The Evolving Threat from Jihadist Terrorism in Turkey

If the trend towards the integration of Turkish Jihadists into larger transnational networks continues, the threat from Jihadist terrorism is likely to grow in Turkey and in countries in which there are sizable Turkish diaspora communities. In the 1980s and 1990s, Jihadist terrorism in Turkey was an isolated phenomenon represented by two organisations, the Turkish Hizbullah and the Great East Islamic Raiders’ Front (IBDA-C). The former was a Kurdish group and the latter predominantly Turkish. Both were nationalist in outlook and strategy. From 2001, however, many Turkish Jihadists have integrated into larger transnational networks, increasingly transcending national affiliations. Instead of fighting Turkish secularists and moderate Islamists, they attack Western targets. They have developed a new interest in Jihadist causes world-wide and have broadened their cooperation with Uzbek, Afghan, Pakistani and Arab Jihadists. The Turkish diaspora in Europe is an important element in this development. If this trend continues, the terrorist threat in Turkey and in countries with sizable Turkish diaspora communities is likely to grow

The Threat of Jihadist Terrorism in Germany

German internal security is threatened by three distinct terrorist phenomena: organised Jihadists, independent Jihadists and the new Internationalists. Although Germany has not yet become the victim of a major terrorist attack, the country has been on high alert several times since 2006. This ARI examines the three different terrorist phenomena threatening internal security in Germany and evaluates the factors impeding a more effective counter-terrorism campaign in the country. The German security services are ill prepared to tackle the threat posed by the Jihadists, especially those which are not closely affiliated to larger terrorist organisations abroad. A deeply divided public and political sphere –including the ruling grand coalition– have not agreed on a common diagnosis of the threat and possible counter-measures so that Germany remains extremely vulnerable to terrorist attacks

The Badr Organization: Iran's most important instrument in Iraq

Since 2014, the Shiite Badr Organization, led by its Secretary General Hadi al-Amiri, has become one of the main actors in Iraqi politics. This development was largely possible due to the successes of its paramilitary units in the fight against the Islamic State (IS). The Badr Organization, which relies strongly on support from Tehran, has thus become the most important instrument of Iranian politics in its neighbouring country. Tehran’s aim is to exert as much influence as possible on the central government in Baghdad and, at the same time, build a strong militia that depends on it. Since Badr established control over the province of Diyala and the Interior Ministry of Baghdad, the organization has grown appreciably and is now playing a role similar to that of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Badr is also part of a growing “Shiite International” which supports the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and aggravates religious conflicts between Sunnites and Shiites through its violent acts. The combination of these factors makes the organization an increasingly important obstacle to the future stabilization of Iraq. (author's abstract

Regional power United Arab Emirates: Abu Dhabi is no longer Saudi Arabia's junior partner

Since the Arab Spring of 2011, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have been pursuing an increasingly active foreign and security policy and have emerged as a leading regional power. The UAE sees the Muslim Brotherhood as a serious threat to regime sta­bility at home, and is fighting the organisation and its affiliated groups throughout the Arab world. The UAE's preferred partners in regional policy are authoritarian rulers who take a critical view of political Islam and combat the Muslim Brother­hood. The new Emirati regional policy is also directed against Iranian expansion in the Middle East. Yet the anti-Iranian dimension of Emirati foreign policy is considerably less pronounced than its anti-Islamist dimension. The UAE wants to gain control of sea routes from the Gulf of Aden to the Red Sea. Since the Yemen conflict began in 2015, it has established a small maritime empire there. The rise of the UAE to a regional power has made the country a more im­portant and simultaneously a more problematic policy partner for Germany and Europe. (author's abstract

The new "Lions of Syria": Salafist and jihadist groups dominate insurgency

Almost three years into the Syrian uprising, Islamist groups of various colour have established themselves as the dominant force among the rebels. The jihadists of the Nusra Front and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria represent two especially powerful groupings. Their growing strength has led international donors to reduce their support, and has sown violent conflict among the rebel groups. This has strengthened the position of President Assad, who has been arguing ever since 2011 that his adversaries are terrorists. Today there are indeed Islamist terrorists on the ground, enormously complicating the West's search for a Syria strategy. Neither the continuation of the Assad regime nor a take-over by the insurgents would be in the German interest. As long as this dilemma continues, Germany should concentrate on humanitarian aid and counter-terrorism, and to that end improve cooperation with Turkey. (author's abstract

A Chechen al-Qaeda? Caucasian groups further internationalise the Syrian struggle

