Una società armata è una società libera

Guns are mere objects. Preventing people from owning them, or limiting their availability, is an infringement of the natural right to property. Guns are also a peculiar good, since they are the key for the protection of liberty and property. In this perspective, gun control is not about guns: it is about control. In fact, government growth may be slowed by private gun ownership. A tyranny is unlikely to occur where people are armed. Historical evidence confirms this point: for example, Adolf Hitler disarmed the German Jews as a premise to their genocide. Moreover, statistics show that private gun ownership does not increase gun accidents or crime; indeed, when private citizens are armed, criminals tend to strike less, or to strike in less lethal ways. Criminals fear armed citizens much more than police forces. Gun control laws, however, are extremely effective in the disarmament of lawabiding citizens; much less in disarming outlaws. The right to keep and bear arms should be maintained where it is recognized, and restored elsewhere. Italy belongs to the latter category. Libertarians’ efforts to reduce the size of government require private gun ownership, because privately owned weapons are the only, sensible obstacle to the rise of Political power

Uno, nessuno o centomila? Tre miti sui prezzi dei carburanti in Italia

This paper deals with the issue of transparency in the pricing process for motor fuels, vis-à-vis the collusion charges between oil companies (for which no evidence is found) and the «myth» of «one» national price for motor fuels. Such an approach ignores both the competition between oil companies, and the large geographical differences. The paper concludes by identifying some structural rigidities in the motor fuel distribution, that are largely due to legislation or regulatory failures

How solar subsidies can distort the power market: the case of Italy

Italian policies to stimulate power production have been a success in the sense that solar power capacity has exploded, but they have also led to formidable costs. What is more, argues Carlo Stagnaro of the Italian think tank Istituto Bruno Leoni, support for green power has profoundly distorted the functioning of the Italian energy market. As solar power is subsidized and given unlimited priority access to the grid, the size of the "contestable market", where power producers compete with each other, has shrunk dramatically. Stagnaro warns that the measures now being discussed to remedy the problems will put further pressure on the market model in Italy and lead to more control from above

Europe 2020: an Alternative Proposal

The European Union has unilaterally decided to implement a cap & trade scheme to contain greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions, starting on 1 January 2005. After the First Phase of the Scheme had been concluded on 31 December 2007, emissions from the sectors covered by the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) had actually increased. That is not enough to tell that the scheme didn’t work: there are too little data to perform a credible assessment. The literature on the issue is not unanimous. It seems plausible, however, that some permits over-allocation occurred in 2005, that might explain the not-so-exciting performance of the scheme. In fact, to some extent some overallocation was also acknowledged by the European Commission itself, which adopted more stringent criteria for the Second Phase of ETS (2008-2012). Now the criteria and the rules for the Third Phase (2013-2020) are being debated, with an emphasis over defining even more stringent criteria and a shift from a grandfatherin system in the initial allocation (whereby allowances are initially given free-of-charge on the basis of historical track records for emissions), towards a partial auctioning system (whereby permits are initially given to the highest bidders), with a goal of a full auctioning in 2027. At the same time, safeguard measures are being considered in order to prevent “carbon leakage” (i.e. delocalization due to higher costs of energy) in the energy-intensive economic sectors or sub-sectors that are exposed to international competition. This paper examines the guidelines for the Energy Policy for Europe by assessing its effectiveness in achieving the stated environmental targets, assuming not every country in the world will be willing to pursue similar targets. Subsequently, it identifies the major shortcomings in the European policies, that mostly depend on the complexity and possible politicization of the ETS. Finally, it reviews the possible alternatives, by emphasizing the benefits that a revenue-neutral carbon tax might deliver both in terms of reaching the environmental goals, and of the policy’s efficiency and allocational efficiency. Two models of carbon tax are considered: one defined on the basis of the expected social cost from GHGs emissions, the other dependent on a state function that measures the degree of global warming in any given year

How solar subsidies can distort the power market: the case of Italy

Italian policies to stimulate power production have been a success in the sense that solar power capacity has exploded, but they have also led to formidable costs. What is more, argues Carlo Stagnaro of the Italian think tank Istituto Bruno Leoni, support for green power has profoundly distorted the functioning of the Italian energy market. As solar power is subsidized and given unlimited priority access to the grid, the size of the "contestable market", where power producers compete with each other, has shrunk dramatically. Stagnaro warns that the measures now being discussed to remedy the problems will put further pressure on the market model in Italy and lead to more control from above

Costs of Nuclear v. Solar Power

A study by the North Carolina Waste Awareness Network (NC WARN), an anti–nuclear power advocacy group, argues that solar power today is less expensive than nuclear power. Media have embraced this study despite its absurd conclusion and its arbitrary use of subsidies in calculating the costs of competing energy sources. NC WARN calculates solar power’s costs at 35 cents per kWh then drastically lowers it by applying two subsidies (federal and state tax credits). Subsidies may reduce the price to consumers, but they do not reduce the cost of generating electricity. Otherwise, a 100 percent tax credit would make the generation of solar power completely free. Even so, NC WARN does not apply subsidies to lower the cost of nuclear power. Therefore, their report unfairly gives solar power the “benefit” of subsidies while denying it to nuclear power

Are Green Jobs Real Jobs? The Case of Italy

The European Union is strongly promoting the adoption of renewable energy sources (RES). This policy relies mostly on environmental reasons, but its promoters also claim that RES subsidies will result into the creation of a significant number of jobs. This papers takes into examination the case of Italian policies with regard to solar panels and wind turbines. The number of RES-related jobs is estimated and it is compared with the number of jobs that are displaced by higher energy prices, due to the cost of incentives. The net balance is found to be negative

Reti di trasporto nazionale e concorrenza nei mercati del gas: il caso Eni-Snam Rete Gas

