How Vulnerable is the Reaction Time Concealed Information Test to Faking?

The reaction time-based Concealed Information Test (RT-CIT) can be used to detect information a suspect wishes to conceal. While it is often argued that it is easily faked, empirical research on its vulnerability to faking is scarce. In three experiments, we tested whether receiving faking instructions enables guilty participants to fake an innocent test outcome in an RT-CIT. In Experiment 1, when not using a response deadline, we found the RT-CIT to be vulnerable to faking (d = 1.06). Experiment 2 showed that when using a response deadline, faking was ineffective (d = −0.25). Critically, Experiment 3 replicated these findings within one between-subject design, showing again a faking effect when no response deadline was used (d = 1.08) that vanished with the use of a response deadline (d = −0.56). By providing suggestions for the development of a faking detection algorithm, we hope to stimulate further research in this area.</p

In Vino Veritas? Alcohol, response inhibition and lying

Aims: Despite the widespread belief that alcohol makes the truth come out more easily, we know very little on how alcohol impacts deception. Given that alcohol impairs response inhibition, and that response inhibition may be critically involved in deception, we expected that alcohol intake would hamper lying. Methods: In total, 104 volunteers were tested at a science festival, where they had the opportunity to drink alcohol. Stop-Signal Reaction Times (SSRTs) served as operationalization of response inhibition. Differences in error rates and reaction times (RTs) between lying and truth telling served as indicators of the cognitive cost of lying. Results: Higher blood alcohol concentration was related to longer SSRTs, but unrelated to the cognitive costs of lying. Conclusion: This study validates previous laboratory research on alcohol and response inhibition in a realistic drinking environment, yet failed to find an effect of alcohol on lying. Implications of these findings and for the role of response inhibition in lying are discussed

From junior to senior Pinocchio: A cross-sectional lifespan investigation of deception

We present the first study to map deception across the entire lifespan. Specifically, we investigated age-related difference in lying proficiency and lying frequency. A large community sample (n = 1005) aged between 6 and 77 were surveyed on their lying frequency, and performed a reaction-time (RT) based deception task to assess their lying proficiency. Consistent with the inverted U-shaped pattern of age-related changes in inhibitory control that we observed in a stop signal task, we found that lying proficiency improved during childhood (in accuracy, not RTs), excelled in young adulthood (in accuracy and RTs), and worsened throughout adulthood (in accuracy and RTs). Likewise, lying frequency increased in childhood, peaked in adolescence, and decreased during adulthood. In sum, we observed important age-related difference in deception that generally fit with the U-shaped pattern of age-related changes observed in inhibitory control. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed from a cognitive view of deception

Learning to lie: effects of practice on the cognitive cost of lying

Cognitive theories on deception posit that lying requires more cognitive resources than telling the truth. In line with this idea, it has been demonstrated that deceptive responses are typically associated with increased response times and higher error rates compared to truthful responses. Although the cognitive cost of lying has been assumed to be resistant to practice, it has recently been shown that people who are trained to lie can reduce this cost. In the present study (n = 42), we further explored the effects of practice on one’s ability to lie by manipulating the proportions of lie and truth-trials in a Sheffield lie test across three phases: Baseline (50% lie, 50% truth), Training (frequent-lie group: 75% lie, 25% truth; control group: 50% lie, 50% truth; and frequent-truth group: 25% lie, 75% truth), and Test (50% lie, 50% truth). The results showed that lying became easier while participants were trained to lie more often and that lying became more difficult while participants were trained to tell the truth more often. Furthermore, these effects did carry over to the test phase, but only for the specific items that were used for the training manipulation. Hence, our study confirms that relatively little practice is enough to alter the cognitive cost of lying, although this effect does not persist over time for non-practiced items