From Repression to Revolt: Thailand's 2020 Protests and the Regional Implications

A democratic revolt erupted in Thailand in summer 2020 against shrinking civic space due to persisting autocracy and COVID-19-related restrictions. At their peak, the youth-led demonstrations attracted almost 100,000 participants whose demands targeted Thailand's most sacred institution: the monarchy. The protests have fanned democratic aspirations in Southeast Asia, prompting many to celebrate the advent of a "Southeast Asian Spring." Before the pandemic, Thailand had already wrestled with a hybrid regime that represses civic space. The regime has weaponised draconian laws to stifle dissent, while unleashing disinformation campaigns to discredit the opposition. With the COVID-19 outbreak, opportunities for mass mobilisation have arisen. Despite the regime's effective containment of the pandemic, its poor economic management and an absent monarch have fostered grievances conducive to mass protest. From July to December 2020, diverse civic networks staged the largest and longest protests since the 2014 coup. Protesters drew on various tactical innovations to push back against regime repression and voice democratic demands, including monarchy reform. Thailand's protests have become a regional sensation by inspiring similar pro-democracy struggles in Laos, the Philippines, Indonesia, and recently Myanmar. These protests largely responded to regime threats to civil society. Despite this regional spillover precipitating democratic optimism, Southeast Asian autocratic regimes remain resilient. Whether regional democratisation can transpire partly depends on civil societies' strategic breakthroughs. As Thailand is a test case for pushback against a trend of shrinking civic space in Southeast Asia, European policymakers, aid agencies and political foundations can play a role in fostering a grassroots network of regional solidarity. They can work with emerging pan-Asian democratic alliances in order to strengthen necessary infrastructures and foster coordination across groups. For this support to be discreet, capacity-building activities that focus on knowledge exchange, networking, and collaboration could be less politically charged - thus avoiding regime allegation of "Western meddling.

Manipulating Civic Space: Cyber Trolling in Thailand and the Philippines

In Thailand and the Philippines cyber bullies targeting internationally supported civil society groups contribute to the global trend of shrinking civic space by manipulating social media content to mobilise public disap­proval of dissent. One effective tactic is to label internationally endorsed civic groups as Western agents and thereby traitors. Thailand's incumbent military regime has systematically devised methods to suppress dissent, while the Philippines' illiberally inclined government has diminished civic space. Social media is a crucial tool for both governments to quell critics. "Cyber troops" are organised by the Thai state and even private traditionalist citizens. In the Philippines, "keyboard armies" tend to be President Duterte's supporters and are in some cases allegedly paid. These actors promulgate pro-government messages, surveil and report civic defiance to the authorities, bully and threaten critics online, and orchestrate offline harassment campaigns. Cyber troops effectively use "patriotic trolling" to highlight the international funding of civil society groups, which they claim is proof of their serving the interests of the "West" and their treason. The nationalist undertone often sparks national outrage, justifying the government to curb advocacy for democracy and rights. Cyber bullying is a symptom of increasingly polarised societies and should be situated in a broader political context. The Thai and Philippine governments manipulate cyber space to consolidate their power while exacerbating social divide. To tackle the global trend of shrinking civic space, European policymakers, aid agencies, and political foundations must take two measures. First, to combat attempts to label civil society as an exogenous threat to national integrity, efforts should be made to vernacularise policy discourses on democracy and human rights so as to generate local legitimacy of civil society. Second, because cyber bullying is also carried out by ordinary citizens against those deemed adversaries, international organisations should play a discrete role in facilitating local initiatives to overcome social divides

Rethinking Civil Resistance in the Face of Rightwing Populism: A Theoretical Inquiry

This paper seeks to examine some theoretical limitations potentially undermining civil resistance campaigns countering rightwing populism, and suggests how we might rethink the politics of nonviolent struggle. It argues that protests against rightwing populism have generally tackled the 'supply side' of populism or populist leaders. However, little attention has been paid to the 'demand side', which explains why constituents vote for populists. Increasing support for populist leaders reflects a collective perception that established political institutions are not living up to the expectations of ordinary people. In response to rightwing populism, civil resistance movements will need to engage two fronts of the struggle. The first is economic inequality perpetuated by a neoliberal order against which rightwing populists claim to defend the 'people'. The second front entails a cultural reconstruction of the notion of the 'people' in response to cultural anxiety that has given ground to populist nativist discourses. This article proposes that both of these tasks require a conceptual reconfiguration of nonviolent resistance regarding power and culture

