The relationship between money and prices: some historical evidence reconsidered

This article describes a debate about the validity of the quantity theory of money and offers further evidence against it. The evidence is primarily from the North American colonies of Virginia, New York, and Pennsylvania and regards the issue of measuring the money supply. Studies have shown that changes in colonial money and inflation are inconsistent with the quantity theory. Some have argued that those studies measure money wrong: specie belongs in the measure because the colonies were on a fixed exchange rate system with Britain; changes in colonial paper money were offset by specie flows. When specie is counted, the quantity theory stands. This study responds with evidence that the critics are wrong: the colonies had no such fixed exchange rate regime, and movements in the stock of colonial paper currency cannot have been offset by specie flows. ; Reprinted in Quarterly Review, Fall 2002 (v. 26, no. 4)Money theory ; Economic history

James Madison's monetary economics

An analysis of Madison's essay, "Money," and a presentation of a model giving rise to equilibria that mimic general observations about the consequences of government policies like the one Madison describes for limiting inflation.Money ; Money theory ; Debts, Public

Is there a "credit channel" for monetary policy? (commentary)

Monetary policy

The value of inside and outside money: expanded version

We study dynamic economies in which agents may have incentives to hold both privately-issued (a.k.a. inside) and publicly-issued (a.k.a. outside) circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium. Our analysis emphasizes spatial separation and limited communication as frictions that motivate monetary exchange. We isolate conditions under which a combination of inside and outside money does and does not allow the economy to achieve a first-best allocation of resources. We also study the extent to which the use of private circulating liabilities alone, or the use of public circulating liabilities alone, can address the frictions that lead to monetary exchange. We identify conditions under which both types of liabilities are essential to efficiency. However, even when these conditions are satisfied, we show that political economy considerations may lead to a prohibition against private circulating liabilities. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such a prohibition for the determinacy of equilibrium, and for endogenously arising volatility.Money ; Money theory

Intermediaries and payments instruments

We study an economy in which intermediaries have incentives to issue circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium. We show that, with arbitrarily small transactions costs, only the liabilities of intermediaries will circulate, and not those of other private sector agents. Therefore, our model connects intermediation activity with the issuance of payments media, a connection that has not been made in earlier literature. We also describe conditions under which equilibrium outcomes may be volatile when private liabilities circulate. Finally, we use our model to suggest a resolution of the "banknote underissue puzzle" of Cagan (1993).Monetary policy ; Bank notes ; Payment systems

The value of inside and outside money

We study dynamic economies in which agents may have incentives to hold both privately-issued (a.k.a. inside) and publicly-issued (a.k.a. outside) circulating liabilities as part of an equilibrium. Our analysis emphasizes spatial separation and limited communication as frictions that motivate monetary exchange. We isolate conditions under which a combination of inside and outside money does and does not allow the economy to achieve a first-best allocation of resources. We also study the extent to which the use of private circulating liabilities alone, or the use of public circulating liabilities alone, can address the frictions that lead to monetary exchange. We identify conditions under which both types of liabilities are essential to efficiency. However, even when these conditions are satisfied, we show that political economy considerations may lead to a prohibition against private circulating liabilities. Finally, we analyze the consequences of such a prohibition for the determinacy of equilibrium, and for endogenously arising volatility.Money ; Money theory

The sub-optimality of the Friedman rule and the optimum quantity of money

According to the logic of the Friedman rule, the opportunity cost of holding money faced by private agents should equal the social cost of creating additional fiat money. Thus nominal rates of interest should be zero. This logic has been shown to be correct in a number of contexts, with and without various distortions. In practice, however, economies that have confronted very low nominal rates of interest over extended periods have been viewed as performing very poorly rather than as performing very well. Examples include the U.S. during the Great Depression, or Japan during the last decade. Indeed economies experiencing low nominal interest rates have often suffered severe and long-lasting recessions. This observation suggests that the logic of the Friedman rule needs to be reassessed. We consider the possibility that low nominal rates of interest imply that fiat money is a good asset. As a result, agents are induced to hold an excessive amount of savings in the form of money, and a suboptimal amount of savings in other, more productive forms. Hence low nominal interest rates can lead to low rates of investment and, in an endogenous growth model, to low rates of real growth. This is a cost of following the Friedman rule. Benefits of following the Friedman rule include the possibility that banks will provide considerable liquidity, reducing the cost of transactions that require cash. With this trade-off, we describe conditions under which the Friedman rule is and is not optimal. Finally, our model predicts that excessively high rates of inflation, and nominal rates of interest, are detrimental to growth. This implication of the model, which is consistent with observation, in turn implies that there is a nominal rate of interest that maximizes an economy’s real growth rate. We characterize this interest rate, and we describe when it is and is not optimal to drive the nominal rate of interest to its growth maximizing level.

Monetary policy and financial market evolution

Monetary policy ; Financial markets

Private money creation and the Suffolk Banking System

Electronic commerce ; Money

The evolution of cash transactions: some implications for monetary policy

This paper considers the implications of a decreasing demand for cash transactions under several monetary policy regimes. A policy of nominal-interest-rate targeting implies that a secular decline in the volume of cash transactions unambiguously leads to accelerating inflation. A policy of maintaining a fixed composition of government liabilities leads to accelerating (decelerating) inflation if agents have sufficiently high (low) levels of risk aversion. A policy of inflation targeting produces falling nominal and real interest rates, while a policy of fixing the rate of money growth can easily lead to indeterminacy and endogenous oscillation in interest rates.Payment systems ; Monetary policy - United States ; Money