The logic of the CAP: Politics or Economics?

Distorted incentives, agricultural and trade policy reforms, national agricultural development, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade, F13, F14, Q17, Q18,

INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION OF AGRICULTURAL PROTECTION: THE CASE OF EU-ACCESSION AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

The literature on political economy analyses of agricultural protection mainly focus on the impact of economic and demographic structures on the level of agricultural protection (Tyers/Anderson 1992, Swinnen 1994, Rausser et al. 1974), although it is commonly accepted that beyond economic and demographic structures political institutions do have an impact on the political power of different interest groups and hence on agricultural policy output (Gardner 1987 as well as Binswanger et al. 1997). The impact of political institutions, e.g. the organization of legislature, election and party systems, on agricultural protection has hardly been taken into account explicitly in theoretical and empirical studies, yet. In this framework the paper investigates to what extent political institutions explain observed variances in the political power of the agrarian population in the ten Central and Eastern European Countries/Candidates (CEEC) applying for an accession of the EU. Moreover, it is analyzed to what extent EU-accession will be politically feasible given the specific political and economic framework conditions of the individual states. In particular, empirical analyses imply the following results: (i) the political power of the agrarian population varies significantly among the analyzed countries ranging from a relative low political weight of 0.115 of the agrarian population in Lativa up to an absolute political dominance of the agrarian population in Slovenia given a weight of 0.887. (ii) The political weights are significantly determined by political institutions. In particular, the more the election systems corresponds to a proportional representation and the more the parliamentary organization allows for a specialized representation of agrarian interests, e.g. bicameralism where a second chamber representing regional interests, and the more efficient the organization of agrarian interests, e.g. existence of a peasent party, the higher is the political weight of the agrarian population. (iii) Analyzing to what extent EU-accession is politically feasible in the CEEC-states we can show that, assuming national financing of EU-policy, EU-accession would be hardly politically feasible in any CEEC-countries. An exception might be seen in Slovenia. Thus political feasibility of EU-accession crucially depends on keeping the rule of financial solidarity. Moreover, assuming a comprehensive pre-accession CAP-reform will take place, possible options to achieve political feasibility in the CEEC-states under these conditions would be undertaking constitutional reforms. In particular, the implementation of electorate system corresponding closer to a proportional representation or the establishment of bicameralism would be, at least theoretically, possible options.Agricultural and Food Policy,

Quantitative polit-ökonomische Analyse der Europäischen Agrarpolitik

Im klassischen Ansatz der Agrarökonomie zur Analyse der Agrarpolitik findet die agrarpolitische Willensbildung noch keinen unmittelbaren Eingang. Die vorliegenden Beiträge beschäftigen sich mit unterschiedlichen theoretischen und angewandten quantitativen polit-ökonomischen Ansätzen zur Analyse des agrarpolitischen Willensbildungsprozesses. Die Beiträge lassen sich in vier Blöcke gliedern. Der erste enthält quantitative Wirkungsanalysen ausgewählter Eingriffe in den Agrarsektor. Der zweite Block geht auf die institutionellen Ursachen der Agrarprotektion ein. Im dritten Block wird die quantitative Modellierung verschiedener institutioneller Entscheidungsregeln der EU angewandt und weiterentwickelt, um Aussagen zur Macht einzelner Akteure treffen zu können. Der letzte Block kombiniert alle methodischen Ansätze der vorigen Kapitel und leitet anhand empirischer Politikpräferenzen ein angewandtes generelles polit-ökonomisches Gleichgewicht ab

Economic Impact of the Mid-Term Review on Agricultural Production, Farm Income and Farm Survival: A Quantitative Analysis for Local Sub-Regions of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany

This study analyzes the impact of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) on the agricultural sector in Schleswig-Holstein, a federal state in Germany. First, a very detailed farm group linear programming model is built to quantify the effects on agricultural production and farm incomes. The production adjustment to the MTR and its impact on farm profit vary significantly between individual farms. These results depend mainly on the farm type and the resource endowments of the farms. Second, the impact on structural change is examined with a farm survival model. Although the MTR clearly reduces the incomes of several farm types, it accelerates the structural change only gradually.policy reform; modeling production adjustment; farm income; structural change

Economic Impact of the Mid-Term Review on Agricultural Production, Farm Income and Farm Survival: A Quantitative Analysis for Local Sub-Regions of Schleswig-Holstein in Germany

