the problems I am able to cope with. The last section of the paper contains a defense of a specific form of logical pluralism. Although this section is an integral part of the paper, it may be read separately

Some adaptive contributions to logics of formal inconsistency

Some insights were gained from the study of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The aim of the present paper is to put some of these insight to work for the study of logics of formal inconsistency. The focus of attention are application contexts of the aforementioned logics and their theoretical properties in as far as they are relevant for applications. As the questions discussed are difficult but important, a serious attempt was made to make the paper concise but transparent