Monopolistic Competition with Two-Part Tariffs

Non-uniform pricing equilibria are shown to dominate uniform pricing equilibria in free entry, monopolistically competitive markets with identical consumers. The non-uniform pricing equilibrium is welfare optimal. Comparisons of Cournot and non-uniform pricing equilibria in terms of the equilibrium number of firms and sales per firm show that the positioning of Cournot equilibria relative to the welfare optimal configuration of firms and outputs depends on the relative curvatures of inverse demand and average cost functions, entry-induced rotation of inverse demand functions, and the relative price effects of changes in own and other firms outputs. The choice between the non-uniform and uniform pricing interpretations of equilibria in differentiated product markets may have important implications for policy analysis

Measuring sustainable broadband adoption: An innovative approach to understanding broadband adoption and use

Efforts to promote sustainable broadband Internet adoption urge new attention to the classic diffusion of innovations paradigm. For this study, innovation attributes were reconceptualized following Social Cognitive Theory (SCT). In a sample of inner-city residents, the model accounted for 36% of the variance in intentions to adopt broadband technology and services, primarily from the SCT variables of expected outcomes and self-efficacy. Prior habitual use of the Internet was also a predictor. Price sensitivity was unrelated to adoption. Among demographic variables, only age had a significant (negative) relationship to broadband adoption after accounting for the SCT variables. Recommendations for the design and monitoring of sustainable broadband adoption interventions are made based on these findings

Trade Liberalization and Policy for Media Industries: A Theoretical Examination of Media Flows

Abstract: The recently developed microeconomic model of one-way international flows in films and television programs is shown to be a specific application of a more general model of trade in media products. Predictions of the general model are consistent with observed international flows for other media, geographic flows of media products within countries, and intertemporal flows of media products across distribution channels. The general tendency is for product to flow from large to small markets unless impeded by policy-created barriers. Earlier explanations for one-way international flows do not similarly generalize, but cultural explanations and the microeconomic model are complementary to each other. The role of market size in determining media trade flows and the effect of domestic media policies on the growth and relative sizes of national media markets should be considered in the formation of trade policies for media industries. Résumé: Dans cet article, nous discutons du modèle micro-économique récemment développé sur la circulation internationale unidirectionnelle de films et d'émissions de télévision. Nous montrons que ce modèle est l'application spécifique d'un modèle plus général d'échanges en produits médiatiques. Ce modèle plus général explique davantage que le cinéma et la télévision. En effet, il s'applique aux circulations internationales observées pour d'autres médias, à la circulation à l'intérieur d'un pays, et aux fluctuations temporelles dans les échanges de produits médiatiques entre pays. En général, les produits tendent à circuler des grands marchés aux petits, dans les cas où il n'y a pas de politiques pour faire obstacle à de tels échanges. Des explications antérieures à la nôtre pour la circulation internationale en sens unique ne généralisent pas de la même manière. Nous croyons que les explications culturelles et le modèle micro-économique sont très complémentaires. Avant de formuler des politiques d'échange pour les industries médiatiques, il est ainsi nécessaire de tenir compte de certaines questions; il faut notamment être conscient de la grandeur du marché, et des effets que les politiques domestiques ont produits sur les marchés médiatiques nationaux

Monopolistic Competition with Two-Part Tariffs

Non-uniform pricing equilibria are shown to dominate uniform pricing equilibria in free entry, monopolistically competitive markets with identical consumers. The non-uniform pricing equilibrium is welfare optimal. Comparisons of Cournot and non- uniform pricing equilibria in terms of the equilibrium number of firms and sales per firm show that the positioning of Cournot equilibria relative to the welfare optimal configuration of firms and outputs depends on the relative curvatures of inverse demand and average cost functions, entry-induced rotation of inverse demand functions, and the relative price effects of changes in own and other firms outputs. The choice between the non-uniform and uniform pricing interpretations of equilibria in differentiated product markets may have important implications for policy analysis.two part tariffs, monopolistic competition, variety