32 research outputs found
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Key regulatory drivers affecting shipments of mixed transuranic waste from Los Alamos National Laboratory to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
A number of key regulatory drivers affect the nature, scope, and timing of Los Alamos National Laboratory`s (LANL`s) plans for mixed transuranic (MTRU) waste shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which are planned to commence as soon as possible following WIPP`s currently anticipated November, 1997 opening date. This paper provides an overview of some of the key drivers at LANL, particularly emphasizing those associated with the hazardous waste component of LANL`s MTRU waste (MTRU, like any mixed waste, contains both a radioactive and a hazardous waste component). The key drivers discussed here derive from the federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and its amendments, including the Federal Facility Compliance Act (FFCAU), and from the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (NMHWA). These statutory provisions are enforced through three major mechanisms: facility RCRA permits; the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, set forth in the New Mexico Administrative Code, Title 20, Chapter 4, Part 1: and compliance orders issued to enforce these requirements. General requirements in all three categories will apply to MTRU waste management and characterization activities at both WIPP and LANL. In addition, LANL is subject to facility-specific requirements in its RCRA hazardous waste facility permit, permit conditions as currently proposed in RCRA Part B permit applications presently being reviewed by the New Mexico Environment Department (NNED), and facility-specific compliance orders related to MTRU waste management. Likewise, permitting and compliance-related requirements specific to WIPP indirectly affect LANL`s characterization, packaging, record-keeping, and transportation requirements for MTRU waste. LANL must comply with this evolving set of regulatory requirements to begin shipments of MTRU waste to WIPP in a timely fashion
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Los Alamos National Laboratory's Sister Laboratory Collaborations on Low and Intermediate Level Radioactive Waste Management
The DOE/National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) ''Sister Laboratory'' program allows for bilateral technical cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing nations. The program establishes a direct line of communication between U.S. scientists and the nuclear research and scientific communities in participating countries
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AN APPROACH FOR ENHANCING NUCLEAR MATERIALS TRACKING AND REPORTING IN WASTE
Recent policy from the Department of Energy/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has identified the need to report nuclear materials in waste in a manner that is consistent with the Department of Energy's Nuclear Materials Information System (NMIS), which uses Form 471 as its official record. NMIS is used to track nuclear material inventories while they are subject to safeguards. This requirement necessitates the reevaluation of existing business practices that are used to track and report these nuclear materials. This paper provides a methodology for applying a systems approach to the evaluation of the flow of nuclear waste materials from a generating facility through to permanent disposal. This methodology can be used to integrate existing systems and leverage data already gathered that support both the waste reporting requirements and the NMIS requirements. In order to consider an active waste reporting system that covers waste management through to final disposal, the requirements for characterization, certification, and transportation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are used as an example. These requirements are found in the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WIPP/WAC) and associated requirement documents. This approach will prevent inconsistencies in reported data and address current and future needs. For example, spent fuel (which the U.S. intends to dispose of as high-level waste) has not been viewed as particularly attractive in terms of proliferation in comparison to materials associated with other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, collecting high-level waste (or some types of defense waste) in one location where it will be left for hundreds or thousands of years presents proliferation and safeguards issues that need to be considered as part of a systems evaluation. This paper brings together information on domestic and international safeguards practices and considers the current system of documentation used by the U.S. Department of Energy for radioactive waste disposal. The information presented represents current practices, and we recognize that the practices were designed to address different goals. After providing an overview of these areas, some steps that may help develop safeguards systems for geologic repositories in the U.S. context are discussed
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Approach for enhancing nuclear materials tracking and reporting in waste
Recent policy from the Department of Energy/Office of Safeguards and Security (DOE/OSS) has identified the need to report nuclear materials in waste in a manner that is consistent with the Department of Energy's Nuclear Materials Information System (NMIS), which uses Form 471 as its official record. NMIS is used to track nuclear material inventories while they are subject to safeguards. This requirement necessitates the reevaluation of existing business practices that are used to track and report these nuclear materials. This paper provides a methodology for applying a systems approach to the evaluation of the flow of nuclear waste materials from a generating facility through to permanent disposal. This methodology can be used to integrate existing systems and leverage data already gathered that support both the waste reporting requirements and the NMIS requirements. In order to consider an active waste reporting system that covers waste management through to final disposal, the requirements for characterization, certification, and transportation for disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) are used as an example. These requirements are found in the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WIPP/WAC) and associated requirement documents. This approach will prevent inconsistencies in reported data and address current and future needs. For example, spent fuel (which the U.S. intends to dispose of as high-level waste) has not been viewed as particularly attractive in terms of proliferation in comparison to materials associated with other parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. However, collecting high-level waste (or some types of defense waste) in one location where it will be left for hundreds or thousands of years presents proliferation and safeguards issues that need to be considered as part of a systems evaluation. This paper brings together information on domestic and international safeguards practices and considers the current system of documentation used by the U.S. Department of Energy for radioactive waste disposal. The information presented represents current practices, and we recognize that the practices were designed to address different goals. After providing an overview of these areas, some steps that may help develop safeguards systems for geologic repositories in the U.S. context are discussed
Diffusion-driven device for a high-resolution dose-response profiling of combination chemotherapy.
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80500.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access)Combination therapies have proven vital in the fight against HIV and cancer. However, the identification and optimization of such combination therapies is largely experience driven and an activity of clinicians rather than of systematic screening efforts. Here we present a diffusion device, compatible with the format of a 12-well microtiter plate, to create and test all possible mixtures of two substances with only two pipetting steps. Applications to the testing of different drug combinations and the parallel screening of different leukemia cell lines as well as primary patient cells are presented. The diffusion device yields qualitatively and quantitatively comparable results to an MTT viability assay conducted in a standard 96-well format albeit with a tremendous reduction of processing steps. In addition, a fluorescence-based annexin V binding assay of cell death was implemented. Next to the reduction of processing steps, the diffusion device constitutes a considerable assay miniaturization that overcomes the problems typically associated with miniaturization as a consequence of small sample volumes. Given its ease of handling, the device will greatly advance the development and optimization of combination drugs and the identification of optimum drug combinations in personalized medicine