46 research outputs found

    Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies

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    We present and test empirically a new theory of property and contract rights. Any incentive an autocrat has to respect such rights comes from his interest in future tax collections and national income and increases with his planning horizon. We find a compelling empirical relationship between property and contract rights and an autocrat's time in power. In lasting -- but not in new -- democracies, the same rule of law and individual rights that ensure continued free elections entail extensive property and contract rights. We show that the age of a democratic system is strongly correlated with property and contract rights

    Euro and the Yuan: Different Peas in the Same Pod

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    This paper attempts to distill and integrate findings on the role that exchange rates, and their valuation, play in determining the fortunes and deficits of nations. It documents the symmetric effects of currency valuation on economic growth and imbalances in the current account. It is hypothesized that if a currency is undervalued, it helps economic growth to proceed faster than otherwise, and for current account surpluses to be larger than otherwise. Contrasting experiences of as diverse economies as China, Japan, and the Eurozone post the introduction of the Euro in 1998 are evaluated from the prism of currency undervaluation.
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