Nietzschean Pragmatism

Nietzsche holds that one should believe what best promotes life, and he also accepts the correspondence theory of truth. I’ll call this conjunction of views Nietzschean pragmatism. This article provides textual evidence for attributing this pragmatist position to Nietzsche and explains how his broader metaethical views led him to it.The following section introduces Nietzschean pragmatism, discussing how Nietzsche expresses it in BGE, and distinguishing it from William James’s pragmatism about truth. The second section explains how Nietzsche’s skepticism about values that can’t be grounded in individual passion attracted him to this kind of pragmatism. The third section explores an early application of Nietzschean..

Scalar consequentialism the right way

The rightness and wrongness of actions fits on a continuous scale. This fits the way we evaluate actions chosen among a diverse range of options, even though English speakers don’t use the words “righter” and “wronger”. I outline and defend a version of scalar consequentialism, according to which rightness is a matter of degree, determined by how good the consequences are. Linguistic resources are available to let us truly describe actions simply as right. Some deontological theories face problems in accounting for degrees of rightness, as they don't invoke continuous parameters among the right-making features of action

Ethical Reductionism

Ethical reductionism is the best version of naturalistic moral realism. Reductionists regard moral properties as identical to properties appearing in successful scientific theories. Nonreductionists, including many of the Cornell Realists, argue that moral properties instead supervene on scientific properties without identity. I respond to two arguments for nonreductionism. First, nonreductionists argue that the multiple realizability of moral properties defeats reductionism. Multiple realizability can be addressed in ethics by identifying moral properties uniquely or disjunctively with properties of the special sciences. Second, nonreductionists argue that irreducible moral properties explain empirical phenomena, just as irreducible special-science properties do. But since irreducible moral properties don't successfully explain additional regularities, they run the risk of being pseudoscientific properties. Reductionism has all the benefits of nonreductionism, while also being more secure against anti-realist objections because of its ontological simplicity

Imagination and Belief

This chapter considers the nature of imagination and belief, exploring how deeply these two states of mind differ. It first addresses a range of cognitive and motivational differences between imagination and belief which suggest that they're fundamentally different states of mind. Then it addresses imaginative immersion, delusions, and the different norms we apply to the two mental states, which some theorists regard as providing support for a more unified picture of imagination and belief

In Defense of Partisanship

This essay explains why partisanship is justified in contemporary America and environments with similar voting systems and coalition structures. It explains how political parties operate, how helping a party succeed can be a goal of genuine ethical significance, and how trusting one party while mistrusting another can be a reliable route to true belief about important political issues

Modified Ninhydrin reagent for the detection of amino acids on TLC plates

Ninhydrin is the most well known spray reagent for identification of amino acids due to its high sensitivity. But, it produces same purple/violet color with all amino acids, except proline and hydroxy proline. A new spray reagent, para bromobenzoic acid has been introduced here which produces distinguishable colors with the amino acids with moderately high sensitivity (0.01-1.0) ?g. A probable mechanism for such color formation has also been proposed

The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality

Christine Korsgaard argues that Humean views of both action and rationality jointly imply the impossibility of irrational action, allowing us only to perform actions that we deem rational. Humeans can answer Korsgaard’s objection if their views of action and rationality measure agents’ actual desires differently. What determines what the agent does are the motivational forces that desires produce in the agent at the moment when she decides to act, as these cause action. What determines what it is rational to do should be the agent’s dispositional desire strengths, as our normative intuitions respond to these

A treatise of humean nature

textA strong version of the Humean theory of motivation (HTM) that includes two theses is defended here. First, desire is necessary for action, and no mental states are necessary for action other than a desire and an appropriate means-end belief. Second, desires can be changed as the conclusion of reasoning only if a desire is among the premises of the reasoning. Those who hold that moral judgments are beliefs with intrinsic motivational force cannot accept HTM, even as a contingent truth, since HTM implies that no beliefs have intrinsic motivational force. Many of them argue that there are cases where HTM fails to explain how we deliberate. The response is to develop a novel account of desire and show that HTM provides superior explanations even in their cases. On this account, desire necessarily motivates action when combined with an appropriate means-end belief. Desire necessarily causes pleasure when our subjective probability of satisfaction increases or when we vividly imagine satisfaction, and likewise causes displeasure when the subjective probability of satisfaction decreases or when we vividly imagine dissatisfaction. It is contingently true that desire directs attention towards things one associates with its object, is made more violent by vivid sensory or imaginative representations of its object, comes in the two flavors of positive desire and aversion, and satisfies the second principle above. This account of desire helps HTM provides superior explanations of deliberation even in the cases that its opponents offer as counterexamples. In response to Darwall’s proposed counterexample to the second principle and some 20th century writers discussing the feeling of obligation, it is shown that Humeans can provide superior explanations of agents’ emotions in their cases. In Searle’s case of akrasia, Scanlon’s case of bracketing, and Schueler’s case of deliberation, it is shown that Humeans can build the structures of deliberation more simply than their opponents can. Against Korsgaard, it is argued that agents cannot choose the aims for which they act.Philosoph

Analysis of n-alkanes in the cuticular wax of leaves of Ficus glomerata Roxb.

Leaf cuticle was covered by epicuticular wax consisting mainly of straight chain aliphatic hydrocarbons with a variety of substituted groups. The studies of cuticular characters of leaves had played an important role in chemotaxonomy. An n-hexane extract of fresh and mature leaves of Ficus glomerata, containing a thin layer of epicuticular waxes was analyzed for the first time by Thin Layer Chromatography, Infrared Spectroscopy, Gas Chromatography and Scanning Electron Microscopy using standard hydrocarbons. The leaves contained 18 identified long chain (C15–C33) n-alkanes except C23 accounting for 68.82% of the hydrocarbons, and an unknown number of unidentified branched chain alkanes. The predominant n-alkanes were C16 (5.92%), C17 (6.18%), C27 (5.11%), C29 (5.29%), C31 (5.47%), whilst C15 (4.21%), C18 (4.57%), C26 (3.88%), C28 (3.53%), C30 (3.43%) n-alkanes were moderately abundant. The C19 (2.53%), C20 (2.52%) and C22 (2.16%) homologues were present only in minor amounts. SEM views were also taken for epicuticular layers and hydrocarbons of the leaves. Qualitative and Quantitative characterization of n-alkanes present in the epicuticular wax can be used as an effective tool in chemotaxonomical work