International aid to southern Europe in the early post-war period: The cases of Greece and Italy

After the Second World War, both Greece and Italy experienced a Left-Right political polarization and a reproduction of earlier patterns of political patronage. Both Italy and Greece received international aid, including emergency relief, interim loans, and Marshall Plan funds. By the beginning of the 1950s, the Italian economy had recovered better from war destruction and had achieved industrial growth faster than Greece. Italy progressed quite rapidly from stabilization to reconstruction, and then on to development, while Greece progressed with reconstruction, but did not achieve stabilization until after the end of the Marshall Plan. Italy and Greece were obviously different with regard to population and market size, but the outcome of the foreign aid they received, differed in the two countries. This paper suggests that the different outcome is explained by historical legacies and conjunctures, as well as series of institutional, cultural, and political factors. Greece underwent a disastrous Nazi occupation (1941-44) and the destructive Civil War (1946-49) of which Italy was spared. The Italian public sector was endowed with state agencies steering economic development, which the Greek public sector lacked until the early 1950s. Italian elections resulted in more stable governments, led by the Christian Democratic Party, which followed their own policy choices, often deviating from the donors' policy preference. This was a pattern absent from the long sequence of unstable and internally fragmented Greek governments. The Italian governing elites relied on a social alliance of middle and upper classes, while in Greece the corresponding classes distrusted the government, and resisted government policies. Finally, an economic culture fostering heavy industrialization, in the context of pragmatist liberal economic policies, was present in Italy, but absent in Greece

Korupcija, antikorupcija i demokracija na Zapadnom Balkanu

The article discusses corruption, anticorruption and democracy in the Western Balkans, with an emphasis on FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and (less so) Serbia. The article does not advance a claim that its conclusions are valid for all West Balkan democracies. The main question is the following: what the political functions of corruption are (beyond its economic functions) and how corruption serves in reproducing the same elites in power. The research presented in the article shows that high-level or grand political corruption in FYR Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, is something larger than a side-benefit of exercising government authority. Such corruption is one of the several means which an elite purposefully uses to stay in power, that was originally attained by winning democratic elections. Furthermore, anticorruption mechanisms are often used with a sole purpose to discredit political opponents, especially those in the opposition. Democracy in the Western Balkans is, thus, distorted in obvious, but also in less obvious ways.U članku se razmatraju korupcija, antikorupcija i demokracija na Zapadnom Balkanu s naglaskom na Makedoniju, Crnu Goru i manjim dijelom na Srbiju. Zaključci članka ne vrijede nužno za sve demokracije Zapadnog Balkana. Glavna istraživačka pitanja su slijedeća: koje su političke funkcije korupcije (pored ekonomskih dobitaka) i kako korupcija služi za reproduciranje istih elita na vlasti. Istraživanje prikazano u članku pokazuje da je korupcija na najvišim razinama vlasti u Makedoniji, Crnoj Gori i Srbiji ipak nešto više nego popratna ekonomska dobit od vršenja vlasti. Takva je korupcija sredstvo koje elite koriste kako bi zadržale vlast koju su izvorno dobile na demokratskim izborima. Nadalje, antikorupcijski mehanizmi se zapravo često koriste kako bi se diskreditirali politički protivnici u opoziciji. Demokracija na Zapadnom Balkanu je tako iskrivljena na očite, ali i na manje očite načine

What Greek political elites think about Europe and the crisis?: an exploratory analysis

In this paper the views of a sample of 74 Greek Members of Parliament (MPs) on European integration and the handling of the economic crisis by the EU are discussed and interpreted. The survey of MPs, which was conducted in 2014, is a replication of a comparable study conducted in 2007. Greek MPs continue to be attached to Europe, but evaluate negatively EU’s institutions’ role during the economic crisis. Overall, three groups of parliamentarians, namely pro-government MPs, parliamentarians self-placed at the centre of the left-right spectrum and more experienced MPs, tended to have more pro-European views and attitudes than MPs of the opposition, left-wing MPs and less experienced MPs. The dominant dimension of conflict for Greek political elites is the issue of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs). The SYRIZA-ANEL government that was formed after the January 2015 elections was not a surprise given the close proximity of these two parties on their stance towards the MoUs and the EU

