The National and Communitary Protection of Individual Rights in Aquis Communautaire Beyond the Application of Judicial Measures

The protection of individual rights within the non-judicial area is no less important that the judicial one, and it is much more often applied. Imprecise as it is, the distinction between the judicial and non-judicial protection does not bear problems in practice. One is entitled to judicial protection in CoJS and CFI and national courts (acting as communal courts) with regard to the violence of rights (protected in acquis communautaire by other units, institutions and legal persons belonging to member states). The protection in national courts deals with the whole range of acquis, including e.g. (after the recent reform in this matter) the right of competition of the EU. Now the judicial protection embraces the following: the right of petition to the European Parliament and the right of complaint to the communal Ombudsman, and numerous complaints to the Commission. With regard to the violence of the communal right (including: cartel plot, public aid, subsidies, antidumping right, and other economic-merchant practices). The non-judicial protection is also enriched by the right to turn to all institutions of the EU in the physical and legal person's mother tongue from the area of the Union, and the duty to answer in this language. Certainty, this type of protection includes also all kinds of means for the protection of the consumer, health protection, and protection of the environment. All authorities and public institutions of the member states are also obliged to provide non-judicial protection in the area of acquis. There are no doubts as to the duties of the EU states that follow from the primary and secondary communal right in the are under consideration. The non-judicial protection in the national systems of entitlements that follow from KPP has no complete juridical justification (it will be introduced by the Constitution for Europe). The mechanisms of protection under discussion exert a positive influence on the enhancement of the international protection of human rights

Subjectivity of the international organizations (gos) and of the intergovernmental or states conferences – introduction to the problem.

Potrzeba stworzenia uznanej definicji podmiotowości (osobowości) międzynarodowej, zwłaszcza takiej, która pozwalałaby na odróżnianie od podmiotów innych niż państwa struktur niepodmiotowych, dotyczy też organizacji i konferencji międzynarodowych (międzyrządowych) sensu largo. Problem tych konferencji bywa poruszany w doktrynie rzadko. Niektóre z nich, zwłaszcza GATT i OBWE, korzystały lub korzystają z niewątpliwej podmiotowości międzynarodowej. Istnieją konferencje wewnątrz organizacji, jak np. unijna IGC, prawotwórcze (np. Rzymska nt. Statutu MTK) i „wewnątrz” traktatów (np. COP w Ramowej Konwencji NZ NT zmian klimatu). Na drugim biegunie są konferencje o minimalnych cechach podmiotowych. Konferencje odgrywają coraz większą rolę w obrocie międzynarodowym. Wszystko to uzasadnia stawiane tu pytania oraz propozycję zarysu badań nad systematyką, prawem, zasadami i procedurami konferencji międzynarodowych. Problem statusu konferencji jest tu chyba najistotniejszy.The necessity to create a widely recognized definition of international personality (especially such that would provide possibility to distinguish subjects from non-subject structures) refers also to international (intergovernmental) organizations and conferences. The problem of the conferences is seldom touched in the doctrine. Some of conferences, especially GATT and CSCE/OSCE used or use undoubtible international subjectivity (and effectivity). On the other end there are conferences with minimal subject features. In classification aspects, there are authonome conferences, conferences inside organizations (GOs) like e.g. IGC of the EU, lawmaking conferences (like Rome Conference on the ICC Statute), or “inside” an international treaty (e.g. COPs & MOPs in the UN Framework Convention of the Climate Changes - UNFCCC). International Organisations and Conferences play a big role in the international legal turn-over. That all justifies questions and proposal of researches on systematics, law and principles of the international conferences status

For a new approach to human rights in contemporary democracies – effectiveness and pragmatism (proposal de lege ferenda)

Obecny model praw człowieka przyjmuje optymistyczne założenie, że ustalony katalog praw jest w pełni realizowany, bez wielu aktów i środków wykonawczych. Poszczególne, ważne prawa w praktyce są jednak słabo chronione, a niedostatek instrumentów nie zapewnia pełnej, dostępnej i skutecznej ochrony. Także w porządku UE przyjmuje się założenie skuteczności unormowanych praw. Powyższe oraz priorytetowy obowiązek państw płynący z zasady zwierzchnictwa narodu implikuje potrzebę nowego ujęcia i regulacji praw człowieka.The current model of human rights (HR) protection includes optimistic supposition, that HR catalogue is to be easy and effectively realized, so it needs a few executive acts and measures. In practice single but important rights are weakly protected and insufficient instruments don’t give them guarantee of complete, effective & accessible protection. Also in the EU legal order it supposes effectiveness of regulated rights. All above mentioned as well as principal obligations of HR protection deriving from supremacy (& sovereignty) of nation are to implicated the need of a new approach and regulations of HR

