Overfishing Trends and the Global Food Crisis

Fish are a vital source of nourishment, especially to people in the world's poorest nations. Widespread over?shing has led to a decline in catch globally; however, the links between over?shing and food security have not been well-understood. The authors of scientific article "Food security implications of globalmarine catch losses due to overfishing." assessed potential losses, globally and regionally, in ?sheries catch and revenue resulting from over?shing. They found a third to a half of commercial marine species had been over?shed during the past half-century, with billions in potential revenue lost. By placing country-level catch loss trends in the context of undernourishment levels in many of the world's poorest countries, the authors estimated that in 2000 the additional catch from sustainable ?shing could have helped 20 million people cover their food de?cit and avert undernourishment. This Pew Ocean Science Series report is a summary of the scientists' ?ndings

A Carding System as an Approach to Increasing the Economic Risk of Engaging in IUU Fishing?

The European Union (EU) instituted a carding system via its European Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 with the goal of incentivizing fish and fish products (fish) exporting countries to the Union to take action to reduce IUU fishing in their waters. This regulation stipulates that the EU will issue warnings, known as a “yellow card,” to countries that perform poorly in the effort to end IUU fishing in their waters. Failure to curb IUU fishing will result in a ban in the export of fish to the EU via the issuance of a red card. Here, I ask the following questions: what is the economic risk of being red carded by the EU? Is the economic risk big enough to significantly reduce IUU fishing in a targeted country’s waters? Would the risk be broad enough to result in a significant reduction in IUU fishing globally? What if the two other leading fish importing countries, i.e., the United States and Japan, also institute a similar carding system as the EU? To address these questions, I develop and compute an economic risk index for the carding system. This study suggests that the impact of an EU only IUU carding system could be significant for some targeted countries but its effect globally, with respect to reducing IUU fishing, would be minimal. However, I find that the economic risk to fish exporting countries would increase significantly if the United States and Japan also instituted similar carding systems, which would in turn help to reduce IUU fishing worldwide. This contribution shows that an IUU carding system could contribute significantly to the elimination of IUU fishing provided a critical mass of top fish importing countries participate in such a system

Fisheries Subsidies: Why Should You Care About Them?

The objective of this paper is to provide an analysis of the current state of fisheries subsidies worldwide, and how they are likely to affect the sustainability of fisheries. More specifically, I will review previous investigations of global subsidies issues, and give a brief overview of the impact of subsidies on key economic, social and environmental aspects of the fisheries sector; present and discuss the different types of subsidies proposed in the literature and how they are likely to affect our ability to manage fisheries sustainability through time; discuss and present the magnitude of fisheries subsidies worldwide, and analyse the most recent estimates at regional and global scale, by categories of subsidies. I conclude my talk by suggesting policy options for restructuring fisheries subsidies, drawing from the work of the E15 Expert Group on Fisheries and Oceans convened by the World Economic Forum and the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development

Skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna allocation within a game theoretic framework

Collaborative management is essential in fisheries with multiple users, where different fishing groups compete to exploit a shared stock, often using unsustainable practices. This is the case in the Coral Triangle, an ecosystem increasingly coveted by conservation organizations for its high biodiversity, and heavily exploited by fishing groups from the six main countries with exclusive fishing access to the majority of its area: Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Timor Leste and Solomon Islands. This paper proposes to address the possibility for collaborative management through the application of game theory to skipjack, yellowfin and bigeye tuna fisheries in the Coral Triangle. The member countries of the Coral Triangle target skipjack tuna, however there are high incidences of juvenile yellowfin and bigeye tuna bycatch. Adult yellowfin and bigeye are targeted by countries outside the Coral Triangle, and thus there is a very obvious conflict of interest between the two groups that needs to be explored. This paper will look at whether current exploitation of tuna stocks in the Coral Triangle is operating under a cooperative or a noncooperative equilibrium, and investigate what type of compensation (perhaps in the form of a side payment) could be offered to Coral Triangle countries to discourage bycatch of juvenile yellowfin and bigeye tuna.Keywords: Bigeye tuna, Fisheries Management, Modeling and Economic Theory, Fisheries Economics, Skipjack tuna, Yellowfin tun

Current and Potential Economic Rent in the Namibian Hake Fishery

We estimated the economic rent obtained currently (that is, in 2002) in the Namibian hake fishery and the rent that might potentially be obtainable if the fishery were managed optimally in the sense of economics. We first reviewed previous economic and biological studies. We then used the theory and model of Arnason [1] to estimate the current and potential rent in the Namibian hake fishery. Our estimates were that the current rent is 21 million USD (90% confidence interval in sensitivity analysis: 13-31) in 2002, with the potential for rent of approximately 112-118 million NAD (90% confidence intervals: 90-140 for logistic model and 84-135 for Fox model) annually if the fishery were managed optimally, i.e., with a much larger stock and a smaller fishing fleet. These estimates were particularly sensitive to some parameters, especially the cost parameter, but in general appeared to be fairly robust. Our estimate of current rent is roughly in line with previous estimates of the same number, while our estimate of potential rent is somewhat higher. We find that approximately 5-6 times greater wealth could be generated from this fishery if it were managed in a way closer to the economic optimum

Catch Shares, the Theory of Cooperative Games and the Spirit of Elinor Ostrom: A Research Agenda

