On the Antitrust Remedies to Promote Retail Innovation in the EU Car Sector

One of the main objectives behind the recent Block Exemption Regulation for the motor vehicle sector is the promotion of innovative retail formats. This article explores the question whether the new competition rules are apt to attain this objective or should have adopted a more restrictive approach towards qualitative selective distribution

Die öffentliche Auftragsvergabe in Italien zwischen Ökonomisierung und Korruptionsbekämpfung

Mit Gesetzesdekret Nr. 163 vom 12. April 2006 hat Italien ein neues Gesetzbuch für öffentliche Aufträge (wörtlich: Gesetzbuch über öffentliche Bau- Dienstleistungs- und Lieferverträge; im Folgenden Vergabegesetzbuch genannt) verabschiedet. Es regelt die Auftragsvergabe oberhalb und unterhalb der EU-Schwellenwerte und setzt die Richtlinien 2004/17/EG und 2004/18/EG in nationales Recht um. Die neuen Regelungen sind seit dem 1. Juli 2006 in Kraft. Im Folgenden wird es darum gehen, eine erste Einsicht in die wichtigsten Regelungen des neuen italienischen Vergabegesetzbuches unter Vorbehalt möglicher, baldigen Änderungen kurz zu gewähren. In Anbetracht sowohl der fortgeschrittenen Harmonisierung des Vergaberechts in der Europäischen Union aber auch der Komplexität der Materie wird hier auf eine ausführliche Darbietung des neuen italienischen Regelwerkes verzichtet. Im Folgenden werden wir uns insbesondere auf diejenige Neuigkeiten beschränken, die aus „fremder Sicht“ möglicherweise interessant sein dürften

Android and Forking Restrictions: On the Hidden Closedness of “Open”

The Google Android Decision was announced by the European Commission on 18 July 2018. The Commission found that three restrictions related to Android and Android apps that Google imposed on mobile device manufacturers and network operators infringed Article 102 TFEU. These restrictions, according to the Commission, “have enabled Google to use Android as a vehicle to cement the dominance of its search engine”. The Android Decision is not yet public. The prohibition of Google’s tying practices on the Android platform has already attracted significant attention by early commentators, also due to the proximity to other high profile antitrust cases. Against the backdrop of the still limited information available, the article proposes some first reflections on another conduct sanctioned by the Android Decision, namely Google’s forking restriction imposed on device manufacturers. In particular, the article describes a possible reasoning underpinning Google’s anti-fragmentation justification based on the economics of two-sided platforms. This justification stems from a purely “transactional view” of platforms. The article concludes that this view is only partially suitable to provide an accurate description of complex innovation ecosystems for the purposes of competition policy enforcement

EU Competition Policy, Vertical Restraints, and Innovation: An Analysis from an Evolutionary Perspective

The EU competition policy in regard to vertical restraints is mainly based upon neoclassical efficiency-oriented reasonings, leading to a neglect of the innovation dimension. This paper analyses to what extent evolutionary theories of competition and innovation economics can be used to derive additional, new criteria for the assessment of vertical restraints. It is shown that Neo- Schumpeterian and Hayekian approaches to competition and innovation economics as well as knowledge-based theories of the firm are capable to provide a basis for a different framework for analysing the impact of vertical agreements. Specific evolutionary arguments, such as subjective and local knowledge, the heterogeneity of knowledge bases of firms, communication and learning problems, and the complementarity of knowledge (systemic innovations) can be used for deriving additional, new assessment criteria for vertical restraints. The analysis is made against the background of the most recent reforms of EU competition rules in regard to vertical restraints. It also shows how evolutionary approaches to competition and innovation might be used for competition policy.European competition policy, vertical restraints, evolutionary economics, innovation economics.

Consultazione di opere digitali: quadro comunitario ed esperienze nazionali

Il Decreto Legislativo n. 68 del 2003 ha implementato nell’ordinamento nazionale l’art. 5, par.3, lett. n della Direttiva UE 2001/29 sul diritto d’autore nella c.d. società dell’informazione in materia di consultazione digitale di opere da terminali situati nei locali di biblioteche, istituti di istruzione, musei o archivi. L’art.71-ter della legge italiana sul diritto d’autore riprende in larga misura il tenore della disposizione comunitaria. Diversamente da quanto accaduto in altri Stati dell’Unione Europea, l’introduzione nell’ordinamento interno di una eccezione al diritto esclusivo dell’autore che agevolasse la c.d. consultazione “on the spot” oppure “on site” non ha incontrato significative difficoltà. In Germania, ad esempio, l’introduzione di una disposizione analoga è stata ritardata da vivaci discussioni coinvolgenti, da una parte, il mondo della ricerca dell’università e, dall’altra, dell’editoria, in particolare scientifica, e fa parte solo del secondo pacchetto di misure di recepimento della Direttiva UE 2001/29, che entrerà in vigore all’inizio del 2008. Lo scopo del mio intervento è delineare, sullo sfondo del quadro normativo comunitario e dello stimolante dibattito tedesco, la reale portata applicativa dell’art.71-ter l.a

All happy families area alike: The EDPS' bridges between competition and privacy

Long before techlash became popular, the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) was holding up a mirror to the EU competition authority. Not only the effectiveness of competition rules’ enforcement in the age of big data was questioned, but the suggestion was made to substantially improve the interaction, i.e. strengthen the family ties, between competition, data protection and consumer protection. The importance of this suggestion was recently acknowledged by the EU Commissioner and Executive Vice-President of the European Commission Margrethe Vestager at a lecture delivered in memorial of the former EDPS Giovanni Buttarelli: “[i]n this time of fast and radical change, all of us have a lot to learn from each other. And if we work together in the spirit that Giovanni Buttarelli showed us, we can achieve his cherished aim – a digital future that works for human beings.” The paper’s main purpose is to take stock of the current state of the interplay between data protection and competition law against the background of the roadmap presciently put forth by the EDPS since 2014. Moreover, in the spirit that Giovanni Buttarelli showed us, it is suggested that new forms of collaborative enforcement should be explored, the workings of the Digital Clearinghouse progressively institutionalised, also at national level, and, most importantly, that a pro-competitive data governance framework should be developed in a cooperative manner. The paper’s main purpose is to take stock of the current state of the interplay between data protection and competition law against the background of the roadmap presciently put forth by the EDPS since 2014. Moreover, in the spirit that Giovanni Buttarelli showed us, it is suggested that new forms of collaborative enforcement should be explored, the workings of the Digital Clearinghouse progressively institutionalised, also at national level, and, most importantly, that a pro-competitive data governance framework should be developed in a cooperative manner

The Incentives Balance Test in the EU Microsoft Case: A More “Economics-Based” Approach?

Microsoft’s claim that it had an objective justification for its refusal to supply interoperability information covered by intellectual property rights was dismissed by the EU Commission. To substantiate this, the Commission applied a newly framed incentives balance test and concluded that the need to protect Microsoft’s incentives to innovate, under the specific circumstances of the case, could not objectively justify the undertaking’s refusal to license. On the contrary, Microsoft’s incentives to innovate were most likely to increase if it were required to license its interoperability information to competitors. This new balancing test is very controversial, both from the economic and legal perspective. It can also be questioned whether the balancing test to justification has been correctly applied in the case at issue. However, the paper purports to show that, for future discussion under the expected policy debate on a more “economics-based” approach to Article 82 of the EU Treaty, valuable insights can be gained from a careful scrutiny of the incentives balance test. In particular, the test helps realizing that a dynamic competition approach on the abuse of dominant position should devote considerable efforts to better understand the working of innovation processes at different industry layers. Moreover, that at least equally challenging is the identification of the appropriate competition remedies in industries characterized by, on the one side, Schumpeterian modes of innovation, and, on the other, strenuous stasis forces like network effects

Dynamic Inefficiencies of Intellectual Property Rights from an Evolutionary/Problem-Solving Perspective: Some Insights on Computer Software and Reverse Engineering

This interdisciplinary paper focuses on an evolutionary and problem-solving approach to intellectual property rights in order to discuss some controversial issues in the European legislation on computer software and in some recent competition law case (e.g. the Microsoft case). Given such claims, we argue that a standard “Coasian” approach to property rights, designed to cope with the externalities of semi public goods may not be appropriate for computer software, as it may decrease both ex-ante incentives to innovation and ex-post efficiency of diffusion. On the other hand the institutional definition of property rights may strongly influence the patterns of technological evolution and division of labour in directions which are not necessarily optimal. Taking the European legislation on computer software and some recent competition law cases as an example, this paper intends to show that a more careful balancing of costs and benefits, both in static and dynamic terms should be suitable for a pro-innovation IP regime and competition policy

EU Competition Policy, Vertical Restraints, and Innovation: An Analysis from an Evolutionary Perspective

The EU competition policy in regard to vertical restraints is mainly based upon neoclassical efficiency-oriented reasonings, leading to a neglect of the innovation dimension. This paper analyses to what extent evolutionary theories of competition and innovation economics can be used to derive additional, new criteria for the assessment of vertical restraints. It is shown that Neo- Schumpeterian and Hayekian approaches to competition and innovation economics as well as knowledge-based theories of the firm are capable to provide a basis for a different framework for analysing the impact of vertical agreements. Specific evolutionary arguments, such as subjective and local knowledge, the heterogeneity of knowledge bases of firms, communication and learning problems, and the complementarity of knowledge (systemic innovations) can be used for deriving additional, new assessment criteria for vertical restraints. The analysis is made against the background of the most recent reforms of EU competition rules in regard to vertical restraints. It also shows how evolutionary approaches to competition and innovation might be used for competition policy

Open access: scelte istituzionali e ruolo del diritto d'autore

Negli ultimi anni si sono moltiplicate le iniziative di enti di ricerca, università, enti erogatori di fondi di ricerca, di promozione del libero accesso ai risultati della ricerca scientifica (c.d. open access). Il contributo propone una breve analisi di tre di quelle politiche istituzionali (National Institutes of Health, Law School dell’Università di Harvard e Istituto Superiore di Sanità), dal diverso grado di vincolatività nei confronti dei ricercatori/autori e, presumibilmente, anche di efficacia. Se la sperimentazione, su scala genuinamente globale, delle politiche istituzionali a favore dell’open access rimane estremamente importante, il contributo termina sostenendo la necessità di un intervento legislativo in tema di diritto d’autore, che promuova un nuovo bilanciamento fra gli interessi di chi sfrutta economicamente le pubblicazioni scientifiche e le esigenze della ricerca