In April 2014 government forces defeated a rebel offensive in the north of the Syrian province of Latakia. Although they initially reached the coast, the insurgents were unable to hold their positions there. The rebel forces included many Chechens and other Caucasians, had who previously been seen fighting exclusively in the Caucasus. Their strong presence in Syria is a completely new turn in international jihadism, and a warning to be taken seriously, as many arrive from the Georgian, Turkish and European diasporas rather from their original home republics. While their goal remains to "liberate" the Caucasus from Russian rule, they are now struggling to topple the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria and there is a risk that they will continue terrorist activity after returning to Turkey and Europe. The arrival of the Chechens in Syria makes a joint anti-terrorism strategy with Turkey even more urgent, and forces Western states to cooperate with Russian security agencies. (author's abstract

The other vanguard of international terrorism: despite setbacks Al-Qaeda profits from Yemen civil war

Yemen has been in the grip of open civil war since spring 2015. The biggest beneficiary of the conflict is the Yemeni al-Qaeda, whose recent capture of territory in southern Yemen opens up new opportunities. Its current gains will hinder a future stabilisation of Yemen and exacerbate the terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia. It also presents new dangers to the West, given that the Yemeni al-Qaeda is by far the strongest group in the network, and has already made repeated attempts to bring down transatlantic airliners. The danger it presents was underlined by the attack it instigated on the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris in January 2015. Although al-Qaeda in Yemen has lost important leaders since then, and a number of its fighters and commanders have defected to the Islamic State (IS), the collapse of the Yemeni state increases the risk that it will exploit its expanded radius of action and prepare new attacks on the United States and Europe. (author's abstract

Leading the counter-revolution: Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has survived the revolutions in the Arab world largely unscathed and entrenched itself as the undisputed leader of the Arab monarchies and the wealthy oil- and gas-producing states. More broadly, though, Saudi and Gulf rulers' concerns about their restive populations meld with confessional tensions associated with the pre-existing conflict between Iran and its regional adversaries. Saudi Arabia and its allies interpret unrest among the Shiites in the Saudi Eastern Province and Bahrain not as protest movements against authoritarian regimes but as an Iranian plot to topple legitimate governments with the assistance of the Arab Shiites. Riyadh has long feared that Tehran aspires to hegemony in the Middle East, and has consequently been pursuing an increasingly determined anti-Iranian regional policy since 2005. Since spring 2011 Riyadh has adopted a twin-track approach. Firstly, the Saudis have worked to stabilise the Jordanian and Moroccan monarchies and backed the Egyptian military, making Saudi Arabia the central proponent of the authoritarian status quo (ante) in the region. Secondly, Riyadh has increasingly taken the offensive. In March 2011 Saudi Arabia led the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar to rescue the Bahraini House of Khalifa after protests by Shiites threatened to spin out of control. The Saudis are operating even more decisively in Syria, where since September 2013 they have stepped up their supplies of money and arms to opposition and insurgent groups in order to bring about the fall of Iran's ally Assad. (author's abstract

Qatar's foreign policy: decision-making processes, baselines, and strategies

Qatar's domestic and foreign policy since the 1990s has developed along three main lines: The emirate has expanded its gas production and supplies liquefied gas to as many countries as possible; it assures itself of US military protection by providing bases; and it conducts a "soft power" campaign in the form of investments in media and sports. During the Arab Spring, Qatar went on the offensive, marking a change in its regional policy. At the time, it aimed at nothing less than revising the regional order in the Arab world. Since Emir Tamim took office in 2013, however, Doha has scaled back its ambitions, yet it still wants to be recog­nised as a regional power. Qatar tries to defuse regional conflicts by positioning itself as a mediator. It maintains good relations with Iran, its allies in the region and with mili­tant groups such as Hamas and the Taliban. This, as well as its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, repeatedly provokes conflicts with Saudi Arabia and other neighbours. As a result, Qatar has identified Tur­key as its new protecting power. Qatar is an attractive partner for Germany and Europe and can become an important gas supplier that has shown a long-standing interest in the Euro­pean market; it is also more flexible in its deliveries than many of its competitors. It was a serious mistake for German policy not to focus on Qatari gas much earlier. Placing more long-term orders could rectify this mistake. If there really is going to be a "Zeitenwende" security policy, Germany must also prepare itself for security risks emanating from the Middle East (keywords: migration, terrorism, nuclear proliferation). This means that Germany and Europe need pro-Western allies - like Qatar. (author's abstract

Ahrar al-Sham - the "Syrian Taliban": Al-Nusra ally seeks partnership with West

President Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to step down and open the door to compromise is not the only obstacle to a resolution of the Syrian conflict. Various Islamist groups focused on outright military victory also play a major role. Since 2012 they have come to dominate the uprising. The international community agrees that there can be no negotiations with the so-called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), nor with the al Nusra Front, which is close to al-Qaeda. The open question is how to treat Ahrar al-Sham, as the largest rebel group alongside ISIS. Its militant Salafist orientation, which makes it the al-Nusra Front’s closest ally, speaks against involving it in talks. Although Ahrar has been seeking since 2015 to position itself as a partner for the United States and its allies, there is no sign that it intends to abandon its alliance with the jihadists. (author's abstract