Development and initial reliability and validity of four self-report measures used in research on interactions between police officers and individuals with mental illnesses

There currently exists a dearth of reliable and valid instruments to examine key police officer variables of importance in the growing research on their interactions with individuals with mental illnesses. This study tested reliability and validity of four newly designed measures of the constructs of self-efficacy (Self-Efficacy Scale; SES), referral decisions and de-escalation skills (Behavioral Outcomes Scale; BOS), attitudes toward psychiatric treatment (Opinions about Psychiatric Treatment; OPT), and social distance (Adapted Social Distance Scale; ASDS) in a sample of law enforcement officers. Self-administered, anonymous surveys, which included the measures of interest, were completed by 177 officers—68 of whom were undergoing Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training and 109 of whom were not—at the beginning and end of week-long trainings. Analyses examined the internal consistency reliability, test-retest reliability, and construct validity of the instruments. The four measures of interest were found to be reliable and valid. Specifically, internal consistency coefficients and test-retest reliability correlations were generally acceptable, all four demonstrated sensitivity to change, and validity correlations were significant and in the expected direction. Findings demonstrated the ability to measure key constructs related to attitudes and intended behaviors in law enforcement officers utilizing psychometrically sound instruments. Further testing and the development of additional reliable and valid instruments focused on attitudinal and behavioral domains among officers who have frequent interactions with individuals with mental illnesses would be of great value

Autopoietic enactivism, phenomenology and the deep continuity between life and mind

In their recent book Radicalizing Enactivism. Basic minds without content, Dan Hutto and Erik Myin (H&M) make two important criticisms of what they call autopoietic enactivism (AE). These two criticisms are that AE harbours tacit representationalists commitments and that it has too liberal a conception of cognition. Taking the latter claim as its main focus, this paper explores the theoretical underpinnings of AE in order to tease out how it might respond to H&M. In so doing it uncovers some reasons which not only appear to warrant H&M’s initial claims but also seem to point to further uneasy tensions within the AE framework. The paper goes beyond H&M by tracing the roots of these criticisms and apparent tensions to phenomenology and the role it plays in AE’s distinctive conception of strong life-mind continuity. It is highlighted that this phenomenological dimension of AE contains certain unexamined anthropomorphic and anthropogenic leanings which do not sit comfortably within its wider commitment to life-mind continuity. In light of this analysis it is suggested that AE will do well to rethink this role or ultimately run the risk of remaining theoretically unstable. The paper aims to contribute to the ongoing theoretical development of AE by highlighting potential internal tensions within its framework which need to be addressed in order for it to continue to evolve as a coherent paradigm