411 research outputs found
Rethinking the Specious Present
In this chapter I argue that despite its current popularity the doctrine of the specious present, or at least every current version of it, should be rejected. I describe two alternative accounts, which deal with experiences of two different kinds of change. The first is what I call the dynamic snapshot theory, which accounts for the way we experience continuous changes such as motion and other motion-like phenomena. The second account deals with the way we experience discontinuous changes, those for which there is no finite rate of change. However I then argue that much of the current debate implicitly presupposes a problematic Cartesian view about the nature of conscious experience. If this view is rejected β as I think it should be β then a different kind of account emerges that avoids commitment both to the specious present and to its main current rival, the cinematic view
Interview with Simon Prosser
(Conducted on 3rd June 2008. Interviewer: Joe Slater)
Commentary : physical time within human time
A Commentary on Physical time within human time by Gruber, R. P., Block, R. A., and Montemayor, C. (2021). Front. Psychol. 13:718505. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.718505 Bridging the neuroscience and physics of time by Buonomano, D., and Rovelli, C. (2021). arXiv. 11. doi: 10.48550/arXiv.2110.01976Publisher PDFPeer reviewe
Locating the contradiction in our understanding of time
I offer some clarification concerning the kind of contradiction that Hoerl & McCormack's account could help explain and the scope of the metaphysical intuitions that could be explained by such a theory. I conclude that we need to know more about the sense in which the temporal reasoning system would represent time as a dimension.PostprintPeer reviewe
The dynamics and communication of concepts
The central claim of this thesis is that concepts, the components from which
cognitively significant truth evaluable content (thought) is composed, are unstructured
entities an account of whose individuation makes no essential reference to other
concepts in the possession of the thinking subject or to any particular means by which
the reference of the concept is identified by the thinking subject. This position is called
Conceptual Atomism and contrasts with Inferential Role Semantics, according to
which concepts are individuated by their inferential roles or their conditions of
warranted application.
The structure of the argument is as follows. Firstly, a principle called the
Transparency Principle is developed. This places constraints on the individuation of
concepts across differing contexts. The Transparency Principle is then used to show
that Inferential Role Semantics is false because it cannot provide a satisfactory account
of cognitive dynamics; that is, of the conditions under which a concept is retained
through changes in the epistemic state of the subject over a period of time. A version
of Conceptual Atomism is then defended and it is shown that this theory yields the
correct individuation of concepts. According to this theory the concepts of an
individual subject are individuated in terms of referential episodes, episodes of
ongoing reference to an object or property during which it is diachronically transparent
to the subject that the same thing is being referred to. The more general notion of a
referential practice is then used to account for the sharing of concepts by more than
one person. Finally, a novel account of the thoughts expressed using indexical terms is
defended in order to show that indexicals present no counterexample to Conceptual
Atomism. This account of indexical thoughts is of some consequence in its own right
Temporal metaphysics in z-land
John Perry has argued that language, thought and experience often contain unarticulated constituents. I argue that this idea holds the key to explaining away the intuitive appeal of the A-theory of time and the endurance theory of persistence. The A-theory has seemed intuitively appealing because the nature of temporal experience makes it natural for us to use one-place predicates like past to deal with what are really two-place relations, one of whose constituents is unarticulated. The endurance view can be treated in a similar way; the temporal boundaries of temporal parts of objects are unarticulated in experience and this makes it seem that the very same entity exists at different times.</p
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