'A lot of people still love and worship the monarchy': How polarizing frames trigger countermobilization in Thailand

This article examines the interplay between nonviolent movements' use of polarizing issues for mobilization and pro-regime countermobilization. Thailand has been chosen as an explanatory case study because it has a history of political polarization and pro-regime mass mobilization. I focus on polarizing frames that were incorporated into the 2020 nonviolent resistance campaigns, which addressed a taboo subject in the country: the monarchy. In response, the regime applied various forms of repression, including the mobilization of royalists. But the assumption that the regime single-handedly mobilized countermovements is only half of the story. Autonomous elements within countermovements also joined forces when there were sufficient social conditions. By juxtaposing protest event data with an analysis of mobilizing frames (through movements' Twitter hashtags), I shed light on a two-pronged process that underpins the nexus between framing choice and countermobilization: (a) how a movement’s choice for polarizing frames sustains existing ideological and identity-based cleavages, antagonizing segments of society that perceive their collective identity to be under siege and; (b) how these ideological and identity-based cleavages also provide social sources for countermobilization. I conclude by addressing some implications of this framing choice-countermobilization nexus on repression dynamics and suggest how we can rethink the relationship between strategic framing and nonviolent resistance campaigns in divided societies

Articulation of Legitimacy: A Theoretical Note on Confrontational and Nonconfrontational Approaches to Protest Policing

The Weberian notion of states holding the monopoly on violence can be challenged in the light of states dealing with street protests. In established democracies, the police handling of street protests is characterized by the oscillation between confrontational and nonconfrontational approaches. In the United States, the escalated force approach was common up until the 1980s, while in the UK, the government dealt with urban riots heavy-handedly. In the 1990s the negotiated management approach emerged. This research argues that unraveling this oscillation requires understanding of democratic states upholding of their legitimacy. Violent crackdown on protests can undermine governments legitimacy. However, by associating public order violators with threat, democratic states may resort to force against protesters, deriving its legitimacy from the publics paranoid mentality

The 2014 Military Coup in Thailand: Implications for Political Conflicts and Resolution

In 2014, the Thai army staged its thirteenth coup claiming to resolve the decade-long political conflict. This article seeks to analyze conflict resolution efforts by Thailands incumbent military regime and the way in which these efforts actually affect the trajectory of the conflict. Drawing on the Thai case, I argue that the juntas conflict resolution efforts aggravate the conditions conducive to conflict entrapment because: (1) military rule closes down a channel for meaningful dialogue among conflict parties; (2) the armys association with Thailands traditional elites implies the continuation of socio-economic inequality underpinning the current crisis; (3) military rule undermines Thailands development of democratic institutions needed to overcome the ongoing power struggle; and (4) the juntas political partisanship is likely to exacerbate social division in Thailand

Manipulation des zivilgesellschaftlichen Raums: Cybertrolle in Thailand und den Philippinen