Legal Weaknesses of the System and Local Democracy of Warsaw

Cel: ustalenie zakresu stosowania konstytucyjnych i ustawowych norm w praktyce m.st. Warszawy oraz skutki status quo dla społeczności lokalnych. Metoda prawno-porównawcza. Wniosek: norma ustrojowa jest jasno określona ale nieadekwatnie stosowana. Istnieje konieczność zmiany tego stanu rzeczy w praktyce prawnej, dla poprawy demokracji i świadomości prawnej społeczeństw lokalnych. Treść: jeśli Konstytucja RP wprowadza prawa społeczeństw lokalnych (a zwłaszcza ich podstawowych jednostek) do samorządności terytorialnej to nie znajduje to odbicia w ustawie warszawskiej, a zwłaszcza w Statucie m.st. Warszawy i Uchwale o przekazaniu niektórych kompetencji dzielnicom. Tak rodzi się niekorzystna dla tych jednostek praktyka. Ograniczanie wspomnianych uprawnień powinno być dostrzegane oraz budzić reakcję społeczeństw lokalnych (chyba niezbyt świadomych swych praw) wobec władz przedstawicielskich, sądów i Trybunału Konstytucyjnego. Stan obecny niekorzystnie wpływa na interesy społeczności lokalnych dzielnic Warszawy, a szerzej także na stosowanie zasad konstytucyjnych przez organy państwa wbrew interesom obywateli. Artykuł ma charakter koncepcyjny.Aim: to provide for the scope of application of constitutional and statutory norms in the practice of the metropolitan city of Warsaw as well as consequences of status quo for local communities. Legal and comparative method. Conclusion: the constitutional norm is clearly defined though inadequately applied. There is the need to change this state of affairs in the legal practice for the purpose of improvement of democracy and legal awareness of local communities. Contents: if the Constitution of the Republic of Poland introduces the rights of local communities (and particularly of their basic units) to the local self-governmental system, this is not reflected in the Warsaw Act, and particularly in the Statutes of the metropolitan city of Warsaw and in the Resolution on delegation of some competencies to districts. Thus there emerges the unfavourable for these units practice. Limitation of the said empowerments should be perceived and should arouse reaction of local communities (perhaps not enough aware of their rights) vis-à-vis representative authorities, courts and the Constitutional Tribunal. The present state unfavourably affects interests of local communities of Warsaw districts and,broader, also the application of the constitutional principles by the state bodies contrary to the citizens’ interests. The article is of the conceptual nature

International normative frame-work of the self-government administration – draft of the problem

W międzynarodowych unormowaniach samorządu terytorialnego można wyróżnić standardy zwyczajowe i traktatowe, w tym konwencje o charakterze uniwersalnym, kontynentalnym i regionalnym. Często mylący termin prawo europejskie winien obejmować zarówno normy zwyczajowe, jak i traktatowe o charakterze euroatlantyckim i kontynentalnym, a wśród ostatnich należy eksponować zwłaszcza regulacje Rady Europy i prawa Unii (pośród kilkunastu możliwych do wyróżnienia systemów). Częstym błędem jest nieujmowanie przepisów acquis w kontekście całego systemu UE. Dla ram normatywnych samorządu istotne znaczenie (obok zasad z konwencji prawa człowieka) ma wolność, demokracja, rządy prawa i poszanowanie praw człowieka, a także partycypacja społeczna i społeczeństwo obywatelskie, których reguły, podobne w systemach Rady Europy i UE, wspomagane są także orzecznictwem i normami zwyczajowymi.There are customary and treaty norms in the international Self-Government regulations, which may have universal, regional and subregional ranges. Term European Law is not correct (precise), because of existence of several different types and ranges of legal systems, among which there are Council of Europe and the European Union orders. Often specificity of the European Union order (including necessary interpretation in acquis context) is forgotten by authors. Basic frame of international regulations of self-government consists of freedom, democracy, rule of law and human rights protection, as well as citizen’s participation (citizen’s community) and informative society, with similar rules in the EU and the Council of Europe systems, enriched by judicial and customary norms

