Boundary restriction for negative emotional images is an example of memory amplification

We investigated whether boundary restriction—misremembering proximity to traumatic stimuli—is a form of memory amplification and whether re-experiencing trauma plays a role in boundary restriction errors. In four experiments, subjects viewed a series of traumatic photographs. Later, subjects identified the photographs they originally saw among distracters that could be identical, close-up, or wide-angled versions of the same photographs. Subjects also completed measures of mood, analogue PTSD symptoms, phenomenological experience of intrusions, and processing style. Across experiments, subjects were more likely to incorrectly remember the photographs as having extended boundaries: boundary extension. Despite this tendency, the extent to which subjects re-experienced traumatic aspects of the photographs predicted how often they incorrectly remembered the photographs as having narrower boundaries: boundary restriction. Our data suggest that although boundary extension is more common, boundary restriction is related to individual differences in coping mechanisms post-trauma. These results have theoretical implications for understanding how people remember trauma.Australian Research Council ARC DP14010266

Metacognitive and metamemory beliefs in the development and maintenance of posttraumatic stress disorder

Can metacognition increase trauma sufferers’ risk for developing and maintaining posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD)? We assessed the role of a range of cognitive and metacognitive belief domains—including metamemory—on PTSD symptoms. Adult participants reported their existing meta/cognitions and lifetime exposure to trauma, then 12 weeks later, they reported meta/cognitions and PTSD symptoms in relation to new trauma exposure since the initial assessment. Participants with more PTSD symptoms held more problematic metacognitions than participants with fewer distress symptoms. Moreover, people who endorsed maladaptive metacognitions before trauma exposure were more likely to experience symptoms of PTSD after exposure. Metacognition predicted the maintenance of elevated PTSD symptoms over the 12-week delay. Our findings support the metacognitive model of PTSD and highlight the importance of metamemory, an understudied factor in PTSD research

Meta-awareness and the involuntary memory spectrum: Reply to Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015)

© 2015 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/In their commentary, Meyer, Otgaar, and Smeets (2015) raise several important issues about the definitions, characteristics and applications of various involuntary cognitive phenomena. Here we respond to the comments of Meyer et al. in ways that we hope will advance understanding of these issues, and inform future research. In particular, we have focused on the characteristics of involuntary phenomena—particularly in relation to meta-awareness—and the clinical relevance of mind-wandering

Explaining Memory Amplification: Is It All About the Test Format?

Takarangi, M. K. T., Oulton, J. M., & Strange, D. (2017). Explaining Memory Amplification: Is It All About the Test Format? Clinical Psychological Science, 6(3), 394–406. https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702617744326 which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702617744326 Copyright © 2018 The Authors. DOI: 10.1177/2167702617744326Trauma-exposed people commonly exhibit a “memory amplification” effect, endorsing exposure to more traumatic events over time. Studies reporting this phenomenon have typically relied on checklists, where participants read event descriptions and indicate (yes/no) their exposure. We examined whether that approach is vulnerable to response biases and memory errors. In two experiments, participants viewed negative photos and completed an Old-New recognition test. In Experiment 1, participants completed either a photo recognition test or description test—composed of written descriptions of negative photos. In Experiment 2, we measured analogue PTSD symptoms and participants completed the description test twice, 24 hr apart. Those in the description test condition performed worse on the memory test and were more biased to endorse negative photos compared with the photo test condition. Furthermore, this bias to endorse negative photos increased over time and was related to analogue PTSD symptoms. Overall, our findings suggest that test format plays a role in memory amplification

Do meta-cognitive beliefs affect meta-awareness of intrusive thoughts about trauma?

© 2016 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/Background and Objectives People exposed to trauma often experience intrusive thoughts and memories about that event. Research examining people's responses to trauma assumes that people can accurately notice the occurrence of symptoms. However, we know from the broader cognitive literature on ‘mind-wandering’ that people are not always aware of their current focus of attention. That lack of awareness has implications for our theoretical and practical understanding of how trauma survivors recover from their experience. In the current study we investigated whether people's meta-cognitive beliefs about controlling trauma-related intrusions influenced the occurrence and meta-awareness of those intrusions. Methods We recruited participants who scored high (strong beliefs) or low (weak beliefs) on beliefs regarding the importance of controlling intrusive thoughts. Participants viewed a trauma film then—during a subsequent reading task—reported any film-related intrusions they noticed. We also intermittently asked half the participants to report what they were thinking at that particular moment, to “catch” intrusions without meta-awareness. Results People are not always aware of their trauma intrusions, and importantly, people with strong beliefs are more likely to notice trauma related intrusions both with and without meta-awareness than people with weak beliefs. Limitations We used an analogue trauma, and focused on a particular metacognitive belief, both of which somewhat limit generalizability. We also cannot definitively rule out demand effects. Conclusions Our data add to existing research showing people may lack meta-awareness of trauma-related thoughts, and suggest that survivors with particular metacognitive characteristics may be more vulnerable to ‘mind-wandering’ about trauma without awareness

