Lessons learned from the first round of applications by carbon-offsetting programs for eligibility under CORSIA

In 2016, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted the Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA). The scheme requires participating airline operators to purchase carbon offset credits to compensate for the increase in their carbon dioxide emissions from international flights above 2019/2020 levels. This paper synthesizes key lessons learned from an assessment of the first 14 applications of carbon-offsetting programs for eligibility under CORSIA, focussing on five out of eight eligibility criteria established by ICAO. The evaluation shows that the degree to which the applicants satisfy the ICAO requirements differs substantially. Some applicants hardly meet any of the requirements and may not even be considered carbon-offsetting programs. However, there are also notable differences in relation to specific criteria. With regard to ensuring additionality and establishing baselines, key shortcomings are that many programmes apply approaches that do not guarantee environmental integrity of the generated credits. Not all programs regularly reassess whether their approaches are still appropriate in the light of new circumstances, such as lower costs of renewable energy technologies, and programs may still need to update their approaches for assessing additionality and establishing baselines in the light of the new context of the Paris Agreement. Some programs also do not require an independent third-party assessment of baseline methodologies. Most programs do not yet have procedures in place or planned for avoiding double counting between CORSIA and nationally determined contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement. However, a few programs are in the process of implementing detailed procedures, based on voluntary Guidelines developed by a multistakeholder group. To address non-permanence, most programs use "buffer" approaches. The duration for which non-permanence is ensured, the avoidance of moral hazard risks of intentional reversals, and the "capitalization" of buffers vary considerably among programs. The Clean Development Mechanism's provisions to address non-permanence were in principle robust but do no longer work, given that the Kyoto Protocol will not have a third commitment period. Lastly, only two programs have a process in place which requires the assessment of environmental and social risks, the adoption of safeguards, and the monitoring and reporting on risks. The paper also identifies several cross-cutting issues. First, we recommend that ICAO only approve programs as eligible for CORSIA once programs have amended their standards and procedures to fulfil all criteria. Second, the evaluation identified that ICAO still needs to clarify several matters that are not explicitly addressed in current criteria, such as what global warming potentials programs should use to convert non-CO2 emissions into CO2 equivalents; whether offset credits will be eligible if the host country does not participate in the Paris Agreement; with what type of international mitigation targets double counting must be avoided; and the treatment of emission reductions not covered by NDCs. Clear international rules on these matters would greatly facilitate the approval of programs and the implementation of CORSIA. Third, we recommend that ICAO adopts a transparent procedure for the initial approval, ongoing supervision, re-approval, suspension and termination of eligibility of programs. This procedure could also address the insufficient level of information in current applications, by requiring programs to provide more detailed information. Lastly, we recommend that the Parties to the Paris Agreement include specific provisions in the international rules on Article 6 for how countries should account for offset credits used under CORSIA

Translation and validation of the Dutch version of the Effective Consumer Scale (EC-17)

PURPOSE: The Effective Consumer Scale (EC-17) measures the skills of musculoskeletal patients in managing their own healthcare. The objectives of this study were to translate the EC-17 into Dutch and to further evaluate its psychometric properties. METHODS: The EC-17 was translated and cognitively pretested following cross-cultural adaptation guidelines. Two hundred and thirty-eight outpatients (52 % response rate) with osteoarthritis or fibromyalgia completed the EC-17 along with other validated measures. Three weeks later, 101 patients completed the EC-17 again. RESULTS: Confirmatory factor analysis supported the unidimensional structure of the scale. The items adequately fit the Rasch model and only one item demonstrated differential item functioning. Person reliability was high (0.92), but item difficulty levels tended to cluster around the middle of the scale, and measurement precision was highest for moderate and lower levels of skills. The scale demonstrated adequate test-retest reliability (ICC = 0.71), and correlations with other measures were largely as expected. CONCLUSION: The results supported the validity and reliability of the Dutch version of the EC-17, but suggest that the scale is best targeted at patients with relatively low levels of skills. Future studies should further examine its sensitivity to change in a clinical trial specifically aimed at improving effective consumer skills

What makes an ideal global stocktake? : A functional analysis ; discussion paper

Many hope that the Global Stocktake under the Paris Agreement can become a catalyst for increased mitigation ambition over time. Based on different theories of change, this paper outlines four governance functions for the Global Stocktake. It can contribute to the Paris Agreement as a pacemaker (stimulating and synchronizing policy processes across governance levels), by ensuring accountability of Parties, by enhancing ambition through benchmarks for action and transformative learning, and by reiterating and refining the guidance and signal provided from the Paris Agreement. The paper further outlines process- and information-related preconditions that would enable an ideal Global Stocktake

Success factors for the global stocktake under the Paris Agreement

While the Paris Agreement (PA) has enshrined ambitious long-term objectives, the current level of action of the Parties to the Agreement falls far short of this ambition, as is recognised in the very COP decision adopting the Agreement. The Global Stocktake (GST) established in Art. 14 of the PA is a key element to address this problem. Its purpose is to review the implementation of the PA and to assess the progress made towards the collectively agreed goals. The aim of this report is to develop recommendations on how to maximise the potential impact of the GST. The report starts from a perspective of what the GST could ideally do, irrespective of decisions already taken under the UNFCCC and other political constraints. In the second step, the report takes these limitations into account and suggests ways for how to nonetheless work towards the desired outcome

Catalyzing mitigation ambition under the Paris agreement : elements for an effective global stocktake

The Global Stocktake (GST) takes a central role within the architecture of the Paris Agreement, with many hoping that it will become a catalyst for increased mitigation ambition. This paper outlines four governance functions for an ideal GST: pacemaker, ensurer of accountability, driver of ambition and provider of guidance and signal. The GST can set the pace of progress by stimulating and synchronizing policy processes across governance levels. It can ensure accountability of Parties through transparency and public information sharing. Ambition can be enhanced through benchmarks for action and transformative learning. By reiterating and refining the long term visions, it can echo and amplify the guidance and signal provided by the Paris Agreement. The paper further outlines preconditions for the effective performance of these functions. Process-related conditions include: a public appraisal of inputs; a facilitative format that can develop specific recommendations; high-level endorsement to amplify the message and effectively inform national climate policy agendas; and an appropriate schedule, especially with respect to the transparency framework. Underlying information provided by Parties complemented with other (scientific) sources needs to enable benchmark setting for collective climate action, to allow for transparent assessments of the state of emissions and progress of a low-carbon transformation. The information also needs to be politically relevant and concrete enough to trigger enhancement of ambition. We conclude that meeting these conditions would enable an ideal GST and maximize its catalytic effect

How can the new climate agreement support robust national mitigation targets? : Opportunities up to Paris and beyond

This report is a synthesis of the research and re-evaluates the options previously considered in this project (Vieweg et al (2014)) in the light of the negotiation process up to today. The mitigation-related design elements considered are: Participation and differentiation of countries; Types of commitments, including also the compulsory character of the commitments and time aspects; Guidance on ambition of the commitments to assure adequacy of global and individual countries' efforts; Transparency of commitments

The challenges of assessing "collective progress" : design options for an effective global stocktake process under the UNFCCC ; final report

The Paris Agreement combines collective goals with individual countries' contributions. This hybrid approach does not guarantee that the individual contributions add up to what is required to meet the collective goals. The Paris Agreement therefore established the Global Stocktake. Its task is to "assess collective progress" towards achieving the long-term goals of the agreement as of 2023 and every five years thereafter. Corresponding to this role, this report addresses three questions: What should an effective Global Stocktake look like? What information and data are needed? Is it possible to execute an effective Global Stocktake within the mandate of the Paris Agreement