42 research outputs found
Payment choice, image motivation and contributions to charity: evidence from a field experiment
From overt to tacit collusion: Experimental evidence on the adverse effects of corporate leniency programs
The own and social effects of an unexpected income shock: Evidence from the Dutch Postcode Lottery
Payment choice, image motivation and contributions to charity: evidence from a field experiment
Payment choice, image motivation and contributions to charity: evidence from a field experiment
This study uses a door-to-door fundraising field experiment to examine the impact of payment choice on charitable giving. The three treatments are distinguished by whether respondents can donate cash, use their debit card or have both options. Cash donations are anonymous whereas debit card donations are observed by the solicitor. Due to dwindling participation, revenues are significantly lower in the debit-only treatment. In the combined treatment, participation decreases relative to the cash-only treatment. Small donors drop out in particular, which indicates that offering the possibility to donate non-anonymously reduces the reputational payoff of anonymous donations. JEL classification: C93; D64; H41; E42 Keywords: Payment choice, field experiment, image motivatio
Consumer demand with social interactions: a simulation study
How do social interactions affect consumer demand? In this paper, I investigate the effects that different social structures have on social welfare and on the budget shares of various categories of goods. A society is modeled in which households' demand for goods is described by a Linear Expenditure System with Social Interactions (LES-SI). In the context of the LES-SI, I find that social interactions can lead to a considerable reallocation of resources over goods. The differences in effect are small for the different social structures. Optimal taxes and subsidies set by a welfare maximizing social planner are explicitly calculated. Interestingly, the budget share and optimal tax rate of the most conspicuous good do not necessarily increase when the degree of interactions increases. The presence of social interactions does not make the tax and subsidy instrument more effective in terms of the increase in social welfare that can be obtained