Danaher's Ethical Behaviourism: An Adequate Guide to Assessing the Moral Status of a Robot?

This paper critically assesses John Danaher's 'ethical behaviourism', a theory on how the moral status of robots should be determined. The basic idea of this theory is that a robot's moral status is determined decisively on the basis of its observable behaviour. If it behaves sufficiently similar to some entity that has moral status, such as a human or an animal, then we should ascribe the same moral status to the robot as we do to this human or animal. The paper argues against ethical behaviourism by making four main points. First, it is argued that the strongest version of ethical behaviourism understands the theory as relying on inferences to the best explanation when inferring moral status. Second, as a consequence, ethical behaviourism cannot stick with merely looking at the robot's behaviour, while remaining neutral with regard to the difficult question of which property grounds moral status. Third, not only behavioural evidence ought to play a role in inferring a robot's moral status, but knowledge of the design process of the robot and of its designer's intention ought to be taken into account as well. Fourth, knowledge of a robot's ontology and how that relates to human biology often is epistemically relevant for inferring moral status as well. The paper closes with some concluding observations

Van ICT-ondersteund afvallen tot simulatorbaby's : ethische vragen rond persuasieve technologieën

No abstract

The voluntariness of persuasive technology

The most important ethical question regarding PTs is the voluntariness of changes they bring about. Coercive technologies control its users by application of direct force or credible threat. Manipulative technologies control their users by influencing them in ways of which the users are not aware and cannot control. As a result, both violate the voluntariness condition of the standard definition of PTs. Any voluntariness assessment needs to consider whether there are external controlling influences and whether the user acts intentionally

Persuasive technology, allocation of control, and mobility : an ethical analysis

En el ámbito del derecho civil los temas de patrimonio, propiedad, copropiedad y sucesiones son recurridos cotidianamente en el continuo interactuar humano, claro está, sólo aquellos que tienen cierta preparación profesional en Derecho utilizan dichos términos apropiadamente, y consecuentemente, conocen el entrelazamiento vital entre los mismos. Cualquier persona puede poseer un patrimonio, por ende, será propietario de todo aquello que integre al mismo; sin embargo, con el constante actuar humano la vida es mutable y las situaciones simples se complican, teniendo los legisladores el deber de prever cualquier situación jurídica posible, y es por ello que existe la posibilidad de que sean varios los propietarios de una misma cosa, cuyo resultado es la copropiedad, siendo copropiedad hereditaria por derivar de la muerte del titular del patrimonio y éste se transmita a personas allegadas al de cujus a través de la sucesión. Dentro de la figura jurídica de la sucesión existe el derecho del tanto, mismo que sólo compete a los herederos, los cuales son coherederos y no obstante de ser propietarios de su parte proporcional del patrimonio del de cujus, no pueden transmitir libremente su parte alícuota a un tercero, pues los otros herederos son preferentes para adquirir los derechos hereditarios en venta. El derecho del tanto funciona como una limitante a la propiedad que se adquiere mediante la sucesión. El presente trabajo de tesis consta de cuatro capítulos; el primero se dedica al derecho del tanto en sí; en el segundo se trata la existencia de este derecho en la materia civil; el tercero versa de este derecho de preferencia en las sucesiones michoacanas; y, en el cuarto se desarrolla la insuficiente prevención legislativa civil estatal del derecho del tanto, pretendiéndose traslucidar la necesidad de dar oportunidad, por parte del legislador michoacano, al heredero enajenante para designar a aquel que hará uso del derecho del tanto, en clara amplitud de su derecho de libertad de expresión

Robots in the workplace: a threat to—or opportunity for—meaningful work?

\u3cp\u3eThe concept of meaningful work has recently received increased attention in philosophy and other disciplines. However, the impact of the increasing robotization of the workplace on meaningful work has received very little attention so far. Doing work that is meaningful leads to higher job satisfaction and increased worker well-being, and some argue for a right to access to meaningful work. In this paper, we therefore address the impact of robotization on meaningful work. We do so by identifying five key aspects of meaningful work: pursuing a purpose, social relationships, exercising skills and self-development, self-esteem and recognition, and autonomy. For each aspect, we analyze how the introduction of robots into the workplace may diminish or enhance the meaningfulness of work. We also identify a few ethical issues that emerge from our analysis. We conclude that robotization of the workplace can have both significant negative and positive effects on meaningful work. Our findings about ways in which robotization of the workplace can be a threat or opportunity for meaningful work can serve as the basis for ethical arguments for how to—and how not to—implement robots into workplaces.\u3c/p\u3