Auctioning of CO2 Emission Allowances in Phase 3 of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

The Climate action and renewable energy package proposed by the European Commission in the beginning of 2008 suggests auctioning as basic principle for allocation for the upcoming third trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme that runs from 2013 to 2020. Overall, it is estimated that at least two third of the total quantity of allowances will be auctioned in 2013, to be increased to 100 % by 2020. In this paper, we emphasize the importance of a properly chosen auction design as the significantly higher auction share, compared to the past and current trading phase, is expected to yield a thin secondary market for CO2 allowances. We elaborate main criteria that a viable auction design is supposed to fulfil and propose a specific auction design for the third trading phase. The auction we recommend is a simultaneous dynamic uniform double auction. -- Die Europäische Kommission hat in ihrem Klima- und Energiepaket vom Januar 2008 eine Weichenstellung für den europäischen Emissionshandel vorgeschlagen. Bislang wurden die Zertifikate an die betroffenen Unternehmen aus den energieintensiven Sektoren kostenfrei vergeben. Nach den Plänen der Kommission sollen Stromproduzenten ab 2013 alle benötigten Zertifikate ersteigern müssen. Unternehmen aus anderen energieintensiven Branchen sollen zunächst nur 20 % ersteigern, in 2020 dann 100 %. Da insgesamt mindestens zwei Drittel aller Zertifikate versteigert werden, ist zu erwarten, dass der freie Markt für Zertifikate ab 2013 deutlich dünner sein wird als dies bisher der Fall ist. Aus diesem Grund gewinnt das Design der Auktion an Bedeutung, denn vom Auktionspreis, der die Knappheit an Zertifikaten signalisieren soll, werden wichtige Investitionsentscheidungen in CO2-arme Technologien abhängen. Eventuelle Fehler im Auktionsdesign können, wenn die Zertifikate überwiegend versteigert werden, nicht mehr durch einen liquiden freien Markt geheilt werden.climate policy,emissions trading,auction design

Auctioning of CO2 Emission Allowances in Phase 3 of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

The “Climate action and renewable energy package” proposed by the European Commission in the beginning of 2008 suggests auctioning as basic principle for allocation for the upcoming third trading phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme that runs from 2013 to 2020. Overall, it is estimated that at least two third of the total quantity of allowances will be auctioned in 2013, to be increased to 100 % by 2020. In this paper, we emphasize the importance of a properly chosen auction design as the significantly higher auction share, compared to the past and current trading phase, is expected to yield a thin secondary market for CO2 allowances. We elaborate main criteria that a viable auction design is supposed to fulfil and propose a specific auction design for the third trading phase. The auction we recommend is a simultaneous dynamic uniform double auction

A Discovery Tour in Random Riemannian Geometry

We study random perturbations of Riemannian manifolds $(\mathsf{M},\mathsf{g})$ by means of so-called Fractional Gaussian Fields, which are defined intrinsically by the given manifold. The fields $h^\bullet: \omega\mapsto h^\omega$ will act on the manifolds via conformal transformation $\mathsf{g}\mapsto \mathsf{g}^\omega\colon\!\!= e^{2h^\omega}\,\mathsf{g}$. Our focus will be on the regular case with Hurst parameter $H>0$, the celebrated Liouville geometry in two dimensions being borderline. We want to understand how basic geometric and functional analytic quantities like diameter, volume, heat kernel, Brownian motion, spectral bound, or spectral gap will change under the influence of the noise. And if so, is it possible to quantify these dependencies in terms of key parameters of the noise. Another goal is to define and analyze in detail the Fractional Gaussian Fields on a general Riemannian manifold, a fascinating object of independent interest.Comment: 38 pages, 9 figures. Version 2: new proof of Prop. 3.

OpenMS - A Framework for Quantitative HPLC/MS-Based Proteomics

In the talk we describe the freely available software library OpenMS which is currently under development at the Freie Universität Berlin and the Eberhardt-Karls Universität Tübingen. We give an overview of the goals and problems in differential proteomics with HPLC and then describe in detail the implemented approaches for signal processing, peak detection and data reduction currently employed in OpenMS. After this we describe methods to identify the differential expression of peptides and propose strategies to avoid MS/MS identification of peptides of interest. We give an overview of the capabilities and design principles of OpenMS and demonstrate its ease of use. Finally we describe projects in which OpenMS will be or was already deployed and thereby demonstrate its versatility