Stealth-Trading: Which Traders' Trades Move Stock Prices?

Using audit trail data for a sample of NYSE firms, we show that medium size trades are associated with a disproportionately large cumulative stock price change relative to their proportion of all trades and volume. This result is consistent with the predictions of the stealth- trading hypothesis (Barclay and Warner (1993)). We find that the source of this disproportionately large cumulative price impact of medium size trades is trades initiated by institutions. This result appears robust to various sensitivity checks. Our findings appear to confirm street lore that institutions are informed traders.stealth-trading, adverse selection, informed trading, trade size

Do Bid-Ask Spreads Or Bid and Ask Depths Convey New Information First?

This paper investigates the order in which new information is first reflected in the market – through changes in spreads or through updated depths. We develop an error correction model of spreads and depths and estimate Gonzalo-Granger common factor components using two years of tick-by-tick quote data on all stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. We show that indeed depths rather than spreads are first to impound new information that leads to new quote trends. Specifically, (bid and ask) depths convey information first in virtually every stock in both years, while spreads almost never convey information in 1998, and do so in only 8 out of 30 cases in 1995. Even in those 8 cases, the percentage of new information revealed by spreads ranges from 50 – 59% with the depths accounting for the rest. Our results have important implications for academic research on asymmetric information trading, for security market design, and for public policy.VECM, spreads, depths, information,

Does Insider Trading Really Move Stock Prices?

Prior studies have reported a positive correlation between insider trading and stock price changes. The implication of these studies is that insider (i.e., informed) trades have a differential impact on price discovery than non-insider (i.e., uninformed) trades. Based on these results, various scholars have argued for the legalization of insider trading to facilitate rapid price discovery. We analyze the trading activity of a confessed inside trader, Ivan Boesky, in Carnation’s stock just prior to the acquisition of Carnation by Nestle, and find that our tests are unable to distinguish the price effect of Boesky’s (i.e., informed) purchases of Carnation’s stock from the effect of non-insider (i.e., uninformed) purchases. Our conclusion survives extensive robustness tests and has methodological and public policy implications.