Contextual blindness in implicature computation

In this paper, I defend a grammatical account of scalar implicatures. In particular, I submit new evidence in favor of the contextual blindness principle, assumed in recent versions of the grammatical account. I argue that mismatching scalar implicatures can be generated even when the restrictor of the universal quantifier in a universal alternative is contextually known to be empty. The crucial evidence consists of a hitherto unnoticed oddness asymmetry between formally analogous existential sentences with reference failure NPs. I conclude that the generation of mismatching scalar implicatures does not require contextual access

Negation and the functional sequence

There exists a general restriction on admissible functional sequences which prevents adjacent identical heads. We investigate a particular instantiation of this restriction in the domain of negation. Empirically, it manifests itself as a restriction the stacking of multiple negative morphemes. We propose a principled account of this restriction in terms of the general ban on immediately consecutive identical heads in the functional sequence on the one hand, and the presence of a Neg feature inside negative morphemes on the other hand. The account predicts that the stacking of multiple negative morphemes should be possible provided they are separated by intervening levels of structure. We show that this prediction is borne out

Non-classical propositional calculi

There exist well-known varieties of implication, such as strict, intuitionist, three-valued and rigorous, which are non-classical in the sense of being more restrictive than material implication. But there exists also a type of implication, intuitively plausible, which is nonclassical not only in being more restrictive, but in satisfying certain theses which are classically false. These theses are exceedingly venerable, dating back to Aristotle and Boethius, but, despite their plausibility, have been generally rejected by logicians since. It has not been noticed, however, that in Sextus Empiricus reference is made to a species of Stoic implication which fits them perfectly.In this work formal recognition is given to this species of implication, known as connexive implication. It is shown that none of the well-known systems of prepositional logic is connexive, and a new system is accordingly constructed. A proof of consistency is given, and a number of problems posed for further investigation.</p