A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom: From London to Strasbourg by the Northwest Passage?

In anticipation of the United Kingdom\u27s patriation of the European Convention on Human Rights, the author explores the possible impact that a Bill of Rights will have on the U.K. system of justice from a European and U.K. perspective. The author argues that, from a European perspective, the U.K. has an established history of yielding to supra-national law given its membership in the European Union. However, from a U.K. perspective, this will present new challenges, as the constitutionality of domestic legislation is subject to increased judicial scrutiny in ensuring conformance with European Convention obligations. The author argues that the pressures on Parliament to remedy domestic legislation as a result of decisions made by foreign judges on the European Court of Human Rights will be a particularly challenging adjustment. He concludes that, while there are lessons to be learned from other countries with bills of rights, the traditional reluctance among U.K. judges to override the will of Parliament will render the impact of such a document unpredictable

A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom: From London to Strasbourg by the Northwest Passage?

In anticipation of the United Kingdom\u27s patriation of the European Convention on Human Rights, the author explores the possible impact that a Bill of Rights will have on the U.K. system of justice from a European and U.K. perspective. The author argues that, from a European perspective, the U.K. has an established history of yielding to supra-national law given its membership in the European Union. However, from a U.K. perspective, this will present new challenges, as the constitutionality of domestic legislation is subject to increased judicial scrutiny in ensuring conformance with European Convention obligations. The author argues that the pressures on Parliament to remedy domestic legislation as a result of decisions made by foreign judges on the European Court of Human Rights will be a particularly challenging adjustment. He concludes that, while there are lessons to be learned from other countries with bills of rights, the traditional reluctance among U.K. judges to override the will of Parliament will render the impact of such a document unpredictable

The insolence of office: the coercive jurisdiction of the courts against minsters and officials

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Ends and means: experts debate the democratic oversight of the UK’s intelligence services

Revelations from Edward Snowden about the scope of intelligence activities in the UK have led to renewed attempts to enhance democratic oversight of the UK’s security services. The heads of MI5, MI6 and GCHQ appeared before the Intelligence and Security Committee for the first time, while Lord Macdonald called for strengthened parliamentary accountability. In this post, we ask democracy and security experts to consider the need for further reform

Judicial Review, Irrationality, and the Legitimacy of Merits-Review

The definition of the irrationality ground of judicial review recognises the constitutional principle of the separation of powers, in allowing for judicial control of the executive only very rarely. The author in a previous article in this study found that the courts, on occasions, had intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions arguably were not irrational. To this end, the purpose of this article is to assess the constitutionality of these seemingly low standards of irrationality. The author does so by reference either to the manner of review employed—the use of the proportionality principle, for example—or the context of the administrative decision under scrutiny, such as the infringement of the applicant’s fundamental rights. The author finds that the cases from the previous article where low standards of irrationality were arguably adopted were, in fact, legitimate according to these chosen methods of evaluation. However, this is an interim conclusion because, for reasons of word length, the author is unable to complete a full assessment here. It is therefore proposed that a subsequent article will continue to examine the constitutionality of these cases. Furthermore, the author will also try and establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are excluded from irrationality review. If the author is unsuccessful in this regard, the final conclusion of this study will inevitably be that low standards of judicial intervention exist without limit—a clear assault on the constitutional principle stated above

Judicial Review, Irrationality, and the Limits of Intervention by the Courts

When exercising judicial review, the courts, on occasions, have intervened in circumstances where administrative decisions were not irrational. However, these low standards of judicial intervention are arguably constitutional, especially since the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). To this end, this article seeks to establish a zone of executive decision-making, for reasons of democracy, where the courts are clearly excluded. But it is unable to do so. Does this mean, therefore, that judicial intervention on the grounds of irrationality exists without limit? Assuming this to be the case, it is suggested that the courts should show greater respect to the administrative branch of the state where it has genuinely sought to engage with the legal process in arriving at its decisions

La prise de décision par le juge anglais

Sedley Stephen. La prise de décision par le juge anglais. In: Revue internationale de droit comparé. Vol. 50 N°3, Juillet-septembre 1998. pp. 817-819