Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games

In attempting to understand cooperation, economists have used the methods of experimental economics to focus on spheres of human behavior in which humans display altruism, reciprocity, or other social preferences through giving and through punishment. Recent work has begun to examine whether allowing allocations in the negative domain, that is, allowing subjects to take (or steal) other subjects' endowments, might affect participants' behavior. If participants' behavior is a affected, then our understanding of experimental results generally, and social preferences specifically, should be affected too (List 2007, Bardsley 2008). In this paper we propose an experimental variation on the Dictator Game with third-party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher 2004b). We examine, first, a basic Dictator Game with third-party punishment, after which we introduce a treatment allowing the dictator to take from the receiver, in the knowledge that the third party could punish them. The results conict. Many dictators choose the most self-interested option, while, when taking is introduced as an option for the dictator, third parties punish the most self-interested option more than in the baseline.Experimental Economics, Social Norms, Punishment, Strong Reciprocity, Social Preferences, Third Party.

Rarer Actions: Giving and Taking in Third-Party Punishment Games

In attempting to understand cooperation, economists have used the methods of experimental economics to focus on spheres of human behavior in which humans display altruism, reciprocity, or other social preferences through giving and through punishment. Recent work has begun to examine whether allowing allocations in the negative domain, that is, allowing subjects to take (or steal) other subjects' endowments, might affect participants' behavior. If participants' behavior is affected, then our understanding of experimental results generally, and social preferences speci cally, should be affected too (List 2007, Bardsley 2008). In this paper we propose an experimental variation on the Dictator Game with third-party punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004b). We examine, first, a basic Dictator Game with third-party punishment, after which we introduce a treatment allowing the dictator to take from the receiver, in the knowledge that the third party could punish them. The results conflict. Many dictators choose the most self-interested option, while, when taking is introduced as an option for the dictator, third parties punish the most self-interested option more than in the baseline.

Adaptive Perturbation Theory: Quantum Mechanics and Field Theory

Adaptive perturbation is a new method for perturbatively computing the eigenvalues and eigenstates of quantum mechanical Hamiltonians that are widely believed not to be solvable by such methods. The novel feature of adaptive perturbation theory is that it decomposes a given Hamiltonian, $H$, into an unperturbed part and a perturbation in a way which extracts the leading non-perturbative behavior of the problem exactly. In this talk I will introduce the method in the context of the pure anharmonic oscillator and then apply it to the case of tunneling between symmetric minima. After that, I will show how this method can be applied to field theory. In that discussion I will show how one can non-perturbatively extract the structure of mass, wavefunction and coupling constantComment: 10 pages, 4 figures, uses psfig.sty. Conference talk Light Cone 2005 -- Cairns This paper is being replaced to add references to previously published work that I became aware of after posting the pape

Data Literacy in Economic Development

In economic development and other economics electives, students regularly encounter economic measures of absolute and relative deprivation, from poverty measures like the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke index to measures of distribution like the Gini index. By “doing economics,” students practice applying economic measurement to real-world data and develop more general data literacy. The author proposes a series of exercises starting with stylized 10-household economies, proceeding to nationally representative cross-sectional surveys using MS Excel or Google Spreadsheets, and culminating in students applying their acquired data literacy to a team project. The data sources are easily tailored to alternative household surveys in low- and middle-income countries that include the required variables. Students learn data literacy through recognizing the properties of rectangular data, visualizing data appropriately, and creating aggregate economic measures

Promoting an Ethical Economics Classroom Through Partnership

In teaching economics, the instructor scaffolds what they teach on an implicitly assumed or explicitly recognized ethical vision. Such a vision holds true even as economists often separate “positive economics” from “normative economics,” claiming positive economics finds its basis in data and theory whereas normative economics concerns the ought or ethical statements that data or theory may imply (Davis, 2016). Economics, furthermore, suffers from lack of diversity: from white men constituting the majority of researchers and teachers, to textbooks that fail to show the diverse range of real people participating in the economy (Aerni, Bartlett, Lewis, McGoldrick, & Shackelford, 1999). In contrast, students taking economics at the undergraduate level, and particularly at Smith College, a liberal arts college in Massachusetts where I teach as an assistant professor, are especially diverse. I believe, therefore, that the choices about what an instructor teaches in a course and how that instructor does so are ethical choices in teaching. These choices cohere around an instructor’s pre-analytic vision of what a course ought to achieve, how the instructor models for students what constitutes good economics, or how diverse voices improve economics (Schumpeter, 2006/1954)

Intersections : a collection of poetry

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Shadow writing and participant observation : a study of criminal justice social work around sentencing

The study of decision-making by public officials in administrative settings has been a mainstay of law and society scholarship for decades. The methodological challenges posed by this research agenda are well understood: how can socio-legal researchers get inside the heads of legal decision-makers in order to understand the uses of official discretion? This article describes an ethnographic technique the authors developed to help them penetrate the decision-making practices of criminal justice social workers in writing pre-sentence reports for the courts. This technique, called `shadow writing', involved a particular form of participant observation whereby the researcher mimicked the process of report writing in parallel with the social workers. By comparing these `shadow reports' with the real reports in a training-like setting, the social workers revealed in detail the subtleties of their communicative strategies embedded in particular reports and their sensibilities about report writing more generally

Assisting and advising the sentencing decision process : the pursuit of 'quality' in pre-sentence reports

Pre-sentence reports are an increasingly prevalent feature of the sentencing process. Yet, although judges have been surveyed about their general views, we know relatively little about how such reports are read and interpreted by judges considering sentence in specific cases, and, in particular, how these judicial interpretations compare with the intentions of the writers of those same reports. This article summarizes some of the main findings of a four-year qualitative study in Scotland examining: how reports are constructed by report writers; what the writers aim to convey to the sentencing judge; and how those same reports are then interpreted and used in deciding sentence. Policy development has been predicated on the view that higher-quality reports will help to 'sell' community penalties to the principal consumers of such reports (judges). This research suggests that, in the daily use and interpretation of reports, this quality-led policy agenda is defeated by a discourse of judicial 'ownership' of sentencing

Reciprocity through ratings: An experimental study of bias in evaluations

This paper studies the potential for ratings of seller quality to be influenced by side payments to raters. In a laboratory setting, we find that even modest side payments from sellers to raters have large effects, with the type of rating (favorable or unfavorable) given to a seller determined primarily by how large a monetary transfer the seller makes to the rater. Our results demonstrate that side payments can crowd out a rater’s concern for buyers, even in situations where there is no potential for long-term relationship building

Law in everyday life and death: a socio-legal study of chronic disorders of consciousness

This paper addresses, from a socio-legal perspective, the question of the significance of law for the treatment, care and the end-of-life decision making for patients with chronic disorders of consciousness. We use the phrase ‘chronic disorders of consciousness’ as an umbrella term to refer to severely brain-injured patients in prolonged comas, vegetative or minimally conscious states. Based on an analysis of interviews with family members of patients with chronic disorders of consciousness, we explore the images of law that were drawn upon and invoked by these family members when negotiating the situation of their relatives, including, in some cases, the ending of their lives. By examining ‘legal consciousness’ in this way (an admittedly confusing term in the context of this study,) we offer a distinctly sociological contribution to the question of how law matters in this particular domain of social life