This study analyzes the impact of the Mid-Term Review (MTR) on the agricultural sector in Schleswig-Holstein, a federal state in Germany. First, a very detailed farm group linear programming model is built to quantify the effects on agricultural production and farm incomes. The production adjustment to the MTR and its impact on farm profit vary significantly between individual farms. These results depend mainly on the farm type and the resource endowments of the farms. Second, the impact on structural change is examined with a farm survival model. Although the MTR clearly reduces the incomes of several farm types, it accelerates the structural change only gradually.policy reform, modeling production adjustment, farm income, structural change, Community/Rural/Urban Development, Q12, Q18,

Die Logik der europäischen Agrarpolitik: Politische Macht oder ökonomische Gesetzmäßigkeiten?

This paper derives an applied general political economy model incorporating a model of political decision-making into a computable general economic equilibrium model. Political decision-making among a set of legislators is modeled via a mean voter decision rule derived from a modified non-cooperative legislative bargaining game of a BARON-FEREJOHN type. Legislators’ preferences are endogenously derived from political support maximization, where policies translate into legislators’ support according to a political transformation surface. Each surface reflects specific economic framework conditions of legislators` constituency. The model allows a simultaneous analysis of political and economic factors determining policy outcome. In regard to the Health Check proposal of the Commission the model is applied to simulate future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) under various political and economic scenarios. Main results are: (i) MTR-reform will not be stable in the future. In particular, EU-enlargement and technical progress imply further reforms in 2013 corresponding to further liberalization of CAP and a further shift towards the second pillar, i.e. from market & price to structural policies. (ii) These general trends would be attenuated by increased world market prices, while additional WTO restriction would amplify these trends. (iii) Compared to economic and international policy factors, constitutional reforms, e.g. a higher participation of the European Parliament in CAP decision-making, have only moderate impact on future CAP, while changed financial rules would significantly reverse policy trends, i.e. reallocating budget from the second to the first pillar.political economy general equilibrium model, European agricultural policy, endogenous policy preferences, CAP reform, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade, Political Economy,

Primary Klebsiella pneumoniae Liver Abscess with Metastatic Spread to Lung and Eye, a North-European Case Report of an Emerging Syndrome

A syndrome of community acquired liver abscess caused by highly virulent hypermucoviscous, rmpA positive Klebsiella pneumoniae strains occurs with high incidence in Asia. We here report a case complicated by metastatic infection, to our knowledge, the first one described in Northern Europe. This and other recently reported cases indicate the emergence of this severe syndrome outside of Asia

Beurteilung des Milchquotenb�rsensystems in Deutschland

In this paper the newly established rules for trading milk quotas in Germany are analyzed. These regulations have been in force since April 2000. Following a brief historical review of the quota system, the major changes in economic incentives regarding trading milk and the expected welfare implications are derived. Next, the effects of the new trading rules on quota prices in comparison to a reference system (sealed bid double auction) are discussed. In the empirical part the significance of the theoretical effects is illustrated. Recent changes in the regulations for quota trade are shown to have little effect in terms of mitigating these problems.rules for milk quota trading, auctions, Agricultural and Food Policy, Financial Economics,

Institutionelle Grundlagen der Agrarprotektion: Eine polit-�konomische Analyse der Agrarpolitik in den Mittel- und Osteurop�ischen L�ndern

The impact of political institutions, e.g. the organization of legislature, election and party systems, on agricultural protection has hardly been taken into account explicitly in theoretical and empirical studies, yet. In this framework the paper investigates to what extent political institutions explain observed variances in the political power of the agrarian population in the ten Central and Eastern European Countries / Candidates (CEEC) applying for an accession to the EU. Moreover, it is analyzed to what extent EU-accession will be politically feasible given the specific political and economic framework conditions of the individual states. In particular, empirical analyses imply the following results: (i) The political power of the agrarian population varies significantly among the analyzed countries. (ii) The political weights are significantly determined by political institutions. (iii) Analyzing to what extent EU-accession is politically feasible in the CEEC-states we can show that political feasibility of EU-accession crucially depends on keeping the rule of financial solidarity. Contrary, keeping the rule of financial solidarity implies that future CAP will become even more inefficient in economic terms.formal model of legislative decision-making, political economy of GAP, EU-enlargement, Agricultural and Food Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics, Political Economy,