Bayesian Estimation of Dynamic Discrete Choice Models

Structural estimation, Dynamic programming, MCMC

Employment, Dynamic Deterrence and Crime

Using monthly panel data we solve and estimate, using maximum likelihood techniques, an explicitly dynamic model of criminal behavior where current criminal activity adversely affects future employment outcomes. This acts as 'dynamic deterrence' to crime: the threat of future adverse effects on employment payoffs when caught committing crimes reduces the incentive to commit them. We show that this dynamic deterrence effect is strong in the data. Hence, policies which weaken dynamic deterrence will be less effective in fighting crime. This suggests that prevention is more powerful than redemption since the latter weakens dynamic deterrence as anticipated future redemption allows criminals to look forward to negating the consequences of their crimes. Static models of criminal behavior neglect this and hence sole reliance on them can result in misleading policy analysis.

Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research

This paper critically and selectively surveys the literature on protection for sale and discusses directions for future research in this area. It suggests that the standard approach needs to be augmented to provide more compelling tests of this model.Common agency, Political economy, Protection for sale, Quotas, Non tariff barriers

Do security deposit rates matter: Evidence from a secondary market

In the recent past, many economies, attempting to become more open, have adopted policies fostering a less restrictive trade regime. In their attempts to become more open, policy makers can, with the best of intentions, adopt policies that have unforeseen and often undesirable side effects. In the 1980s, Australia was in the process of converting quotas to tariffs. In the process they auctioned off import quota licenses in order to use the submitted bids to calculate equivalent tariff rates. A security deposit was charged to prevent frivolous bidding. The collection of security deposits may be seen as a harmless policy with the only discernable cost being the opportunity cost of the funds while they are on deposit. We argue that, at least in the Australian context, this is not so. Using data from a middleman in the secondary market for these licenses, we show that the policy may have led to welfare losses in the secondary market.

A Quantile Based Test of Protection for Sale Model

This paper proposes a new test of the Protection for Sale (PFS) model by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Unlike existing methods in the literature, our approach does not require any data on political organizations. We formally show that the PFS model provides the following prediction: In the quantile regression of the protection measure on the inverse import penetration ratio divided by the import demand elasticity, its coefficient should be positive at the quantile close to one. We examine this prediction using the data from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). The results do not provide any evidence favoring the PFS model.Quantile Regression, Protection for Sale, Political Economy

Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?

This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential Grossman and Helpman "protection for sale" (PFS) model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occuring in response to import surges, but only for organized industries, is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought.Common agency, Political economy, Protection for sale, Quotas, Non tariff barriers

A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model

This paper proposes a new test of the Protection for Sale (PFS) model by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Unlike existing methods in the literature, our approach does not require any data on political organization. We use quantile and quantile IV regressions to do so using the data from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Surprisingly, the results do not provide any evidence favoring the PFS model. We also explain why previous work may have inadvertently found support for it.protection for sale, lobbying, political economy, quantile regression

A Quantile-based Test of Protection for Sale Model

This paper proposes a new test of the Protection for Sale (PFS) model by Grossman and Helpman (1994). Unlike existing methods in the literature, our approach does not require any data on political organization. We use quantile and quantile IV regressions to do so using the data from Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). Surprisingly, the results do not provide any evidence favoring the PFS model. We also explain why previous work may have inadvertently found support for it.Protection for Sale, Lobbying, Political Economy, Quantile Regression

From Engineer to Taxi Driver? Occupational Skills and the Economic Outcomes of Immigrants

We examine the ability of male immigrants to transfer their occupational human capital using information from the O*NET and a unique dataset that includes both the last source country occupation and the first four years of occupations in Canada. We first augment a model of occupational choice and skill accumulation to derive predictions about the cross-border transferability of occupational human capital. We then test the empirical implications using the skill requirements of pre- and post-immigration occupations. We find that male immigrants to Canada were employed in source country occupations that required high levels of cognitive skills, but relied less intently on manual skills. Following immigration, they find initial employment in occupations that require the opposite. Regression analysis uncovers large returns to the quantitative skill requirements of Canadian occupations, but no returns to source country skill requirements. Finally, our empirical findings suggests that occupational skill gaps are detrimental to immigrants` earnings.occupational mobility, skills, human capital, immigration

Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?

This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential Grossman and Helpman %u201Cprotection for sale (PFS)%u201D model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occurring in response to import surges, but only for organized industries, is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought.