Negotiating the global security dilemma: Interpreting Russia’s security agenda

With the proliferation of discussion about global order change in recent years, and accompanying predictions about a greater role for non-Western great powers, or the so-called rising powers, in questions of global governance and security (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Ikenberry and Wright 2008; Young 2010; Schweller 2011; Gu et al. 2008; Drezner 2007; Ikenberry 2008), the field of Security Studies is increasingly acknowledging that it is no longer sufficient to examine questions of global security primarily or exclusively through the experience of the West. There is growing recognition that it is empirically necessary to take into account the positions, views and interests of these nonWestern powers in study of international affairs (Zakaria 2008; Glosny 2009; Kappell 2011; Layne 2009; Whitman 2010; Flemes 2011). In turn, theoretical models and concepts should also take into account the contexts and actors within non-Western contexts (Bilgin 2010). The aim of this chapter is to shed light on the way in which one such non-Western power, Russia, has sought to conceptualize and make sense of the global security agenda in the post-Cold War era. Within the extensive body of literature assessing the directions, interests and priorities of contemporary Russian security policy, a bias for positivist realist perspectives continues to exist (see Wegren 2003; Kanet 2005). Indeed, many scholars have sought to characterize the Putin regime as ideologically promoting a more aggressive and largely anti-Western position in global security matters (Blank 2002). However, the interpretivist framework adopted here departs from existing constructivist literature on Russia’s foreign and security policy, which tends to focus primarily on Russia’s identity politics as the driving factor behind the evolution of Russia’s view of itself and the world (see Neumann 2008; Morozov 2008; Tsygankov 2005, 2007; Lomagin 2007; Kassianova 2001; Hopf 2005; Clunan 2009). Instead, as already outlined in Chapter 1 of the book, rather than focusing primarily on concepts such as language, identity, culture or ideas, the interpretivist perspective used here centres primarily on recapturing actors’ beliefs and meanings within their own contexts, and on investigating the process by which ideas and beliefs evolve across time, through the notion of traditions and dilemmas and the principle of ‘situated agency’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2006; Bevir et al. 2013)

‘The Loud Dissenter and its Cautious Partner' - Russia, China, global governance and humanitarian intervention

The global issue of humanitarian intervention has become more pronounced and complicated in recent years due to increasingly diverging views on addressing security crises between the West on one side and Russia and China on the other. Despite their support for the principles of ‘Responsibility to Protect' (R2P), both Russia and China are wary of Western intervention in internal conflicts after the Cold War and have become increasingly critical of Western-led armed intervention in humanitarian conflicts. Unease in Beijing and Moscow over the multilateral intervention in the 2011 Libyan conflict and their ongoing opposition to Western policies in the Syrian Civil War since 2011 would seem to point to ever more coincidence in their negative views of American and Western intervention policies. A conventional wisdom has thus emerged that there is something akin to a Sino-Russian ‘bloc', with near-identical policies of discouraging armed intervention within state borders under the aegis of humanitarian intervention or the R2P doctrine, signed in 2005 (2005 World Summit). However, closer examination of Russian and Chinese positions on the Libyan and Syrian conflicts, drawing on normative and identity perspectives, reveals significant differences in how both states address intervention in civil conflicts involving human rights emergencies. Indeed, the Libyan and Syrian cases suggest that the distance between the two states on ‘acceptable' policies toward international intervention in civil conflicts may actually be increasing. While Russia has assumed the role of the ‘loud dissenter' in global dialogs on humanitarian intervention, China has opted for the position of a ‘cautious partner

Terrorismus in Russland: von der existenziellen Bedrohung zum Sicherheitsrisiko und einer konzeptionellen Sackgasse

Russlands Krieg gegen den Terrorismus dauert nun schon über einem Jahrzehnt. Wie der Terroranschlag vom 24. Januar 2011 auf dem Flughafen Domodedowo gezeigt hat, ist die Gefahr weiterer Anschläge jedoch nicht so schnell gebannt. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt Russlands Umgang mit dem Terrorismus seit 1999 dar und vertritt die Position, dass die Terrorgefahr, die anfangs als eine existenzielle Bedrohung für den russischen Staat und die Nation dargestellt wurde, in den letzten Jahren zu einem bloßen Sicherheitsrisiko herabgestuft wurde. Da sich die russische Führung bezüglich der Ausrichtung ihrer Strategie zur Terrorismusbekämpfung gegenwärtig allem Anschein nach in einer konzeptionellen Sackgasse befindet, schließt die Autorin mit einer pessimistischen Prognose. Russland wird das Terrorproblem in den nächsten fünf Jahren nicht erfolgreich bewältigen können

Risiken, die sich wirklich ausgezahlt haben könnten? Die Außenpolitik Russlands

2016 ist für die russische Außenpolitik zweifellos ein bemerkenswertes Jahr gewesen, und eines, in dem sich viele der gewagten Schritte ausgezahlt zu haben scheinen. Das Regime Putin hat weiterhin selbstbewusst Gewalt eingesetzt, sowohl konventionelle wie im Falle Syriens und der Ukraine, als auch unkonventionelle oder nichtlineare Maßnahmen, wie bei den Cyber-Angriffen auf die USA. Neben aktiv ausgerichteter außenpolitischer Entscheidungen war 2016 wohl ein Jahr, in dem Russland von vielen anderen internationalen Entwicklungen profitierte. Insbesondere vom Aufschwung populistischer Kräfte im Westen, am markantesten symbolisiert durch den Sieg von Donald Trump bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen in den USA im November. Während wir das Jahr 2017 werden abwarten müssen, um zu sehen, wie diese Ereignisse in praktische Politik umgewandelt werden, hat das Putin-Regime das Jahr 2016 wohl mit einem Hoch abgeschlossen

From an existential threat to a security risk and a conceptual impasse: Terrorism in Russia

ISSN:1863-042

The evolution of Russia's security discourse 2000-2008: state identity, security priorities and Chechnya

This thesis examines the evolution of Russia’s internal and external security perceptions from 2000-2008. Drawing on social constructivist ontology, it argues that the Putin regime’s articulation of security priorities evolved in relation to its reconceptualisation of Russian state identity from a ‘weak’ to a ‘strong’ state. To trace this evolutionary relationship between state identity and security perceptions, official discourse on Chechnya is examined. In this way, Russian narrative constructions of the process of securitisation and desecuritisation of Chechnya, and the role that this discourse played within the articulation of state identity and security priorities are investigated. The thesis suggests that the initial securitisation and subsequent desecuritisation of Chechnya are best understood within the Putin regime’s discursive construction of state building and changing security priorities, rather than as a reflection of shifting material conditions. The thesis concludes that analysis of individual security policies should take into account that the narrative construction of these policies shape, and are shaped by, the multifaceted and evolutionary meta-narratives of Russian state and security identity. Moreover, it is argued that Russian security policy should be studied as a subject in its own right, investigating both internal and external security issues, rather than being subsumed within a broader foreign policy analysis

Russia’s North Caucasus: An Arc of Insecurity

ISSN:2296-024

Afghanistan: Withdrawal and a Regional Solution?

ISSN:2296-024

Russia and the narrative of BRIC

Currently, there is a lot of debate about "rising powers" challenging the existing global status quo. Within this debate, the BRIC thesis and, more recently, the BRIC summit often feature prominently. Although most analysts question whether Russia can be considered a "rising power", Moscow has sought to promote the BRIC summit and thesis as one aspect of its wider attempts to ensure itself a voice in what it deems as a changing global order.ISSN:1863-042