Debt, hedging, and human capital

This paper provides a theory of debt and hedging based on human capital. We distinguish human capital from physical capital in two ways: (1) human capital is inalienable and can exercise a one-sided option to leave the firm, and (2) human capital is not perfectly replaceable. We show that a firm may reach the first best solution while issuing debt or equity to outsiders provided that either the insiders receive a senior claim or that the firm hedges. We then show that, given asymmetric information concerning costs, the only viable solution has the firm issuing debt to outsiders and hedging.

Jump risk, time-varying risk premia, and technical trading profits

In this paper we investigate the recently documented trading profits based on technical trading rules in an asset pricing framework that incorporates jump risk and time-varying risk premia. Following Brock, Lakonishok, and LeBaron (1992), we apply popular technical trading rules to the daily S&P 500 index over a long period of time. Trading profits are examined using bootstrap simulation to address distributional anomalies. We estimate a variety of asset pricing models, including the random walk, autoregressive models, a combined jump diffusion model, and a combined model of jump-diffusion and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity. Technical trading profits are shown to be statistically significant for the pure diffusion models and autoregressive models, yet become less significant when jump risk is incorporated into the model and virtually disappear for an asset pricing model that incorporates both jump risk and time-varying risk premia. The empirical evidence suggests that technical trading profits could be fair compensation for the risk of price discontinuity as well as time-varying risk premia of asset returns. Alternatively, technical trading profits provide a test of specification of asset pricing models; in this vein the evidence provides support for the incorporation of jump risk into asset pricing models.Financial markets ; Prices

Hedging, financing, and investment decisions: a simultaneous equations framework

The purpose of this paper is to empirically investigate the interaction between hedging, financing, and investment decisions. This work is relevant in that theoretical predictions are not necessarily identical to those in the case where only two decisions are being made. We argue that the way in which hedging affects the firms’ financing and investing decisions differs for firms with different growth opportunities. We empirically find that high-growth firms increase their investment, but not their leverage, by hedging. However, we also find that firms with few investment opportunities use derivatives to increase their leverage.

Derivatives and corporate risk management: participation and volume decisions in the insurance industry

In this paper we formulate and test a number of hypotheses regarding insurer participation and volume decisions in derivatives markets. Several specific hypotheses are supported by our analysis. We find evidence consistent with the idea that insurers are motivated to use financial derivatives to hedge the costs of financial distress, interest rate, liquidity, and exchange rate risks. We also find some evidence that insurers use these instruments to hedge embedded options and manage their tax bills. We also find evidence of significant economies of scale in the use of derivatives. Interestingly, we often find that the predetermined variables we employ display opposite signs in the participation and volume regressions. We argue that this result is broadly consistent with the hypothesis that there is also a per unit premium associated with hedging and that, conditional on having risk exposures large enough to warrant participation, firms with a larger appetite for risk will be less willing than average to pay this marginal cost.Corporations - Finance ; Derivative securities ; Financial services industry ; Business enterprises

Derivatives and Corporate Risk Management: Participation and Volume Decisions in the Insurance Industry

The use of derivatives in corporate risk management has grown rapidly in recent years. In this paper, the authors explore the factors that influence the use of financial derivatives in the U.S. insurance industry. Their objective is to investigate the motivations for corporate risk management The authors use regulatory data on individual holdings and transactions in derivative markets. According to modern finance theory, shares of widely held corporations are held by diversified investors who operate in frictionless and complete markets and eliminate non-systematic risk through their portfolio choices. But this theory has been challenged by new hypotheses that take into account market imperfections, information asymmetries and incentive conflicts as motivations for corporate managers to change the risk/return profile of their firm. The authors develop a set of hypotheses regarding the hedging behavior of insurers and perform tests on a sample of life and property-liability insurers to test them. The sample consists of all U.S. life and property-liability insurers reporting to the NAIC. The authors investigate the decision to conduct derivatives transactions and the volume of transactions undertaken. There are two primary theories about the motivations for corporate risk management - maximization of shareholder value and maximization of managerial utility. The authors discuss these theories, the hypotheses they develop from them , and specify variables to test their hypotheses. They posit the following rationales for why corporations may choose to engage in risk management and also specify variables that help them study the use of these rationales by insurance firms: to avoid the costs of financial distress; to hedge part of their investment default/volatility/liquidity risks; to avoid shocks to equity that result in high leverage ratios; to minimize taxes and enhance firm value by reducing the volatility of earnings; to maximize managerial utility. The authors argue that the use of derivatives for speculative purposes in the insurance industry is not common. The authors analyze the decision by insurers to enter the market and their volume of transactions. They use probit analysis to study the participation decision and Tobit analysis along with Cragg's generalization of the Tobit analysis to study volume. The results provide support for the authors' hypothesis that insurers hedge to maximize shareholder value. The analysis provides only weak support for the managerial utility hypothesis. Insurers are motivated to use financial derivatives to reduce the expected costs of financial distress. There is also evidence that insurers use derivatives to hedge asset volatility and exchange rate risks. There is also evidence that there are significant economies of scale in running derivatives operations - only large firms and/or those with higher than average risk exposure find it worthwhile to pay the fixed cost of setting up a derivatives operation. Overall, insurers with higher than average asset risk exposures use derivative securities.