The Persistence of American Economic Power in Global Capitalism: From the 1960s into the Twenty-First Century

This dissertation intervenes in the more than four decades-long debate on the decline or persistence of American economic power. It argues that we cannot move forward without reconceptualizing the nature of economic power in global capitalism, especially by moving beyond national accounts (such as GDP). Too many commentators from across the diversity of perspectives assume that the relative rise and decline of national accounts approximates the relative rise and decline of national economic power. In contrast, this dissertation argues that in the era of globalization, national accounts are an inadequate measure of national economic power. Rather, we must investigate the transnational corporations themselves in order to encompass their transnational operations, and analyze the matrix of inter-linkages now characteristic of global capitalism in general, and American power in particular. Therefore, this dissertation draws upon extensive original empirical research, including the following: 1) the first aggregation of the national sales-shares of the world’s top 200 corporations from 1957 to 2013; 2) the first aggregation of the national profit-shares of the world’s top 2,000 corporations across 25 broad sectors from 2006 to 2013; 3) the first aggregation of the top 50 national acquirers and targets of all cross-border mergers and acquisitions worth $1 million or more from 1980 to 2012; and 4) the first national aggregation of the ownership structures of the world’s top 500 corporations. The results from this empirical research, among others, will illuminate a number of facets concerning contemporary global capitalism. First, the nationality of capital remains very relevant despite several decades of intensifying globalization at the turn of the twentieth century. Following from this, the persistence of American economic power from the 1960s into the twenty-first century is astounding, particularly at the technological frontier. Indeed, in advanced technology and even Wall Street, American dominance has actually increased since the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. There are no foreseeable contenders, including China. Therefore, this dissertation will demonstrate that far from relative American decline, in certain respects American economic power has never been stronger — and will conclude with a number of important implications from this analysis concerning the future of world order

"Crisis of Capital, Crisis of Theory": Conference Program and Videos

This is the first in a conference series organized by the Forum on Capital as Power and sponsored by Routledge and Springer. The present meetings explore the dual crisis of capital and theory. There are 21 scheduled presentations, including keynote addresses by Herman Scwhartz and Randall Germain and guest presentations by George Comninel, Leo Panitch, David McNally and Jonathan Nitzan. The conference closes with a roundtable interrogation of capital, power and the future of political economy. Attendance is free and all are welcome. DATE/TIME/PLACE: October 29-31, 2010 || York Lanes, Rooms 280N & 280A || Keele Campus of York University. VIDEOS: To watch the panels, click the link to the video podcasts above

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Guest editorial for online peer-reviewed journal on media and culture

Call for Papers: "Crisis of Capital, Crisis of Theory"

This is the first in a series of conferences in heterodox political economy, seeking to develop new ways of understanding capitalism and power. The conference will be held at York University in Toronto on October 29-31, 2010. The deadline for abstract submission is July 31, 2010

Back to the future, or the past? : on the re-periperalization of Central-East Europe

It is common for many commentators in the Western establishment to claim that "communism" collapsed in eastern Europe in 1989-91, and that the region henceforth is finally able to embark upon the path to the "free market", to join the hallowed halls of Western liberal "democracy". In addition, there is much credence given to the idea of the former state-socialists' rightful "Return to Europe" after half a century of "totalitarianism", now that much of at least central-east Europe is subsumed within the European Union. Underpinning many of these assertions is the ideology of modernization, that is, the beliefsystem that a given nation-state's "development" can follow a lineal evolution if a certain set of policy prescriptions are followed, and develop from industrializing to industrialized to advanced industrialized (or post-industrial). More often than not, the criteria to be a fullyfledged advanced industrialized country, or whatever other relevant stage at the apogee of progress, is simply a description of the West. The ideology of modernization can be divided into two opposing camps: neoliberalism and neomercantilism. Both advocate policy prescriptions to modernize a country (or so they claim); both theorize without any conceptualization of the projection of power in international relations. It is the central purpose of this thesis to provide an alternative to the above assertions, ideologies, and assumptions, by using the tools of analysis from mainly world-systems theory. The thesis argues that the "collapse" of state-socialism in central-east Europe should in fact be seen as its destruction, by certain processes and logics inherent to the capitalist world-economy. In particular, an analysis of the reconstitution of the world order by the core- particularly the hegemon- beginning in the 1970s and firmly established by the 1990swhat many misleadingly refer to as "globalization"- is crucial if we are to understand what is happening in central-east Europe (and indeed the world) today the return of its centuries old peripheral status in relation to the core, i.e. its re-peripheralization. Hence, this thesis concludes that we must look back to the past, not the future, in order to understand- and possibly change- the present. Key Words: Central-East Europe; Eastern Europe; European Enlargement; Globalization; International Political Economy, Modernization Theory, Neoliberalism; Poland; Post- Socialist Transformation; Transition Studies; World-Systems Theory.Arts, Faculty ofCentral, Eastern, and Northern European Studies, Department ofGraduat

Call for Papers: "Crisis of Capital, Crisis of Theory"

capital accumulation capitalism competition crisis imperialism finance international relations market power productivity state transnational corporationsThis is the first in a series of conferences in heterodox political economy, seeking to develop new ways of understanding capitalism and power. The conference will be held at York University in Toronto on October 29-31, 2010. The deadline for abstract submission is July 31, 2010

A chip war made in Germany? US techno‐dependencies, China chokepoints, and the German semiconductor industry

As geo-economic and geopolitical rivalries intensify, the US is weaponizing its power in global semiconductor supply chains to restrict Chinese technological development. To win this chip war against China, the US must compel key foreign firms in Asia and Europe not to supply its adversary with the materials, tools, and know-how needed to make advanced semiconductors. But will these firms agree to follow the US chip embargo and avoid the lucrative Chinese market? This article examines Germany’s “China chokepoint” firms, whose identity and behavior remain critically understudied. Drawing on novel data sets and annual company reports, we show that German firms across three case studies are highly “techno-dependent” on the US. Despite this techno-dependence, German firms have so far sought to circumnavigate US export controls. This constitutes a puzzle because Germany’s semiconductor firms are no more involved in the Chinese market than are firms in Japan and South Korea—which have frequently signaled voluntary compliance or even withdrawn from China in anticipation of harsher US sanctions. To resolve this puzzle, we map out Germany’s semiconductor network and demonstrate that it is tightly articulated with Germany’s auto industry—which is in turn heavily exposed to Chinese markets. We propose that this secondary exposure, through firms’ embeddedness in Germany’s “national production regime,” encourages them to resist the US chip embargo. In this way, we contribute empirical and conceptual insights to international political economy scholarship on firms as geo-economic actors, actively engaged in a protracted and contentious policy process with US authorities.</p