Are U.S. reserve requirements still binding?

Paper for a conference sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York entitled Financial Innovation and Monetary TransmissionBank reserves ; Federal funds market (United States) ; Monetary policy

Pre-IPO financial performance and aftermarket survival

Many commentators have portrayed the tech boom of the late 1990s as an era of unprecedented deterioration in the quality of firms undertaking initial public offerings. But as far back as the early 1980s, firms seeking to go public were displaying signs of financial weakness, and the failure rate of issuers was on the rise. An analysis of the likelihood of failure among IPO firms in 1980-2000 suggests that pre-issue profitability is a good predictor of aftermarket survival.Corporate profits ; Corporations - Finance ; Stock market ; Venture capital

Capital ratios as predictors of bank failure

The current review of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord has put the spotlight on the ratios used to assess banks’ capital adequacy. This article examines the effectiveness of three capital ratios—the first based on leverage, the second on gross revenues, and the third on risk-weighted assets—in forecasting bank failure over different time frames. Using 1988-93 data on U.S. banks, the authors find that the simple leverage and gross revenue ratios perform as well as the more complex risk-weighted ratio over one- or two-year horizons. Although the risk-weighted measures prove more accurate in predicting bank failure over longer horizons, the simple ratios are less costly to implement and could function as useful supplementary indicators of capital adequacy.Bank failures ; Bank capital ; Banks and banking - Ratio analysis

What was behind the M2 breakdown?

A deterioration in the link between the M2 monetary aggregate and GDP, along with large errors in predicting M2 growth, led the Board of Governors to downgrade the M2 aggregate as a reliable indicator of monetary policy in 1993. In this paper, we argue that the financial condition of depository institutions was a major factor behind the unusual pattern of M2 growth in the early 1990s. By constructing alternative measures of M2 based on banks’ and thrifts’ capital positions, we show that the anomalous behavior of M2 in the early 1990s disappears. Specifically, after accounting for the effect of capital constrained institutions on M2 growth, we are able to explain the unusual behavior of M2 velocity during this time period, obtain superior M2 forecasting results, and produce a more stable relationship between M2 and the ultimate goals of policy. Our work suggests that M2 may contain useful information about economic growth during periods of time when there are no major disturbances to depository institutions.Monetary policy

A disaggregate analysis of discount window borrowing

Discount window borrowing is an important source of liquidity for depository institutions. This article estimates the demand for adjustment credit of 240 commercial banks during 1981-90. By focusing on the borrowing behavior of individual banks, the authors are able to clarify some anomalies exhibited by borrowed reserves at the aggregate level.Discount window ; Federal funds market (United States)

CLO trading and collateral manager bank affiliation

This paper investigates whether the institutional affiliation of a collateralized loan obligation (CLO) manager influences the manager's access to information and risk appetite. We find that CLO managers affiliated with banks start to sell off their positions in loans arranged by their bank well before the onset of default. In contrast, CLO managers affiliated with nonbanks do not lower their exposures to distressed loans. These findings are consistent with bank-affiliated CLO managers being more risk averse, but they could also derive from them having access to valuable information. On close inspection, we find that although bank-affiliated CLO managers are averse to holding any distressed loans, they are also more aggressive at divesting distressed loans arranged by their parent bank, suggesting that they benefit from an information wedge. Besides helping us understand CLO managers’ trading activities, our findings highlight a potential limit to banks’ ability to originate loans and distribute them via their affiliated CLOs.authorsversionpublishe

Trends in financial market concentration and their implications for market stability

The link between financial market concentration and stability is a topic of great interest to policymakers and other market participants. Are concentrated markets - those where a relatively small number of firms hold large market shares - inherently more prone to disruption? This article considers that question by drawing on academic studies as well as introducing new analysis. Like other researchers, the authors find an ambiguous relationship between concentration and instability when a large firm in a concentrated market fails. In a complementary review of concentration trends across a number of specific markets, the authors document that most U.S. wholesale credit and capital markets are only moderately concentrated, and that concentration trends are mixed - rising in some markets and falling in others. The article also identifies market characteristics that might lead to greater, or less, concern about the consequences of a large firm's exit. It argues that the ease of substitution by other firms in concentrated markets is a critical factor supporting market resiliency.Financial markets ; Capital market ; Theory of the firm

Credit, equity, and mortgage refinancings

Using a unique loan level data set that links individual household credit ratings with property and loan characteristics, the authors test the extent to which homeowners' credit ratings and equity affect the likelihood that mortgage loans will be refinanced as interest rates fall. Their logit model estimates strongly support the importance of both the credit and equity variables. Furthermore, the authors' results suggest that a change in the overall lending environment over the past decade has increased the probability that a homeowner will refinance.Mortgages

The Role of Bank Advisors in Mergers and Acquisitions

This paper looks at the role of commercial banks and investment banks as financial advisor's. Unlike some areas of investment banking, commercial banks have always been allowed to compete directly with traditional investment banks in this area. In their role as lenders and advisor's, banks can be viewed as serving a certification function. However, banks acting as both lenders and advisor's face a potential conflict of interest that may mitigate or offset any certification effect. Overall, we find evidence of the certification effect for target firms, but conflicts of interest for acquirers. In particular, the target earns higher abnormal returns when the target’s own bank certifies the (more information ally opaque) target’s value to the acquirer. In contrast, we find no certification role for acquirers. This may be due to two reasons. First, certification plays less of a role for acquirers because it is the target firm that must be priced in a merger. Second, acquirers predominantly utilize commercial bank advisor's in order to obtain access to bank loans that may be used to finance the post-merger transition period. Thus, we find that acquirers tend to choose their own banks (those with prior lending relationships to the acquirer) as advisors in mergers. However, this choice weakens any certification effect and creates a potential conflict of interest because the acquirer’s advisor negotiates the terms of both the merger transaction and future loan commitments. Moreover, the advisor’s merger advice may be distorted by considerations related to the bank’s credit exposure resulting from both past and future lending activity. The market prices these conflicts of interest; we find significantly negative abnormal returns for bank advisor's when they advise their own loan customers in acquiring other firms