The Truth About The World; Basic Readings In Philosophy

vi + 194 hlm

The truth about the world : basic readings in philosophy

vi, 329 p. ; 22 cm

The Truth about The World: Basic Readings in Philosophy, 3/E

This collection of essays addresses some of the most important issues in philosophy, involving God, the mind, freedom, knowledge, and ethics. It can accompany James Rachels and Stuart Rachels’ introductory text, Problems from Philosophy, or it can stand alone with great effectiveness. The Truth about the World and Problems from Philosophy were James Rachels’ last contributions to philosophy, and each book has been revised by his son, Stuart. In these two books, James Rachels found a culminating expression for his love of philosophy

The Right Thing to Do 4th ed. Basic Readings in Moral Philosophy

Buku ini membahas tentang pengenalan filsafat moral yang dipahami secara luas. Filsafat moral berusaha untuk mencapai pengertian sistematis tentang moral. Apakah moral itu dan apa yang diperlukan dari kita dan bagaimana seharusnya hidup dan mengapa. Buku ini menampilkan beberapa teori utama tentang moral dari tradisi Barat dan menghadirkan beberapa argumen terbaik yang ditawarkan filsafat untuk isu moral praktis

Hedonic value

In this essay I support, develop and apply a theory of hedonic value. These tasks are interwoven, but principally, I support the theory in chapters 1-4, develop it in chapters 5 and 6, and apply it to a challenging cluster of problems in chapter 7. Sentient experience, I suggest in chapter 1, provides key evidence for founding ethics: a severely painful experience gives its subject evidence that it\u27s bad in some way. Moreover, similar considerations, as well as analogies, support thinking that all unpleasures (unpleasant experiences) are bad in some way and all pleasures (pleasant experiences) are good in some way. But what type of value and disvalue do they have (if indeed this evidence is not outweighed)? Experiences that are pleasant or unpleasant are intrinsically so (I argue in chapter 2). so, their normative import doesn\u27t derive from extrinsic motivational or affective conditions that their pleasantness or unpleasantless might be thought to consist in. In chapter 3 I extend my argument in chapter 1 to the conclusion that pleasures and unpleasures have agent-neutral moral significance. Hence, I have just as much basic reason to promote your hedonic well-being as mine. And even the pleasure of potential persons matters, I argue in chapter 4; the fact that a person would feel pleasure is a reason to create her. In chapter 5 I argue that being hedonically better than is not a transitive relation. With this result in hand, I offer several snippets of advice and a host of principles in chapter 6 for assessing the hedonic value of states of affairs. Along the way I argue against a higher/lower distinction for pleasures and for the thesis that pleasures have value when undeserved or taken in bad objects. Finally. in chapter 7 I show that the theory of hedonic value I\u27ve developed entails a viable set of solutions to the problems Derek Parfit poses for moral theory in Reasons and Persons. Pleasures, I conclude, are intrinsically good and unpleasures are intrinsically bad