The Governance of Agricultural Trade: Perspectives from the 1940's

International Relations/Trade,

ECONOMICS OF TARIFF-RATE QUOTA ADMINISTRATION

The 1996 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture was a step toward free trade. The Agreement lifts bans and quotas on imports, but allows their conversion into tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), which function like quotas. At present, many of the 1,300 TRQs increased market access to imports, but some have preserved pre-Agreement levels of protection. The World Trade Organization's intent as to the administration of TRQs is open to interpretation. This report analyzes seven administrative methods in light of the principle of nondiscrimination. We conclude that auctions are the best way to administer a TRQ. First-come, first-served and license-on-demand methods present a moderate risk of biased trade. State trading organizations and producer groups that directly administer TRQs can also bias trade. Historical allocation is the method most likely to be discriminatory. Two case studies illustrate our conclusion.Tariff-rate quotas, quantitative restrictions, trade barriers, tariffs, International Relations/Trade,

U.S. TRQS FOR PEANUTS, SUGAR, AND TOBACCO: HISTORICAL ALLOCATION AND NONDISCRIMINATION

U.S. peanut, sugar, and tobacco tariff rate quotas (TRQs) are allocated to suppliers on an historical market share basis. Once allocated they become difficult to redistribute to accommodate changes in comparative advantage among suppliers. The distribution of trade departs increasingly from the tariff-equivalent distribution advocated by the WTO principle of nondiscrimination. Article XIII of the GATT regarding the rules for historical allocation is examined and applied to four cases of historical allocation: domestic tobacco quota and TRQs for peanuts, sugar and tobacco. The difference between the law enforcement objective of the WTO and the Pareto optimization objective assumed by economists is stressed throughout.International Relations/Trade,

THE ECONOMICS OF TRQ ADMINISTRATION

International Relations/Trade,

Economic Analysis of Base Acre and Payment Yield Designations Under the 2002 U.S. Farm Act

The 2002 Farm Act provided farmland owners the opportunity to update commodity program base acres and payment yields used for calculating selected program benefits. Findings in this report suggest that farmland owners responded to economic incentives in these decisions, selecting those options for designating base acres that resulted in the greatest expected flow of program payments. Decisions of farmland owners in South Dakota, in upland cotton area, and in the Heartland region support the payment-maximization argument. In general, landowners favored maximizing payments over aligning base acres to current or recent plantings. Farmland owners with high-payment base acres, such as rice and cotton, held on to these base acres and, whenever possible, expanded them. Analogously, landowners with low-payment commodity base acres, such as oats and barley, switched to higher payment commodities whenever possible.base, 2002 Farm Act, direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, production flexibility contract payments, base acres, program yields, Agricultural and Food Policy, Farm Management,

ISSUES IN REFORMING TARIFF-RATE IMPORT QUOTAS IN THE AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE IN THE WTO

Contents: The Economics of Tariff Rate Quotas and the Effects of Trade Liberalization; TRQs and GATT Rules; An Overview of Tariffs, Quotas and Imports Worldwide; TRQs in the European Union; U.S. TRQs for Sugar, Tobacco and Peanuts; Dairy TRQs in the United States; Tariff Rate Quota Implementation and Administration by Developing Countries; Management of Tariff Rate Quotas in Korea and Japan; Tariff Rate Quota Administration in Canadian Agriculture; The Case of Australia and New Zealand Facing TRQs; The 1999 WTO Panel Report on the EU's Common Market Organization for Bananas; AssessmentInternational Relations/Trade,

AGRICULTURAL POLICY REFORM IN THE WTO: THE ROAD AHEAD

Agricultural trade barriers and producer subsidies inflict real costs, both on the countries that use these policies and on their trade partners. Trade barriers lower demand for trade partners' products, domestic subsidies can induce an oversupply of agricultural products which depresses world prices, and export subsidies create increased competition for producers in other countries. Eliminating global agricultural policy distortions would result in an annual world welfare gain of $56 billion. High protection for agricultural commodities in the form of tariffs continues to be the major factor restricting world trade. In 2000, World Trade Organization (WTO) members continued global negotiations on agricultural policy reform. To help policymakers and others realize what is at stake in the global agricultural negotiations, this report quantifies the costs of global agricultural distortions and the potential benefits of their full elimination. It also analyzes the effects on U.S. and world agriculture if only partial reform is achieved in liberalizing tariffs, tariff-rate quotas (limits on imported goods), domestic support, and export subsidies.Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade,

U.S. TRQS FOR PEANUTS, SUGAR, AND TOBACCO: HISTORICAL ALLOCATION AND NONDISCRIMINATION

U.S. peanut, sugar, and tobacco tariff rate quotas (TRQs) are allocated to suppliers on an historical market share basis. Once allocated they become difficult to redistribute to accommodate changes in comparative advantage among suppliers. The distribution of trade departs increasingly from the tariff-equivalent distribution advocated by the WTO principle of nondiscrimination. Article XIII of the GATT regarding the rules for historical allocation is examined and applied to four cases of historical allocation: domestic tobacco quota and TRQs for peanuts, sugar and tobacco. The difference between the law enforcement objective of the WTO and the Pareto optimization objective assumed by economists is stressed throughout