Trauma-related versus positive involuntary thoughts with and without meta-awareness

© 2016 Elsevier Inc. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/In earlier work, we asked subjects to report involuntary thoughts relating to a trauma film and also probed subjects periodically. Subjects often reported involuntary thoughts in response to probes, suggesting they lacked meta-awareness of those thoughts. But it is possible that some or all probe-detected thoughts were continuations of thoughts subjects had spontaneously reported, leading us to overestimate involuntary thoughts lacking meta-awareness. It is also unclear whether failures in meta-awareness occur for other emotional events. We exposed subjects to a negative or positive film. Subsequently, they reported involuntary film-related thoughts and responded to probes that distinguished new from continuing thoughts. Many (54%) but not all probe-caught thoughts were thought continuations. This result supports our earlier finding that people can lack meta-awareness for trauma-related thoughts, but suggests caution in how meta-awareness is assessed. We also found that self-caught negative and positive involuntary thoughts occurred at a similar frequency, with different characteristics

Imagining trauma: Memory amplification and the role of elaborative cognitions

© 2018 Elsevier. This manuscript version is made available under the CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ This author accepted manuscript is made available following 24 month embargo from date of publication (April 2018) in accordance with the publisher’s archiving policyBackground and objectives: Trauma victims, such as war veterans, often remember additional traumatic events over time: the “memory amplification effect”. This effect is associated with the re-experiencing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), including frequent and intrusive images of the trauma. One explanation for memory amplification is that people gradually incorporate new, imagined information about the trauma with what they actually experienced, leading to an amplified memory for what actually happened. We investigated this proposal here. Methods: Participants viewed highly negative and graphic photographs and recorded their intrusions. Critically, we instructed some participants to elaborate on their intrusions—that is, we asked them to imagine details about the trauma beyond what they actually witnessed. We assessed memory for the traumatic photos twice, 24-hours apart. Results: The elaboration condition experienced fewer intrusions about the photos compared to the control condition. Furthermore, the elaboration condition were less susceptible to memory amplification compared to controls. Limitations: The use of negative photos allowed experimental control, however does not permit generalization of our findings to real-world traumatic experiences. Conclusions: Our findings suggest that effortful imagination of new trauma-related details leads to a reduction in intrusions and an increased tendency to not endorse trauma exposure over time. One explanation for this finding is that elaboration enhanced conceptual processing of the trauma analogue, therefore reducing intrusions. Critically, this reduction in intrusions affected participants’ tendency to endorse trauma exposure, which is consistent with the realitymonitoring explanation for memory amplification

A mega-analysis of memory reports from eight peer-reviewed false memory implantation studies

Understanding that suggestive practices can promote false beliefs and false memories forchildhood events is important in many settings (e.g., psychotherapeutic, medical, legal). The generalizability of findings from memory implantation studies has been questioned due to variability in estimates across studies. Such variability is partly due to false memories having been operationalized differently across studies and to differences in memory induction techniques. We explored ways of defining false memory based on memory science and developed a reliable coding system that we applied to reports from eight published implantation studies (N=423). Independent raters coded transcripts using seven criteria: accepting the suggestion, elaboration beyond the suggestion, imagery, coherence, emotion, memory statements, and not rejecting the suggestion. Using this scheme, 30.4% of cases were classified as false memories and another 23% were classified as having accepted the event to some degree. When the suggestion included self-relevant information, an imagination procedure, and was not accompanied by a photo depicting the event, the memory formation rate was 46.1%. Our research demonstrates a useful procedure for systematically combining data that are not amenable to meta-analysis, and provides the most valid estimate of false memory formation and associated moderating factors within the implantation literature to date