Perceptions of Healthcare, Health Status, and Discrimination Among African-American Veterans

The Institute of Medicine identified access to healthcare and race-based discrimination as important barriers to quality healthcare that contributes to health disparities. This study (1) describes African-American veterans’ perceptions of healthcare services and perceived discrimination in healthcare and (2) investigates the relationship between perceived discrimination and patient perceptions of care, satisfaction with healthcare, and health status. A convenience sample of 141 African-American veterans in Boston completed surveys from May to June 2006. Respondents reported an average of 16 lifetime experiences of discrimination and over half recalled a situation when they experienced discrimination in healthcare. Modest ratings of perceived quality of care, and satisfaction with healthcare reflect areas for improvement. Perceived healthcare discrimination was negatively and significantly associated with satisfaction (p\u3c0.001), perceived quality of care (p\u3c0.01), and physical functioning (p\u3c0.05). Policies eliminating discrimination in healthcare are needed to improve patient satisfaction, quality of care, and health outcomes of African- American veterans

Monitoring your Friends, not your Foes: Strategic Ignorance and the Delegation of Real Authority

In this laboratory experiment we study the use of strategic ignorance to delegate real authority within a firm. A worker can gather information on investment projects, while a manager makes the implementation decision. The manager can monitor the worker. This allows her to better exploit the information gathered by the worker, but also reduces the worker's incentives to gather information in the first place. Both effects of monitoring are influenced by the interest alignment between manager and worker. Our data confirms the theoretical predictions that optimal monitoring depends non-monotonically on the level of interest alignment. We also find evidence for hidden costs of control and preferences for control, but these have no substantial effects on organizational outcomes.delegation, real authority, strategic ignorance

Does Electoral Competition create Incentives for Political Parties to collect Information about the Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies?

A well-known rationale for representative democracy is that direct democracy leads to a free-rider problem as to the collection of information. A problem with this rationale is that it takes for granted that representatives collect information. In this paper we examine whether or not electoral competition induces political parties or candidates to collect information about policy consequences. We show that the answer to this question depends on the cost of information collection. More surprisingly, we find that endogenizing information may lead to divergence of policy platforms

A Simple Model of Self-Assessments

We develop a simple model that describes individuals' self-assessments of their abilities. We assume that individuals learn about their abilities from appraisals of others and experience. Our model predicts that if communication is imperfect, then (i) appraisals of others tend to be too positive, and (ii) overconfidence leading to too much activism is more likely than underconfidence leading to too much passivity. The predictions of our model are consistent with findings in the social psychological literature

Polarization, Information Collection and Electoral Control

We identify the conditions under which voters can induce political parties to collect information and to select policies which are optimal from the representative voter's point of view. We show that when parties are office motivated the voting rule should encourage parties to collect information. Voting rules that focus on the opposition party sometimes dominate voting rules that focus on the incumbent party. When parties are policy motivated, parties have also to be motivated to select good policies. Generally, it is easier to stimulate policy motivated parties to collect information than office motivated parties. However, in contrast to office motivated parties, policy motivated parties will sometimes select policies that conflict with the representative voter's interest

Building Safe Community Spaces for Immigrant Families, one Library at a Time

In today’s political climate, supporting the needs of young children from Latinx immigrant families has become increasingly difficult at the community, institutional, state, and federal levels. This essay is about a group of Latinx families who participated in an innovative early literacy program at a county public library branch in the migration setting of the U.S. Southeast known as the New Latino Diaspora (Hamann, Wortham, Murillo, 2015). We describe the program and its role in building a safe and welcoming environment for Latinx students and their families. We include the voices of the librarian and parents who had never before participated in a family literacy series for Spanish-speaking immigrants. We conclude with a discussion about factors that foster an inclusive community space for educational experiences

Disciplining and Screening Top Executives

Boards of directors face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives' behaviour, and only infrequently have information about the success or failure of initiated strategies, reorganizations, mergers etc. We analyse the nature of (implicit) retention contracts boards use to discipline and screen executives. Consistent with empirical observation, we find that executives may become overly active to show their credentials; that the link between bad performance and dismissal is weak; and that boards occasionally dismiss competent executives

In Defense of Boards

It is often assumed that bad corporate performance means a bad CEO. The task of a board of directors is then simple: dismiss the executive. If it fails to do so, the board is said to be indolent. We take a kinder approach to observed board behaviour and point to the problems even well-intended boards would encounter. They face the twin task of disciplining and screening executives. To perform these tasks directors do not have detailed information about executives behaviour, and only infrequently hav