In Thailand und den Philippinen trägt Cybermobbing zur Einschränkung des zivilgesellschaftlichen Raums bei. Es richtet sich gegen bestimmte Gruppen der Zivilgesellschaft, die aus dem Ausland unterstützt werden. Damit verstärken diese Länder einen weltweiten Trend, indem sie Inhalte sozialer Netzwerke manipulieren, um abweichende Meinungen in der Öffentlichkeit zu diffamieren. Eine wirksame Taktik ist dabei die Etikettierung international renommierter Gruppen der Zivilgesellschaft als westliche Agenten und somit als Verräter. Das amtierende Militärregime Thailands entwickelt systematisch Methoden zur Unterdrückung von Andersdenkenden, während die Regierung der Philippinen mit ihrer tendenziell restriktiven Haltung den zivilgesellschaftlichen Raum einschränkt. Für beide Regierungen sind die sozialen Netzwerke ein wesentliches Instrument zur Unterdrückung kritischer Stimmen. Der thailändische Staat und selbst konservative Privatpersonen unterhalten "Cybertruppen". In den Philippinen wird Präsident Duterte häufig von "Informationskriegern" unterstützt, von denen manche auch bezahlt werden sollen. Diese Akteure verbreiten regierungsfreundliche Botschaften, spähen zivilen Ungehorsam aus und zeigen entsprechende Äußerungen bei den Behörden an. Sie schikanieren und bedrohen Andersdenkende im Netz und inszenieren Offline-Kampagnen, um sie einzuschüchtern. Als "patriotische Trolle" geißeln Cybertruppen die Finanzierung zivilgesellschaftlicher Gruppen durch das Ausland – in ihren Augen der Beweis dafür, dass sie den Interessen des "Westens" dienten und daher Verräter seien. Der nationalistische Unterton schürt häufig nationale Empörung und liefert damit der Regierung eine Rechtfertigung, das Eintreten für Demokratie und Menschenrechte zu unterdrücken. Cybermobbing ist ein Symptom zunehmend polarisierter Gesellschaften und sollte in einem größeren politischen Kontext betrachtet werden. Die Regierungen Thailands und der Philippinen manipulieren das Internet, um ihre Macht zu konsolidieren. Zugleich verschärfen sie damit die gesellschaftliche Spaltung. Um dem globalen Trend zur Einschränkung des zivilgesellschaftlichen Raums entgegenzuwirken, müssen europäische Politiker, Hilfsorganisationen und politische Stiftungen zwei Maßnahmen ergreifen. Erstens sollten Versuche, die Zivilgesellschaft als Bedrohung der nationalen Integrität durch äußere Mächte darzustellen, bekämpft werden, indem politische Diskurse über Demokratie und Menschenrechte zur Normalität gemacht werden, um die Zivilgesellschaft vor Ort zu legitimieren. Da auch ganz normale Bürger mittels Cybermobbing gegen vermeintliche Gegner vorgehen, sollten zweitens lokale Initiativen, die sich um die Überwindung der sozialen Spaltung bemühen, durch internationale Organisationen diskret unterstützt werden

Global Civic Activism in Flux

Civil society around the world is in flux. New forms of civic activism have taken shape, ranging from protest movements to community-level forums and online campaigns by individual activists.This analysis charts how civic activism is evolving across eight countries:* Brazil* Egypt* India* Kenya* Thailand* Tunisia* Turkey* Ukraine.These case studies reveal crosscutting themes relevant to the future of civil society support:* While there is a global wave of new protests and innovative citizen movements, many civic struggles are increasingly rooted in specific national issues.* New and older forms of civic activism coexist and intertwine in a variety of ways.* Some new activism is highly political and confrontational; some is very practical and pragmatic about trying to circumvent the shortcomings of mainstream politics.* New civic activism includes groups espousing an increasingly wide range of ideological positions.* While the new activism has been effective on some specific issues, it is mostly struggling to hold at bay resurgent authoritarian and illiberal government responses

Thailand's 2020 protests: Dataset

This is the dataset of the 2020 protests in Thailand, produced by Janjira Sombatpoonsiri and Thammachat Kri-akson. Our data sources are the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) and Mob Thailand. Please cite Janjira Sombatpoonsiri and Thammachat Kri-akson, "Thailand's 2020 protests: Dataset", DOI: 10.17632/mpx79kgdbt.1" when referencing this dataset

Thailand's 2020 protests: Dataset

This is the dataset of the 2020 protests in Thailand, produced by Janjira Sombatpoonsiri and Thammachat Kri-akson. Our data sources are the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) and Mob Thailand. Please cite Janjira Sombatpoonsiri and Thammachat Kri-akson, "Thailand's 2020 protests: Dataset", DOI: 10.17632/mpx79kgdbt.1" when referencing this dataset.THIS DATASET IS ARCHIVED AT DANS/EASY, BUT NOT ACCESSIBLE HERE. TO VIEW A LIST OF FILES AND ACCESS THE FILES IN THIS DATASET CLICK ON THE DOI-LINK ABOV