The Significance of Essential Subjective Attributes in Determining Subjectivity Under International Law

Current approaches to subjectivity do not stress the notion of attributes of international subjectivity. The definitions of subjectivity embrace this category in general terms (concentrating on the implication of rights and obligations directly from international law), granting such status mainly to individual entities. The resultant increase in the number and quality of potential international entities would make international turnover virtually impossible. This would in turn imply granting international subjectivity to concerns and carriers of domestic law, thus obscuring the scope and subjectivity of particular structures. Hence, clear research assumptions are needed as well as efforts to determine what subjectivity is. These are tentatively formulated in this article with the subjective attributes (i.e. the most essential and constituting qualities) emphasised. The range of subject categories is wide (states and their in statu nascendi forms, international organisations, recognised entities other than states and organisations, international bodies and conferences). An analysis of the normative aspect and implementation of international subjectivity makes it possible to exclude entities and persons from having such status

The Establishment and Character of the General Principles of Law and Their Role in the International Public Law (including the Community Law). Introductory Remarks to the Analysis of the Issue

There are few broader studies on the general principles of the law in international legal literature, although they have been known since antiquity and are valued in all legal systems. In the international law they are deemed to be one of the three independent sources of the law. Their specific character, however, makes it that they must be taken into account in the process of establishment and application of international norms, including contracts and customs. The fact that there are no analyses or legal awareness may lead (or even leads) to underestimation of this normative category, which is not right. Even in those studies in which this category is included, their authors do not analyse the way in which the general principles of the law were established, their character, their role and procedures of application in legal systems, nor their mutual relations with the norms resulting from other sources. Concrete rules tat belong to the category of the general principles of the law are part of legal systems in the process of juridical practice at the moment when application is deemed to be a legal duty. Therefore this process is close to the creation of a customary law, although the contribution of a legal analysis (reflection) is considerable. In so far as the internal systems of rationalism and the principles of legal logic automatically make us apply the general principles of the law, similar mechanisms do not always function (automatically) in the international public law. The more so that particular subjects attempt to interpret legal norms according to their own interests, even though it would violate their material contents. Now considering the general principles of the law from the quantitative point of view, we state that most of them have a procedural meaning, and the material norms are relatively few. In the international public law (despite some procedural principles), however, there dominate, in terms of their quantity and contents, material principles. The range of application and the role of this category in both systems are similar, whereas applying this category in the development of the communal law is very common. First in the communal law, then in acquis communautaire, they played and still play important material, formal, and structural roles. The Tribunal of Justice judicature has contributed significantly to the development of those principles. It confirmed the high rank of the general principles of the law within the system of the European Communities, and their interactive character. The Constitution for Europe introduces a new, different from acquis, legal system. Did they play a role here? If so, which a role did they play? Speaking in general terms, one should state that the general principles of the law always make up the foundation of any system in the developmental (creative), functional, relative, and interactive sense. Therefore each legal system, if it is to fulfil some basic requirements (to be logical, non-contradictory, and complete), should not only contain the general principles of the law, but also confer a respectively high rank on them in the structure of this system

Is the European Union Becoming Hostile to Human Rights?

Po wejściu w życie Traktatu z Lizbony, Unia oraz państwa UE nie respektują stypulowanych w Traktacie norm dotyczących praw człowieka. Można odnieść wrażenie, że przeważa tu wrogie podejście do nowego systemu ochrony praw człowieka, zwłaszcza ze strony dużych państw Unii i jej instytucji. Dowodzić tego może 6 lat zmarnowanych na mało skuteczne przygotowywanie porozumienia z Radą Europy oraz negatywna opinia 2/13 Trybunału Sprawiedliwości UE. Postawę Trybuna-łu można uznać za zaskakującą, zwłaszcza wobec Traktatowego nakazu przystąpienia Unii do EKPC.Upon entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the Union and the EU member states do not respect the stipulated in the Treaty standards concerning human rights. One may get the impression that there prevails a hostile approach to the new system of human rights protection, particularly on the part of big states of the Union and its institutions. This can be proved by the 6 years wasted on ineffective preparation of the agreement with the Council of Europe as well as by the negative opinion 2/13 of the Court of Justice of the EU. The stance of the Court may be considered as surprising, particularly in the face of the Treaty ‘s writ on access of the EU to the ECHR