What punishment expresses

In this article, I consider the question of what punishment expresses and propose a way of approaching the question that overcomes problems in both psychosocial and philosophical expressivist traditions. The problem in both traditions is, I suggest, the need for an adequate moral – neither moralizing nor reductive – psychology, and I argue that Melanie Klein’s work offers such a moral psychology. I offer a reconstruction of Klein’s central claims and begin to sketch some of its potential implications for an expressive account of punishment. I outline a Kleinian interpretation of modern punishment’s expression as of an essentially persecutory nature but also include depressive realizations that have generally proved too difficult for liberal modernity to work through successfully, and the recent ‘persecutory turn’ is a defence against such realizations. I conclude by considering the wider philosophical significance of a Kleinian account for the expressivist theory of punishment

The role of recognition in the desistance process:A case analysis of a former far-right activist

This article explores the intersubjective dynamics that foster desistance from crime. It explains that the concepts of ‘identification’ and ‘recognition’—as defined by Jessica Benjamin—illuminate how psychic change can come about despite social continuity within offenders’ lives. The value of Benjamin’s approach is illustrated through the analysis of the case of a former far-right activist. The article shows that in order to desist from crimes that involve a symbolic ‘othering’ (e.g. hate crimes) offenders have to reclaim the psychic parts of themselves that are projected onto victims. The article concludes that when those deemed ‘other’ are able to withstand and survive hostile projections the possibilities for psychic change among desisting offenders are enhanced