Greek MPs pro European but weary of European institutions

Syriza, a radical left party critical of the functioning of the EU institutions, won the Greek parliamentary elections of 25 January 2015 and formed a government coalition with the smaller right-wing eurosceptic party of Independent Greeks (ANEL). Does this mean that Greek political elites are hostile to the EU? The answer to this question is obviously affected by the context of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) and loan agreements signed in 2010 and 2012 between Greece and its creditors, when Greece was on the brink of default. The ways in which Greek MPs perceive the EU were the topic of our attitudinal survey research, supported by the Hellenic Observatory, among Greek MPs. Our survey was conducted in April – October 2014 and involved face-to-face interviews with 74 MPs (25 per cent of the total) who were randomly sampled and came from all Greek parties except for the communist party (the KKE traditionally refuses interviews). The survey is topical, as before the elections the Syriza and ANEL parties had taken a strong anti-Memorandum stand which they will try to implement as government partners, while the centre-right New Democracy (ND) and the centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), which were together in power in 2011-2014, had followed pro-Memorandum policies

The crisis in Greece: the semi-rentier state hypothesis

This article offers an alternative explanation of the ‘Greek crisis’ by using the rentier-state theory. Past explanations referred to domestic pitfalls of the Greek economic development or to external constraints such as the incomplete architecture of the Eurozone. Without rejecting these interpretations, we offer a complementary interpretation underlining the facility and large scale with which external funds have flowed into Greece. This pattern was reminiscent of cases of resource-rich countries of the developing world and have created a semi-rentier state. External resources have spread a ‘rentier mentality’ among state actors and a ‘get-rich-quick mentality’ among business entrepreneurs and interest groups. Political decisions were characterised by riskaverse attitudes, while private actors spent their energy in seeking political protection rather than in initiating new enterprises. Three factors that played a significant role in shaping the Greek crisis and continue to plague Greece are foreign loans, EU funds and tax evasion

The Remains of Authoritarianism: Bureaucracy and Civil Society in Post-Authoritarian Greece

The dominant view of Greek civil society is that it is weak compared to the civil societies of other West European countries. At the same time, the Greek bureaucracy is not as strong as its West European counterparts in the sense that the Greek bureaucracy, even after the fall of the colonels' authoritarian regime, cannot resist the incursions of conservative or populist political elites, which, organized around the parties of New Democracy and PASOK respectively, have alternated in power sin..

Through the lens of social constructionism: the development of innovative anti-corruption policies and practices in Bulgaria, Greece and Romania, 2000–2015

The past decade has witnessed two distinct yet interconnected developments in the understanding, policy and practice of corruption studies. On the one hand, corruption has progressively been constructed as a major threat to economic and social development through the use of deceivingly simplistic Western-centric definitions,1 awareness campaigns and international perception-indexes that create the illusion of measuring real levels of corruption. Such developments have recently been criticized by academic observers and activists alike for presenting corruption as a country-specific issue, closely linked to the public sector. On the other hand, and perhaps counterintuitively, anti-corruption efforts have been decontextualized, focusing on generic fixes that typically involve the public sector. This one-size-fits-all approach has not produced impressive results, and has come under attack for ignoring the historical context and function of contemporary states

Outcomes of elective liver surgery worldwide: a global, prospective, multicenter, cross-sectional study

Background: The outcomes of liver surgery worldwide remain unknown. The true population-based outcomes are likely different to those vastly reported that reflect the activity of highly specialized academic centers. The aim of this study was to measure the true worldwide practice of liver surgery and associated outcomes by recruiting from centers across the globe. The geographic distribution of liver surgery activity and complexity was also evaluated to further understand variations in outcomes. Methods: LiverGroup.org was an international, prospective, multicenter, cross-sectional study following the Global Surgery Collaborative Snapshot Research approach with a 3-month prospective, consecutive patient enrollment within January–December 2019. Each patient was followed up for 90 days postoperatively. All patients undergoing liver surgery at their respective centers were eligible for study inclusion. Basic demographics, patient and operation characteristics were collected. Morbidity was recorded according to the Clavien–Dindo Classification of Surgical Complications. Country-based and hospital-based data were collected, including the Human Development Index (HDI). (NCT03768141). Results: A total of 2159 patients were included from six continents. Surgery was performed for cancer in 1785 (83%) patients. Of all patients, 912 (42%) experienced a postoperative complication of any severity, while the major complication rate was 16% (341/2159). The overall 90-day mortality rate after liver surgery was 3.8% (82/2,159). The overall failure to rescue rate was 11% (82/ 722) ranging from 5 to 35% among the higher and lower HDI groups, respectively. Conclusions: This is the first to our knowledge global surgery study specifically designed and conducted for specialized liver surgery. The authors identified failure to rescue as a significant potentially modifiable factor for mortality after liver surgery, mostly related to lower Human Development Index countries. Members of the LiverGroup.org network could now work together to develop quality improvement collaboratives