Prices and Exchange Rate of Hellenic Drachma (GRD), during 1981-

The paper presents empirical results on an import prices equation to the case of the small open Hellenic economy, during her course to the European Monetary Union, in the 1980s until mid-1990s. The analysis employs cointegration theory to examine the long-run co-movements of prices, effective exchange rate of GRD and unit labour cost of the European countries, which export to Greece. Innovation accounting is also used so as to detect the dynamics of the data set. We found slight evidence to support long run equilibrium, however, it was only the Hellenic inflation rate, which was adjusting to the deviations from this. The fragile stability of the system is confirmed by the impulse response functions examination where the exchange rate of the GRD do not converge to its long-run values, even after a 3 years period from the one unit-shock in various innovations. The determinant role of the growth rate of the unit labour cost and therefore of European countries’ prices to the exchange rate of GRD, to the Hellenic inflation rate, and less to the growth rate of the import prices is (1) justified by its high proportion to their variance decomposition and (2) became apparent approximately after 9 months. The latter seems to amount to the “contract-period” in the Magee’s terminology.Trade Balance Adjustment through exchange rate policies; European Monetary Integration; Unit Root Tests; Co-integration Analysis; Innovation Accounting

On the possibility of licensing in a market with logit demand functions

We analyze the incentives for technology transfer between two firms in a market characterized by a logit demand framework. The available licensing policies of the incumbent innovator are the up front fee, royalty and two-part tariff policies. We show that when the market is covered there is no equilibrium where technology transfer occurs.

Trade Balance and Exchange-Rate for a Small Open Economy during the EMS: The Hellenic Case 1983:1-1995:12

We are interested on assessing the effectiveness of the Bank of Greece (BoG) exchange rate policy, to achieve the objective of adjusting balance of payments des-equilibrium, during the period 1983:1-1995:12. The traditional theory of the balance of payments adjustment process through exchange rate changes is used for this purpose. We found evidence, first, about the doubtful effectiveness of this policy due to the marginal verification of the critical elasticities condition; second, about the success of the exchange rate policy in the short-run, since the monthly data of bilateral exchange rates (USD, DEM, ITL, FRF, GBP, JPY) of the Hellenic Drachma (GRD) Granger cause the respective trade balances; third, about the significant co-movement in the series which in the long-run, are driven by the same stochastic trend. We are much aware of the tentative nature of these conclusions. However, our findings suggest that the loss of the exchange rate policy was costly in the case of Hellas because an efficient policy sacrificed by the BoG to the European Central Bank (ECB).Optimum Currency Area, EMS, EMU, Traditional Adjustment Process for Merchandise Payments, Granger Causality, Integration and Co- integration Analysis

Hellenic Export Prices and European Monetary Integration, 1970- 1995.

We aim to explain the variability of the Hellenic Export Index Unit Value, during the period 1970-1995. The Hellenic index of unit labour cost, an effective index of unit value of European competitors’ exports and the effective exchange rate of the Greek Drachma (GRD) are used as explanatory variables, suggested by the literature and much more by the consequences of the Hellenic accession into the EEC. We found evidence with regards to the sample’s split in the accession’s year 1981 and the equilibrium relationship between Hellenic export prices and exchange rate of GRD during the second subperiod. In addition, in spite of the small size of the Hellenic economy we detected the Greek exporters’ discreet pricing policy, for the first sub-period, this was possible due to the diversification of their destination markets and for the second, the sliding rate policy of the Bank of Greece. The latter policy combined with the European competitors’ pricing policy re-established their margins, with at the most a year lag, whenever the Hellenic labour cost was increased.Decomposition Approach; Export Prices Equations; Discreet Pricing Policy; Inconsistent triad; European Monetary Integration; Integration and Co-integration Analysis.

When an inefficient firm makes higher profit than its efficient rival

This paper considers a Cournot duopoly game with endogenous organization structures. There are two firms A and B who compete in the retail market, where A is more efficient than B. Prior to competition in the retail stage, firms simultaneously choose their organization structures which can be either 'centralized' (one central unit chooses quantity to maximize firm's profit) or 'decentralized' (the retail unit chooses quantity to maximize firm's revenue while the production unit supplies the required quantity). Identifying the (unique) Nash Equilibrium for every retail-stage subgame, we show that the reduced form game of organization choices is a potential game. The main result is that with endogenous organization structures, situations could arise where the less efficient firm B obtains a higher profit than its more efficient rival A.Centralized structure; decentralized structure; potential games

Exceptional Anti-Icing Performance of Self-Impregnating Slippery Surfaces

A heat exchange interface at subzero temperature in a water vapor environment, exhibits high probability of frost formation due to freezing condensation, a factor that markedly decreases the heat transfer efficacy due to the considerable thermal resistance of ice. Here we report a novel strategy to delay ice nucleation on these types of solid-water vapor interfaces. With a process-driven mechanism, a self-generated liquid intervening layer immiscible to water, is deposited on a textured superhydrophobic surface and acts as a barrier between the water vapor and the solid substrate. This liquid layer imparts remarkable slippery conditions resulting in high mobility of condensing water droplets. A large increase of the ensuing ice coverage time is shown compared to the cases of standard smooth hydrophilic or textured superhydrophobic surfaces. During deicing of these self-impregnating surfaces we show an impressive tendency of ice fragments to skate expediting defrosting. Robustness of such surfaces is also demonstrated by operating them under subcooling for at least 490hr without a marked degradation. This is attributed to the presence of the liquid intervening layer, which protects the substrate from hydrolyzation enhancing longevity and sustaining heat transfer efficiency.Comment: This document is the Accepted Manuscript version of a Published Work that appeared in final form in ACS Applied Materials & Interfaces, copyright (c) American Chemical Society after peer review and technical editing by the publisher. To access the final edited and published work see pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acsami.7b0018

Strategic delegation in a sequential model with multiple stages

We analyze strategic delegation in a Stackelberg model with an arbitrary number, n, of firms. We show that the n-1 last movers delegate their production decisions to managers whereas the first mover does not. Equilibrium incentive rates are increasing in the order with which managers select quantities. Letting u_i^* denote the equilibrium payoff of the firm whose manager moves in the i-th place, we show that u_n^*>u_{n-1}^*>...>u_2^*>u_1^*. We also compare the delegation outcome of our game with that of a Cournot oligopoly and show that the late (early) moving firms choose higher (lower) incentive rates than the Cournot firms.Comment: To appear in International Game Theory Review (IGTR), Vol. 13, No. 3 (2011) 1-1