4 research outputs found
On the power of two-party quantum cryptography
We study quantum protocols among two distrustful parties. Under the
sole assumption of correctness - guaranteeing that honest players
obtain their correct outcomes - we show that every protocol
implementing a non-trivial primitive necessarily leaks information to
a dishonest player. This extends known impossibility results to all
non-trivial primitives. We provide a framework for quantifying this
leakage and argue that leakage is a good measure for the privacy
provided to the players by a given protocol. Our framework also covers
the case where the two players are helped by a trusted third party. We
show that despite the help of a trusted third party, the players
cannot amplify the cryptographic power of any primitive. All our
results hold even against quantum honest-but-curious adversaries who
honestly follow the protocol but purify their actions and apply a
different measurement at the end of the protocol. As concrete
examples, we establish lower bounds on the leakage of standard
universal two-party primitives such as oblivious transfer
Quantum key distribution based on orthogonal states allows secure quantum bit commitment
For more than a decade, it was believed that unconditionally secure quantum
bit commitment (QBC) is impossible. But basing on a previously proposed quantum
key distribution scheme using orthogonal states, here we build a QBC protocol
in which the density matrices of the quantum states encoding the commitment do
not satisfy a crucial condition on which the no-go proofs of QBC are based.
Thus the no-go proofs could be evaded. Our protocol is fault-tolerant and very
feasible with currently available technology. It reopens the venue for other
"post-cold-war" multi-party cryptographic protocols, e.g., quantum bit string
commitment and quantum strong coin tossing with an arbitrarily small bias. This
result also has a strong influence on the Clifton-Bub-Halvorson theorem which
suggests that quantum theory could be characterized in terms of
information-theoretic constraints.Comment: Published version plus an appendix showing how to defeat the
counterfactual attack, more references [76,77,90,118-120] cited, and other
minor change
Oblivious outsourced storage with delegation
In the past few years, outsourcing private data to untrusted servers has become an important challenge. This raises severe questions concerning the security and privacy of the data on the external storage. In this paper we consider a scenario where multiple clients want to share data on a server, while hiding all access patterns. We propose here a first solution to this problem based on Oblivious RAM (ORAM) techniques. Data owners can delegate rights to external new clients enabling them to privately access portions of the outsourced data served by a curious server. Our solution is as efficient as the underlying ORAM constructs and allows for delegated read or write access while ensuring strong guarantees for the privacy of the outsourced data. The server does not learn anything about client access patterns while clients do not learn anything more than what their delegated rights permit