Can A Quantum Field Theory Ontology Help Resolve the Problem of Consciousness?

The hard problem of consciousness arises in most incarnations of present day physicalism. Why should certain physical processes necessarily be accompanied by experience? One possible response is that physicalism itself should be modified in order to accommodate experience: But, modified how? In the present work, we investigate whether an ontology derived from quantum field theory can help resolve the hard problem. We begin with the assumption that experience cannot exist without being accompanied by a subject of experience (SoE). While people well versed in Indian philosophy will not find that statement problematic, it is still controversial in the analytic tradition. Luckily for us, Strawson has elaborately defended the notion of a thin subject—an SoE which exhibits a phenomenal unity with different types of content (sensations, thoughts etc.) occurring during its temporal existence. Next, following Stoljar, we invoke our ignorance of the true physical as the reason for the explanatory gap between present day physical processes (events, properties) and experience. We are therefore permitted to conceive of thin subjects as related to the physical via a new, yet to be elaborated relation. While this is difficult to conceive under most varieties of classical physics, we argue that this may not be the case under certain quantum field theory ontologies. We suggest that the relation binding an SoE to the physical is akin to the relation between a particle and (quantum) field. In quantum field theory, a particle is conceived as a coherent excitation of a field. Under the right set of circumstances, a particle coalesces out of a field and dissipates. We suggest that an SoE can be conceived as akin to a particle—a SelfOn—which coalesces out of physical fields, persists for a brief period of time and then dissipates in a manner similar to the phenomenology of a thin subject. Experiences are physical properties of selfons with the constraint (specified by a similarity metric) that selfons belonging to the same natural kind will have similar experiences. While it is odd at first glance to conceive of subjects of experience as akin to particles, the spatial and temporal unity exhibited by particles as opposed to fields and the expectation that selfons are new kinds of particles, paves the way for cementing this notion. Next, we detail the various no-go theorems in most versions of quantum field theory and discuss their impact on the existence of selfons. Finally, we argue that the time is ripe for a rejuvenated Indian philosophy to begin tackling the three-way relationship between SoEs (which may become equivalent to jivas in certain Indian frameworks), phenomenal content and the physical world. With analytic philosophy still struggling to come to terms with the complex worlds of quantum field theory and with the relative inexperience of the western world in arguing the jiva-world relation, there is a clear and present opportunity for Indian philosophy to make a worldcentric contribution to the hard problem of experience

Ecological Sensibility: Recovering Axel Honneth’s Philosophy of Nature in the Age of Climate Crisis

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Consciousness and relativity: anekāntavāda and its role in Jaina epistemology

Among the numerous intellectual traditions indigenous to South Asia, the Jaina or Jain tradition is distinctive in a number of important ways. Not least among these is its view of consciousness as inherent to all living beings. According to Jain tradition, not only are all living beings possessed of consciousness, but this consciousness is also, in each being, potentially infinite in extent. Indeed, the ultimate soteriological goal of the Jain path, as a spiritual practice, entails the attainment of a unique, absolute awareness (kevala jñāna) in which the practitioner realizes a state of literal omniscience. The attainment of this state is taken, in the Jain tradition, to be an extremely difficult achievement that requires many lifetimes of rigorous ascetic practice. For beings who have not attained this state–the vast majority of beings in the cosmos–consciousness is realized only in a relative way that is dependent upon the amount and type of karma to which a given being is bound. Karma is seen in the Jain tradition as a type of matter that adheres to a living being, or jīva, and obscures the infinite potential inherent in that being, thus giving rise to the great variety of organisms that exist in the world. This Jain understanding of consciousness gives rise to a set of doctrines–the Jain doctrines of relativity–that are among the most important contributions of the Jain tradition to world philosophy. These doctrines–anekāntavāda, nayavāda, and syādvāda–have profound implications for the discourses of interreligious dialogue and religious pluralism. Jain intellectuals of the modern period have begun to explore these implications, as have authors from outside the Jain tradition sympathetic to its approach to truth. This is an approach which affirms the relativity of perspectives but avoids a sceptical relativism that would deny the possibility of ever grasping the truth at all

The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory

In the last decade, Guilio Tononi has developed the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness. IIT postulates that consciousness is equal to integrated information (Φ). The goal of this paper is to show that IIT fails in its stated goal of quantifying consciousness. The paper will challenge the theoretical and empirical arguments in support of IIT. The main theoretical argument for the relevance of integrated information to consciousness is the principle of information exclusion. Yet, no justification is given to support this principle. Tononi claims there is significant empirical support for IIT, but this is called into question by the creation of a trivial theory of consciousness with equal explanatory power. After examining the theoretical and empirical evidence for IIT, arguments from philosophy of mind and epistemology will be examined. Since IIT is not a form of computational functionalism, it is vulnerable to fading/dancing qualia arguments. Finally, the limitations of the phenomenological approach to studying consciousness are examined, and it will be shown that IIT is a theory of protoconsciousness rather than a theory of consciousness