In transposing EU Directive 73/2009/CE on natural gas infrastructures into Italy’s national legislation, the country opted for a Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) model instead of full ownership unbundling. ITO allows the essential facility to be controlled by a vertically integrated incumbent who is also in charge of choosing the company’s directors, even though within a strictly regulated context. Regulation applies both to the use of the infrastructure itself and information flow to and from it. This paper explores the costs and benefits of ownership unbundling in the light of the literature. The Italian case is studied by developing a simple econometric model that compares the investment policy of Snam Rete Gas – i.e. the operator of Italy’s natural gas transportation network, which is controlled by the former monopolist Eni - with that of Terna, operator of the electricity transmission grid, which has been unbundled from the formerly-vertically integrated incumbent since 2004

Reti di trasporto nazionale e concorrenza nei mercati del gas: il caso Eni-Snam Rete Gas

In transposing EU Directive 73/2009/CE on natural gas infrastructures into Italy’s national legislation, the country opted for a Independent Transmission Operator (ITO) model instead of full ownership unbundling. ITO allows the essential facility to be controlled by a vertically integrated incumbent who is also in charge of choosing the company’s directors, even though within a strictly regulated context. Regulation applies both to the use of the infrastructure itself and information flow to and from it. This paper explores the costs and benefits of ownership unbundling in the light of the literature. The Italian case is studied by developing a simple econometric model that compares the investment policy of Snam Rete Gas – i.e. the operator of Italy’s natural gas transportation network, which is controlled by the former monopolist Eni - with that of Terna, operator of the electricity transmission grid, which has been unbundled from the formerly-vertically integrated incumbent since 2004

CARBON CONUNDRUM How to save climate change policy from government failure

Both the UK and the EU have made commitments to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Political leaders all over the world have promised ‘new green deals’ that involve embracing large-scale government intervention. These policies lead to substantial resources being allocated on the basis of politicians’ own technological preferences, rather than according to the principles of economic and technical efficiency. • Energy sources are both taxed and subsidised. In principle, environmental taxes and subsidies should reflect externalities. However, in practice, policy is chaotic with tax treatment reflecting the nature of the fuel, who consumes the fuel and for what purpose the fuel is used. In some countries, renewable energy receives large subsidies with little or no regard to the environmental benefit they actually deliver. Furthermore, fossil fuels are generally subsidised too. In the UK, that happens by an exemption from the general rate of value added tax. • On average, oil products are taxed at €405 per tonne of oil equivalent in the UK and €334 in the EU27, as compared with €135 and €101 for natural gas and €112 and €84 for coal. This is despite the fact that coal, not oil, poses the largest environmental challenges as far as climate change is concerned. • Energy sources, including those that are taxed and including fossil fuels, are also heavily subsidised. In 2018 energy subsidies were as high as €500 per head in the UK and €355 in the EU27. Most subsidies were given to renewable energy sources, the production of which was subsidised by €448 per tonne of oil equivalent on average in the UK and €320 in the EU27. Subsidies were higher for solar photovoltaics (€1,468 per tonne of oil equivalent in the UK and €2,019 in the EU27), followed by wind power (€961 and €743, respectively). Hydro power and bio-energies received, on average, much lower subsidies. These differential subsidies to different forms of renewable energy sources are wasteful and inefficient. Subsidies to fossil fuels were generally intended to support consumption rather than production. On average, oil, natural gas and coal received €130, €61 and €86 per tonne of oil equivalent in subsidies in the UK and €320, €47 and €27 respectively in the EU27. • If we net off taxes and subsidies, we find that, on balance, renewables are heavily subsidised, while fossil fuels have greater taxes levied on them than they receive in subsidies. However, there is no coherent pattern. The net effect of taxes and subsidies leads to substantially greater net taxes on oil than on natural gas while coal is taxed the least. The level of net taxes on energy sources does not, in any way, relate to the externalities from the energy source. • If the EU-sponsored estimates of external costs from energy sources is taken as a benchmark, it can be said that all energy sources are either under-taxed or over-subsidised. • It is clear that taxes and subsidies on energy sources are not designed as a rational tool of environmental policy. They are part of a broader industrial policy that reflects the individual preferences of policymakers and the producer and consumer interest groups that influence them. • This means that current green policies are more costly than they need be. A rational system that taxed energy sources according to the damage caused by their emissions would ensure that greater levels of carbon reduction would be possible for a much lower economic cost. It would also make use of decentralised information, as individuals would be able to reduce carbon emissions in the way that was least costly for them. • Climate change is by no means the only externality from the use of energy. Many other externalities have a local, not a global, nature. The problems are not significantly different from a range of other scenarios where economic activity by one party has an impact on another party. Externalities with a local impact do not justify either taxes or subsidies at the national level. They require a legal, institutional and constitutional framework which allows the maximum scope for preferences to be expressed through various bargaining and charging mechanisms at the local level. • Decarbonisation has been established as a key policy objective for the UK and the EU. Economic efficiency, including efficiency of capital allocation, are especially important in this process given the immense costs involved. For this reason, the government should stop its policies of trying to pick winners, subsidising fossil fuels and subsidising renewables and levy a carbon tax proportional to emissions. Estimates of the damage caused by emissions may vary and those used by the EU are contestable. Thus, there is room for debate on how big a carbon tax should be. However, this is the most efficient mechanism available for reducing carbon emissions. • The proceeds of a carbon tax should be used directly to reduce the tax burden in other areas. Welfare benefits would be uprated as a result of the impact of a carbon tax on prices. The aim of a carbon tax is to price carbon and not to increase the tax burden. • The invasion of Ukraine by Russia does not change the argument. Indeed, it makes it more important that we adopt policies that lead to the efficient consumption and production of energ