Learning in the force protection environment between international operations : Last-minute learning

This study considers learning in international military operations. It explores these questions: What are the obstacles to learning in a military context? How did these obstacles manifest themselves in contribution made by the Royal Norwegian Air Force (RNoAF) in Mali? How effective in overcoming these obstacles were the formal and informal learning processes that took place? And what does this tell us about how learning might be improved in a military context? Norway has supported the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) since 2013. The RNoAF contribution began in January 2016 and continued periodically until May 2021. The contribution consisted of a Hercules C130 transport aircraft with crew and other support personnel. The detachment from Norway consisted of approximately 60–70 women and men with backgrounds in various fields of expertise (aviators, navigators, cargo masters, technicians, security personnel, and other support personnel) required to execute the mission. Based on in-depth interviews of key personnel, this study looks at learning that took place among the various constellations of personnel from the force protection responsible for security during the operation. Much of the learning took place through last-minute efforts because of tight schedules and other pressing tasks. The study has resulted in a conceptual model for facilitating and better supporting the acquisition of knowledge through a continuous process rather than at the last minute. This will require top-down and bottom-up processes, both formal and informalpublishedVersio

Patterns of Learning: A Systemic Analysis of Emergency Response Operations in the North Sea through the Lens of Resilience Engineering

Crisis-induced learning (CIL), as a concept, has an ancient history. Although the academic literature offers a range of sophisticated approaches to address CIL, it is still not quite clear how we learn, how we know we have learned, and what challenges and opportunities are involved in the CIL process. To address these questions and navigate ways forward, we need to use a specific real-world subject to capture contextual issues involved in a crisis cycle, which affects the learning process. In this paper, we uncover patterns of learning by exploring contextual issues involved with “actual scenarios” related to three COVID-19 episodes (emergencies) between August and December 2020. To analyze the study’s findings, we use three different themes from the DARWIN Generic Resilience Management Guidelines: (1) supporting the coordination and synchronization of emergency-response operation activities, (2) managing adaptive capacity, and (3) developing and revising procedures and checklists. Looking into these “real scenarios” seems fruitful for understanding patterns of learning, and it results in several learning recommendations. Among others, this study reveals how the uncertainty involved in emergency-response operations creates cognitive demands for emergent problem-solving

Patterns of Learning: A Systemic Analysis of Emergency Response Operations in the North Sea through the Lens of Resilience Engineering

Crisis-induced learning (CIL), as a concept, has an ancient history. Although the academic literature offers a range of sophisticated approaches to address CIL, it is still not quite clear how we learn, how we know we have learned, and what challenges and opportunities are involved in the CIL process. To address these questions and navigate ways forward, we need to use a specific real-world subject to capture contextual issues involved in a crisis cycle, which affects the learning process. In this paper, we uncover patterns of learning by exploring contextual issues involved with “actual scenarios” related to three COVID-19 episodes (emergencies) between August and December 2020. To analyze the study’s findings, we use three different themes from the DARWIN Generic Resilience Management Guidelines: (1) supporting the coordination and synchronization of emergency-response operation activities, (2) managing adaptive capacity, and (3) developing and revising procedures and checklists. Looking into these “real scenarios” seems fruitful for understanding patterns of learning, and it results in several learning recommendations. Among others, this study reveals how the uncertainty involved in emergency-response operations creates cognitive demands for emergent problem-solving