This paper puts forth the proposition that all catch share schemes should be analysed primarily through the lens of cooperative game theory, which has now been developed to an advanced degree in the analysis of international fisheries management. If the fishers in a catch share scheme are playing cooperatively, the resource managers are at the same time to be seen as playing a leader-follower game with the fishers. While the proposition obviously applies to all catch share schemes, the focus of the paper will be on ITQ schemes. The basic rudiments of the required theory are to be found in a 2006 article by Lone Krønbak and Marko Lindroos, and carry with it the spirit of Elinor Ostrom. We will argue that much more needs to be done. We shall maintain that, if a given ITQ scheme constitutes a stable cooperative game, the various residual inefficiencies of ITQ schemes discussed in many articles should vanish. Needless to say, if a given ITQ scheme constitutes a stable cooperative game the distinction between it and other catch right schemes will blur. We shall also argue that, if ITQ schemes succeed as stable cooperative games, this will enable the fishers to bargain constructively with other stakeholders. Examples will be drawn, inter alia, from the evolving harvesting rights schemes off Canada’s Pacific coast

Limits to the privatization of fishery resources

A debate is emerging over the extent to which privatization of fishery resources – private ownership and resource management without significant state oversight- is practical and socially desirable. What we term the “optimists” maintain that there are no effective limits to privatization and that the decades old fear that privatization could, in some cases, lead to resource extinction are baseless, and of theoretical interest only. This paper attempts to add to the debate by arguing that the fears are, regrettably, not at all baseless and that there are, in fact, definite limits to socially desirable privatization. The paper goes on to discuss means, by which such limits could be identified, on a fishery by fishery basis

Adapting to Regional Enforcement: Fishing Down the Governance Index

Background: Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a problem for marine resource managers, leading to depletion of fish stocks and negative impacts on marine ecosystems. These problems are particularly evident in regions with weak governance. Countries responsible for sustainable natural resource management in the Southern Ocean have actively worked to reduce IUU fishing in the region over a period of 15 years, leading to a sequence of three distinct peaks of IUU fishing. Methodology/Principal Findings: We reviewed existing public records relating to IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean between 1995–2009 and related this information to the governance capacity of flag states responsible for IUU vessels. IUU operators used a number of methods to adapt to enforcement actions, resulting in reduced risks of detection, apprehension and sanctioning. They changed fishing locations, vessel names and flag states, and ports for offloading IUU catches. There was a significant decrease in the proportion of IUU vessels flagged to CCAMLR countries, and a significant decrease in the average governance index of flag states. Despite a decreasing trend of IUU fishing, further actions are hampered by the regional scope of CCAMLR and the governance capacity of responsible states. Conclusions/Significance: This is the first study of long-term change in the modus operandi of IUU fishing operators, illustrating that IUU operators can adapt to enforcement actions and that such dynamics may lead to new problems elsewhere, where countries have a limited capacity. This outsourcing of problems may have similarities to natural resourc

The Economic Viability of Small- vs. Large-Scale Fisheries: An Example from Mexico

Achieving economic viability is an important goal when it comes to developing policies for sustainable fisheries management, especially for small-scale fisheries (SSF). SSF are vital for many coastal communities, however, often economically and politically marginalized. Here, we develop and estimate what we denote as ‘basic economic viability’ of SSF, using Mexican fisheries as an example. Results from 2000 to 2012 show increasing economic viability of SSF, mainly driven by decreasing fishing effort and increasing total revenue. Despite receiving 75% of total fisheries subsidies, the economic viability of large-scale fisheries (LSF) declined over the study period and more recently has fallen below zero, indicating a negative contribution to society. Recommendations for improvement in economic viability of fisheries include improved fisheries monitoring, especially in small coastal communities that is backed by increased access to data (social and economic). This can be done by re-directing capacity-enhancing subsidies towards strengthening fisheries management and broadening the livelihood possibilities available to fishers. We hope that results from assessments such as this help bridge the current knowledge gap in SSF research essential for policy making and management, that would not only improve economic viability but also the sustainability of the fish stocks upon which they rely

Size matters: fishing less and yielding more in smaller-scale fisheries

Several factors influence catches and the sustainability of fisheries, and such factors might be different depending on the scale on which fisheries work. We investigated the existence of possible subdivisions within small-scale fisheries (SSF) themselves, regarding their economic performance and relative social and environmental impacts to understand which categories of these two types of fleets are best positioned to support sustainability. By doing so, we investigated if it is a good strategy for SSF to aim to grow towards larger scales. We obtained economic and ecological data from landing samplings and information on technological efficiency of this fleet, using a northeastern Brazilian state as a case study. We defined a cut-off point to separate the SSF into two categories of boats, according to their size and gear. We compared their cpue and the factors affecting it within each category; we also compared economic (number of boats, number of landings, jobs, gears, catch, travel time and total time of the fishery, revenues, costs, profits, revenue per unit of effort, and profit per unit of effort) and ecological factors (vulnerability of species caught) between the two categories. We found that small boats spent less time fishing and employed comparatively more people per landed value and catch. The cpue and profits of small boats were also higher. Both large and small boats exploit species with the same overall vulnerability. Therefore, being smaller, even within the SSF category, seems to be a more advantageous social and economic strategy for guaranteeing higher catches and more employment opportunities per catch. These findings need to be taken into account when defining new policies, such as the distribution of subsidies that support or not the sustainable use of fishery resources